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Abstract
This paper develops a tractable version of a two-sector open economy model with
search frictions to disentangle the implications of workers’ mobility costs and labor
market institutions following higher relative productivity of tradables. Using a panel
of eighteen OECD countries, our estimates show that higher productivity in tradables
relative to non tradables causes a decline in non traded relative to traded wages. The
fall in the relative wage reveals the presence of labor mobility costs which mitigate the
appreciation in the relative price of non tradables and lower the relative unemployment
rate of tradables following higher relative productivity of tradables. Whilst our evi-
dence suggests that such responses have increased over time as the result of decreasing
labor mobility costs, our estimates also reveal that the magnitude of the effects vary
considerably across countries. Using a set of indicators capturing the heterogeneity of
labor market frictions across economies, we find that both the relative wage and the
relative unemployment rate of tradables decline significantly more and the relative price
appreciates less in countries where labor market regulation is more pronounced. We
show that these empirical findings can be rationalized in a two-sector open economy
model with search in the labor market as long as we allow for an endogenous sectoral
labor force participation decision. When we calibrate the model to country-specific
data, numerical results reveal that the responses of the relative wage, the relative price,
and to a lesser extent the relative unemployment rate display a wide dispersion across
countries. Importantly, all variables display a significant negative relationship with la-
bor market regulation.
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1 Introduction
According to the conventional wisdom, trade liberalization and productivity shocks biased
toward the traded sector should be followed by intersectoral labor shifts. Labor reallocation
would in turn gradually arbitrage away spatial and sectoral differences in wages. However,
empirical findings cast doubt over the assumption of perfect labor mobility. Wacziarg and
Wallack [2004] find that trade liberalization leads to little or no inter-industry worker reallo-
cation, thus suggesting large switching costs across sectors. Only recently have researchers
begun measuring mobility costs across sectors or regions. Adopting a structural empirical
approach, Artuc¸ et al. [2010], Dix-Carneiro [2014], Dix-Carneiro and Kovak [2017], Lee
and Wolpin [2006] find substantial barriers of mobility and furthermore that wages are not
equalized across sectors or regions neither in the short run nor in the long run. Despite
the significance of limited labor mobility across sectors, only very few attempts have been
made to investigate the consequences of technology shocks when workers experience costs
of switching sectors. This analysis is all the more relevant that traded industries experience
much larger productivity gains than non traded industries, thus leading to labor realloca-
tion between sectors. While workers’ mobility costs may hamper labor movements across
sectors, labor market institutions which vary across countries also influence the shifts of
employment and thus the sectoral output adjustment to technology shocks.
This paper proposes to disentangle quantitatively the implications of workers’ mobility
costs and labor market institutions for the relative price and the relative wage of non trad-
ables responses to technology shocks biased toward the traded sector. While labor mobility
costs are key to producing a sectoral wage differential in the long-run and mitigating the
appreciation in the relative price, international differences in labor market regulation can
account for the dispersion in sectoral wage and sectoral price differences across countries.
The advantage to work on relative wage and relative price effects is that their movements
estimated empirically can reveal the presence of labor market frictions.1 Because such fric-
tions in the labor market imply that hiring in the traded and non traded sector occurs at
uneven paces, a key contribution of our paper is to show that higher relative productivity
of tradables lowers the unemployment rate differential between tradables and non tradables
in the long-run.
To set the stage of the quantitative analysis, we first assess empirically the effects of
higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables on both the relative wage and the
relative price of non tradables. Our estimates reveal that a productivity differential between
tradables and non tradables by 1% lowers the relative wage by 0.22% and appreciates the
1The open economy version of the neoclassical model abstracting from labor market frictions predicts
that the relative wage is unaffected while the relative price of non tradables appreciates by the same amount
as the productivity differential, see e.g., Canzoneri et al. [1999], Kakkar [2003]. Contrasting empirically
estimated effects on the relative wage and relative price with the baseline model’s predictions allows us to
gauge the presence of labor mobility costs whereas working on relative quantities could not give us such an
information.
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relative price by 0.64% for the whole sample. The long-run decline in the relative wage
suggests the presence of labor market frictions preventing wage equalization across sectors.
Such frictions can also rationalize the relative price appreciation which is less than that
predicted by the standard neoclassical model abstracting from labor market frictions. A
way to gauge the role of labor mobility costs is to investigate how vary the elasticities of the
relative wage and the relative price over time and if their movements are positively related to
the magnitude of labor reallocation caused by higher relative productivity. When estimating
elasticities of the relative wage and relative price with respect to relative productivity
on overlapping windows of fixed length, our estimates reveal that the former has been
reduced over time by a factor of two, passing from -0.3 to -0.15, whilst the relative price
appreciated significantly more. Strikingly, our estimates also show that the magnitude of
labor reallocation across sectors following a productivity differential has almost doubled
over the same period. These findings thus suggest that labor mobility costs have been
reduced markedly which resulted in increases in relative wage and relative price elasticities
with respect to relative productivity.
Whilst our evidence suggests that labor mobility costs can rationalize estimated effects
of higher relative productivity of tradables, our empirical findings also reveal that interna-
tional differences in labor market institutions can account for the cross-country dispersion
in estimated effects. Using a set of indicators to capture the extent of labor market regula-
tion, the decline in the relative wage is found empirically to be more pronounced and the
appreciation in the relative price to be less in countries where the unemployment benefit
scheme is more generous or the worker bargaining power measured by the bargaining cov-
erage is larger. While the relative wage also falls more in countries where legal protection
against dismissals is stricter, we find empirically that the relative price appreciates by a
larger amount.
Labor market frictions are also empirically found to have major implications for the
long-run adjustment in sectoral unemployment rates. Whilst higher relative productivity
of tradables lowers the unemployment rate of tradables relative to that of non tradables
for the whole sample as a result of labor mobility costs, our estimates also reveal that the
decline in the relative unemployment rate of tradables is more pronounced in countries
where labor markets are more regulated.
In order to account for our evidence, we put forward a variant of the two-sector open
economy model with tradables and non tradables and search in the labor market along
with an endogenous labor force participation decision in the lines of Shi and Wen [1999].2
Like Alvarez and Shimer [2011], imperfect mobility across sectors arises because searching
for a job in one sector is a time-consuming and thus a costly activity. In our model, the
2In contrast to Merz [1995], Andolfatto [1996], Shi and Wen [1999], Heer and Schubert [2012] who
construct dynamic general equilibrium models with labor markets characterized by search frictions, we
abstract from physical capital accumulation and consider a two-sector open economy setup.
2
elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin plays a pivotal role because it measures
the extent of workers’ moving costs: the smaller the elasticity of labor supply, the larger the
switching cost, and thus the lower the degree of labor mobility across sectors.3 Conversely,
when we let the elasticity of labor supply tend toward infinity, the case of perfect labor
mobility is obtained in the long-run so that the relative wage remains (almost) unaffected
by productivity shocks biased toward the traded sector, in contradiction with our empirical
findings. Standard search frictions are thus insufficient on their own to produce significant
long-run movements in the relative wage. Conversely, as long as the elasticity of labor supply
at the extensive margin takes intermediate values, the relative wage may fall. Because hiring
is also a costly activity which depends on labor market institutions, the magnitude of the
decline in the relative wage is determined by labor market regulation.
One key feature of our open economy model with search frictions is its dynamic nature.
Because a productivity shock biased toward the traded sector leads to more hiring and the
recruitment process is costly, it is optimal for the open economy to run a current account
deficit along the transitional path. As the country must fulfill the intertemporal solvency
condition, the trade balance must improve in the long-run. Higher net exports has an
expansionary effect on the demand for tradables and thus on traded firms’ hirings. If
workers incur mobility costs, such demand shift lowers non traded wages relative to traded
wages. It also mitigates the appreciation in the relative price of non tradables and thus
the ability of non traded firms to compensate for lower productivity gains.4 As a result,
the unemployment rate of tradables falls more than that of non tradables, in line with the
evidence. The dynamic nature of our setup plays a pivotal role since keeping net exports
fixed prevents the model from matching the evidence when traded and non traded goods are
complements in consumption. With an elasticity of substitution between traded and non
traded goods smaller than one, higher relative productivity of tradables increases the share
of non tradables and thus has an expansionary effect on hirings in the non traded sector.
As a result, the relative wage of non tradables increases instead of declining. Because the
relative price appreciates more than the productivity differential, the unemployment rate
differential between tradables and non tradables also increases instead of declining.
Importantly, when we calibrate our model to a representative OECD economy, our
quantitative analysis reveals that our model can account for our aforementioned evidence.
Even when traded and non traded goods are complements, the long-run increase in net
3We consider an endogenous sectoral labor force participation decision by assuming that representative
household members experience disutility from working and searching efforts in each sector. Relocating hours
worked from one sector to another is costly as the representative household must incur a searching cost for
a job in this sector; such utility loss may capture sector-specific human capital and/or geographical mobility
costs. Thus, in contrast to Matsuyama [1992] who assumes the irreversibility of the career decision, workers
can move between sectors, at some cost though.
4This result echoes estimates by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2004] who find that countries with a larger
decline in the net foreign position have more depreciated relative price of non tradables. In a world where
labor market frictions are absent, the net foreign position would have no effect neither on the relative price,
the relative wage nor the unemployment differential.
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exports driven by the accelerated hiring process more than offsets the decline in the share
of tradables so that the relative wage falls. Because the appreciation in the relative price is
not large enough to offset lower productivity gains in the non traded sector, higher relative
productivity of tradables drives down the unemployment rate differential between tradables
and non tradables.
When exploring the impact of labor institutions, our sensitivity analysis reveals that
more generous unemployment benefits or a higher worker bargaining power amplify the
decline in both the relative wage and the relative unemployment rate of tradables and
mitigate the appreciation in the relative price following a productivity differential, in line
with our evidence. Intuitively, such labor market policies make firms’ hiring in the traded
sector more elastic to productivity gains and thus amplify the long-run rise in net exports
which in turn exerts a larger negative impact on the relative wage of non tradables. Since
the relative price appreciates less, unemployment of tradables falls more relative to that
of non tradables. In addition, as firms’ hiring in the non traded sector is less sensitive
to productivity gains in countries where the firing cost is larger, stringent employment
protection legislation causes the relative price to appreciate more, and both the relative wage
and the relative unemployment rate of tradables to fall by a larger amount, in accordance
with our empirical findings.
To assess the performance of the model and investigate the implications of labor market
institutions for the cross-country dispersion in estimated effects, we calibrate the model to
country-specific data. We thus allow for two pivotal sets of parameters which we estimate
for each economy to vary across countries: search parameters and labor market policies
which account for cross-country labor market differentials and the elasticity of substitution
between tradables and non tradables. When we compare numerically computed responses
of the relative wage and relative price to our empirical estimates for each OECD economy
in our sample, we find that the model predicts the relative wage decline pretty well and
to a lesser extent the rise in the relative price. Importantly, while the model generates a
wide dispersion in the relative wage and the relative price responses across countries, we
find quantitatively that it can account for the larger decline in the relative wage and the
smaller appreciation in the relative price in countries where labor market regulation is more
pronounced.5 Our cross-country analysis also reveals that a productivity differential of one
percent results in a decline in the relative unemployment rate of tradables which appears to
be insignificant in countries having more flexible labor markets, while the decrease ranges
between twofold and fourfold of that obtained in the baseline case in economies with more
regulated labor markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide empirical
5When using a measure of labor market regulation which encompasses the three dimensions of labor
market institutions, we find that the relative price significantly appreciates less in countries where labor
markets are more regulated.
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facts on the effects of higher relative productivity of tradables suggesting the presence of
labor mobility costs and document evidence on the implications of labor market regula-
tion. In section 3, we develop an open economy version of the two-sector model with both
imperfect mobility of labor arising from searching efforts and unemployment arising from
matching frictions in both sectors. Section 4 sheds some light on the role of labor mobility
costs and disentangles the implications of the three dimensions of labor market regulation.
In section 5, we discuss numerical results. Section 6 summarizes our main results and
concludes.6
Related literature. Our paper is at the cross-roads of three strands of the literature in-
vestigating the adjustment of open economies to structural shocks. First, it is closely related
to the theory developed by Balassa [1964] and Samuelson [1964] which has been renewed
recently, notably by Bergin et al. [2006], Ghironi and Melitz [2005], and Christopoulos et
al. [2012]. The former two papers relax the assumption of perfectly competitive goods
market and show that heterogenous productivity among firms and/or entry and exit of
firms amplifies the effect of higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables on
domestic prices.7 In contrast, in our paper, we consider imperfectly competitive labor mar-
kets and show that labor market frictions moderate the appreciation in the relative price
of non tradables following a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables
by reducing the relative wage of non tradables. In this regard, Cardi and Restout [2015]
show that imperfect mobility of labor across sectors is key to producing an elasticity of the
relative price with respect to the productivity differential smaller than one. However, the
paper abstracts from search frictions and thus neither addresses the role of labor market
institutions nor the adjustment in sectoral unemployment rates. One of the main contribu-
tions of the present paper is to show both empirically and numerically that search frictions
on workers’ side are key to producing a decline in the relative wage along with the less than
proportional increase in the relative price while international differences in labor market
regulation account for the cross-country dispersion in both the relative wage and relative
price responses. In this respect, our work complements that by Christopoulos et al. [2012]
who put forward financial frictions as an explanation of the cross-country dispersion in the
relative price movements. Unlike the aforementioned papers which abstract from search
frictions, we show that the relative price adjustment to higher relative productivity plays a
pivotal role in determining the magnitude of the decline in sectoral unemployment rates.
Second, our study can be viewed as complementary to the growing literature which
6An online technical appendix, available at http://cred.u-paris2.fr/cardi, provides a very detailed
description of the dataset along with additional empirical results, and contains all the proofs and derivations
of analytical results.
7Ghironi and Melitz [2005] show that higher traded productivity triggers firm entry which stimulates
labor demand, raises wages and thus increases traded prices, amplifying the rise in domestic prices commonly
induced by the appreciation in the price of non traded goods. According to Bergin et al. [2006], higher
productivity in tradables relative to non tradables induces the least productive firms in the traded sector to
cease exporting; as a result, the share of non tradables in the economy increases, thus amplifying the effect
of the appreciation in the relative price of non tradables on domestic prices.
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investigates the quantitative implications of barriers of mobility following trade shocks,
e.g., Kambourov [2009] and Cosar [2013]. Developing and calibrating general equilibrium
sectoral models of a small open economy with sector specific human capital, both Kam-
bourov [2009] and Cosar [2013] find that human capital is a substantial barrier mobility
along with firing costs for the former and search frictions for the latter. Like the authors,
we uncover the factors that affects sectoral reallocation. In our setup, job search costs
hamper labor reallocation, whilst labor market institutions may mitigate or amplify labor
shifts across sectors. More precisely, by raising the marginal benefit of search, a more
generous unemployment benefit scheme or a higher worker bargaining power encourages
workers to shift from one sector to another. In contrast, in countries where firing costs
are more pronounced, the shifts of labor are lower because firms are less prone to post
more job vacancies. However, both our objective and modelling strategy are very different
from those by Kambourov [2009] and Cosar [2013]. We abstract from workers’ heterogene-
ity and rather emphasize the importance of various dimensions of labor market regulation
in explaining cross-country differences in estimated effects of higher relative productivity.
While we base most of our analysis on the long-run effects of a productivity differential,
by keeping our setup simple enough, we are able to fully characterize analytically the tran-
sitional adjustment of the open economy toward the steady-state, focusing mainly on the
dynamics of sectoral unemployment rates.8 Moreover, instead of considering sector-specific
human capital, we generate imperfect mobility of labor by assuming that workers must
search for a job before shifting from one sector to another, in the lines of Alvarez and
Shimer [2011]. This modelling strategy enables us to derive analytical expressions for the
response of the unemployment differential between tradables and non tradables to higher
relative productivity of tradables. In this regard, our analysis is related to that by Curuk
and Vannoorenberghe [2017] who derive analytical expressions of industry’s employment to
aggregate shocks. In contrast to them, we consider a model with search frictions and thus
are interested in sectoral unemployment rates’ adjustment and emphasize the implications
of international differences in labor market regulation. Unlike the aforementioned papers,
we show that the shift in the demand of goods and services along with the change in the
net foreign asset position play a key role in determining the size and the direction of the
effects of a technology shock.
The dynamic nature of our model along with time-varying net foreign asset position
along the transitional path makes our setup very different from that constructed by Dutt,
Mitra and Ranjan [2009] who analyze the effects of trade openness on unemployment by
assuming that trade is balanced. In our model, the share of tradables varies as the re-
sult of imperfect substitutability between tradables and non tradables and net exports’
8While we employ ’long-run’ to refer to steady-state values, it refers to a medium-run analysis as we
abstract from physical capital and we find numerically that the adjustment is rapid since it takes the open
economy between 3 and 5 years to reach the steady-state.
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adjustment. Most importantly, our model allows for an endogenous sectoral labor force
participation decision which produces intersectoral mobility costs; such a feature enables us
to rationalize the responses we document empirically. Moreover, in addition to providing
analytical results, we solve the model numerically.
Third, like the literature employing multi-sector model with search frictions in the labor
market, we emphasize that sectoral shocks that hit the economy unevenly produce short-
run effects which are quite distinct from those prevailing in the long-run. More specifically,
Phelan and Trejos [2000] show that an adverse sectoral demand shock originating from a
cut in military purchases can be greatly magnified as a result of the combined effect of labor
shifts across sectors and a slow reallocation. The gradual adjustment in sectoral labor plays
also a key role in our model as the long-run effects are reversed in the short-run. While in
the long-run, an increase in relative productivity of tradables lowers the unemployment rate
of tradables relative to that of non tradables, we get the opposite result on impact. When
the shock hits the economy, the unemployment rate of non tradables falls dramatically as
a result of the combined effect of the positive wealth effect along with the sector-biased
technology shock. Unlike Phelan and Trejos [2000], changes in sectoral demand occur en-
dogenously in our model. Moreover, the present paper endogenously generates workers’
costs of switching sectors caused by job search costs and differentiate their implications
from those driven by hiring costs supported by firms which are influenced by labor market
institutions. One close paper to ours is Chang [2012] who develops a two-sector model
with search frictions and emphasizes the key role of the combined effect of standard search
frictions and imperfect mobility of labor following sectoral TFP shocks biased toward one
sector. However, our work differs in many respects. First, Chang [2012] formalizes the
mobility decision such that the switching cost vanishes in the long-run whereas we consider
that workers experience a mobility cost at the steady-state in line with our evidence which
reveals that the sectoral wage differential is persistent in the long-run. Second, we consider
an open economy where both consumers’ preferences and the dynamics of the net foreign
asset position play a pivotal role in determining the long-run effects. These features are ab-
sent from Chang’s setup. Third, we perform a cross-country quantitative analysis. Fourth,
a rise in relative productivity produces quantitatively much greater unemployment effects
in our setup since the aggregate labor force is not constant as we allow for the transition
between leisure and the labor force, in accordance with the Real Business Cycle literature.
2 Empirical Facts
In this section, we document a set of empirical facts related to the effects of higher pro-
ductivity in tradables relative to non tradables and investigate how labor market frictions
shape estimated effects. We denote the level of the variable in upper case, the logarithm in
lower case (except for the unemployment rate which is expressed in percentage point), and
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the percentage deviation from its initial steady-state by a hat.
2.1 A Simple Model with Labor Market Frictions
To set the stage for the empirical analysis, we revisit the theory that Balassa [1964] and
Samuelson [1964] (BS hereafter) developed by relaxing the assumption of perfectly compet-
itive labor markets in order to build up intuition regarding the implications of labor market
frictions. As it is commonly assumed, the country is small in terms of both world goods
and capital markets, and thus faces an exogenous international price for the traded good
normalized to unity. Each sector produces Y j by using labor, Lj , according to a linear
technology, Y j = AjLj , where Aj represents the labor productivity index.
Because firms face a cost by maintaining job vacancies, they receive a surplus equal
to the marginal revenue of labor Ξj less the product wage W j . Symmetrically, so as to
compensate for the cost of searching for a job, unemployed workers receive a surplus equal
to W j less the reservation wage W jR. We denote by Ψ
j the overall surplus created when a
job-seeking worker and a firm with a job vacancy conclude a contract:





where ΞT = AT , ΞN = PAN with P corresponding to the relative price of non tradables,
and we denote by θj the labor market tightness in sector j, defined as the ratio of job
vacancies to unemployed workers; when firms post more job vacancies, θj rises which raises
the reservation wage, i.e., wˆjR = χ
j θˆj where 0 < χj < 1 represents the share of the surplus
associated with a labor contract in the marginal benefit of search.
The product wage W j paid to the worker in sector j is equal to the reservation wage
plus a share αW of the overall surplus:




+ αWΨj , (2)
where the worker bargaining power αW is assumed to be symmetric across sectors. Denot-
ing the relative wage by Ω ≡ WN/W T and differentiating (2) leads to the sectoral wage
differential:











where we assume that initially W j ' W and χjW jR ' χWR and Ψj ' Ψ to ease the
interpretation. In a model abstracting from labor market frictions, as the standard BS
model, searching for a job is a costless activity so that Ψ and χ are nil; hence sectoral wages
rise at the same speed. Conversely, in a model with labor market frictions, a productivity
differential between tradables and non tradables may lower ω. The reason is as follows.
First, as captured by the first term on the RHS of (3), higher AT /AN induces traded
firms to recruit more than non traded firms; because agents experience a utility loss when
increasing the search intensity for a job in the traded sector, traded firms must increase
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wages to attract workers as reflected by the rise in the ratio θT /θN . Moreover, as shown by
the second term on the RHS of (3), by raising ΨT /ΨN , a productivity differential between
tradables and non tradables lowers ω; intuitively, higher AT /AN increases the surplus from
an additional job in the traded sector relative to the non traded sector, ΨT /ΨN , the worker
obtaining a share equal to αW .
Denoting the job destruction rate by sj and the job finding rate by mj , and using the
fact that at the steady-state, the flow of unemployed workers who find a job is equalized
with the flow of employed workers who lose their job, the unemployment rate uj in sector j
reads as uj = s
j
sj+mj(θj)
. Totally differentiating uj and denoting the elasticity of vacancies
in job matches by αV , allows us to express the unemployment rate differential between
tradables and non tradables in terms of the differential in sectoral labor market tightness:





where we assume that at the initial steady-state, search parameters are such that uj ' u.
According to (4), higher AT /AN results in a decline in uT relative to uN by raising the
ratio θT /θN as traded firms recruit more than non traded firms.
When a labor contract is concluded with a worker, the representative firm in sector j
receives the marginal revenue of labor Ξj which must cover the recruiting cost plus the
dividend per worker equivalent to (1− αW )Ψj and the wage rate paid to the worker:
Ξj = (1− αW )Ψj +W j . (5)
Differentiating (5) and subtracting ΞˆT from ΞˆN leads to:
pˆ =
(
aˆT − aˆN)+ W
Ξ
(






where we assume that initially Ξj ' Ξ, Ψj ' Ψ, and W j ' W . According to (6), when
abstracting from labor market frictions, as the BS model, the surplus Ψ is nil while sectoral
wages increase at the same speed so that p must appreciate by the same amount as aˆT − aˆN .
Conversely, in a model with labor market frictions, as captured by the second term on the
RHS of (6), ω falls because traded firms have to pay higher wages to compensate for the
workers’ mobility costs. Moreover, as shown by the third term on the RHS of (6), since
traded firms recruit more than non traded firms, the hiring cost must be covered by an
increase in ΨT /ΨN , the firm obtaining a share equal to 1− αW . Thus, by lowering ω and
increasing the hiring cost in the traded sector relative to that in the non traded sector, a
productivity differential of 1% appreciates p by less than 1%.
The relative wage and relative price equations described by (3) and (6), respectively,
allow us to explain why labor market frictions imply that sectoral wages may no longer rise
at the same speed and the elasticity of the relative price w.r.t. the productivity differential
may be smaller than one. However, such conclusions are established by abstracting from
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the goods market equilibrium which matters as long as labor is not perfectly mobile across
sectors. In section 4, we show that the full steady-state can be solved for the relative price
and the relative wage, i.e., P ≡ PN/P T = P (AT , AN) and Ω ≡ WN/W T = Ω (AT , AN).
Because all variables display trends, our empirical strategy consists in estimating the coin-
tegrating relationships with relative productivity.
In the following, we also explore empirically whether higherAT /AN leads to duT−duN <
0. Whilst the standard BS model abstracting from labor market frictions cannot address
unemployment issues, standard search frictions are not sufficient on their own to lower the
unemployment rate differential following a rise in AT /AN . More specifically, for higher
relative productivity to result in a decline in uT relative to uN , as shown in eq. (4), traded
firms must recruit more than non traded firms. For this to happen, the appreciation in
the p must be less than the productivity differential otherwise non traded firms are able
to exactly offset lower productivity gains by setting higher prices. As discussed above, the
relative price appreciates less than proportionately if workers experience mobility costs.
2.2 Data Construction
Before empirically exploring the effects of higher relative productivity, we briefly describe
the dataset we use and provide details about data construction below and in Appendix A.
Our sample consists of a panel of eighteen OECD countries for eleven 1-digit ISIC-rev.3
industries. To split these eleven industries into traded and non traded sectors, we follow the
classification suggested by De Gregorio et al. [1994] that we updated by following Jensen
and Kletzer [2006].
For the relative price and the relative wage, our sample covers the period 1970-2007.
We use the EU KLEMS [2011] database which provides domestic currency series of value
added in current and constant prices, labor compensation and employment (number of hours
worked) for each sector j (with j = T,N), permitting the construction of price indices pj
(in log) which correspond to sectoral value added deflators, sectoral wage rates wj (in log),
and sectoral measures of productivities aj (in log). The relative price of non tradables at
time t in country i, pi,t, is the log of the ratio of the non traded value added deflator to the
traded value added deflator (i.e., pi,t = pNi,t − pTi,t). The relative wage ωi,t is the log of the
ratio of the non traded wage to the traded wage (i.e., ωi,t = wNi,t − wTi,t). We use sectoral




i,t to approximate technical change which are constructed
from constant-price series of value added Y ji,t and hours worked L
j
i,t.
We construct time series for sectoral unemployment rate, uj , as the ratio of the number
of unemployed workers U j in sector j to the labor force F j ≡ Lj+U j in this sector. Data are
taken from LABORSTA database from ILO which provides series for unemployed workers
by economic activity for fourteen OECD countries out of eighteen listed in Appendix A.
The longest available period ranges from 1987 to 2007. On average, our data covers thirteen
10
years per country (see Appendix B.3).9
2.3 Estimating the Effects of Higher Relative Productivity
We regress the (log) relative wage ω and the (log) relative price p on the (log) relative
productivity, respectively:10










where i and t index country and time and vi,t and ui,t are i.i.d. error terms. Country fixed
effects are captured by country dummies δi and αi.
Since p, ω and aT − aN display trends, we ran unit root and then cointegration tests.
Having verified that these two assumptions are empirically supported, we estimate the coin-
tegrating relationships by using fully modified OLS (FMOLS) and dynamic OLS (DOLS)
procedures for the cointegrated panel proposed by Pedroni [2000], [2001]. Both estimators
give similar results and coefficients β and γ of the cointegrating relationships are significant
at 1%. Two major results emerge. First, estimates reported in the Table 1 reveal that
a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables by 1% lowers the relative
wage by about 0.22% and appreciates the relative price by 0.64%. Second, as shown in
the second line and the third line of Table 1, the predictions of the model abstracting from
labor market frictions are strongly rejected: the slope of the cointegrating vector β (γ) is
statistically significantly different from zero (one).
We now assess if our conclusion for the whole sample also holds for each country. To do
so we run again the regression of relative wage and relative price on relative productivity by
letting β and γ vary across countries. Table 2 shows DOLS and FMOLS estimates for the
eighteen countries of our sample. The first result that emerges is that the responses display
a wide dispersion across countries. The second result is that despite these large cross-
country variations, higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables significantly
lowers ω in all countries while p rises less than the productivity differential.
Because long-run movements in both the relative wage and relative price reveal the
presence of labor market frictions, we also run the regression of the change in the unem-
ployment rate differential between tradables and non tradables on the relative productivity
9Whereas we are able to construct time series of sectoral unemployment rates for Korea, data for the
unemployment benefit replacement rate, used as a control variable, are not available before 2002 and thus
this country is removed from the sample.
10In contrast to Kakkar [2003], Cardi and Restout [2015] who do not identify empirically the role of labor
market institutions following a productivity differential, our dataset includes eighteen OECD countries
instead of fourteen and we measure technological change with sectoral labor productivity instead of sectoral
TFP in order to be consistent with the model developed in section 3 where we abstract from physical
capital accumulation. It is worth mentioning that the two-sector open economy model with search frictions
we develop is tractable enough to enable us to derive analytical expressions of elasticities β, γ (see section
5.3) and σ (see section 5.4) estimated empirically.
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of tradables in growth rate:11





where ηi are the country fixed effects and zi,t are i.i.d. error terms. As can be seen in the
first line of Table 3, a rise in the productivity differential by 1% lowers the unemployment
rate in the traded relative to the non traded sector by 0.034 percentage point. Columns 2
to 4 reveal that our result is robust to the inclusion of control variables for labor market
regulation and thus sectoral unemployment rates adjust unevenly in all specifications.12
< Please insert Tables 1, 2 and 3 about here >
2.4 How to Explain Estimated Effects?
As stressed in section 2.1, the decline in the relative wage following higher relative produc-
tivity points the presence of labor market frictions which are responsible for the less than
proportional appreciation in the relative price along with the significant fall in uT relative
to uN .
While the causes of labor market frictions hampering labor reallocation are diverse,
they can be classified into two categories: those related to the workers’ characteristics,
thus affecting labor supply, and those related to rigid labor markets influencing firms’ labor
demand. The present paper endogenously generates workers’ costs of switching sectors
caused by job search costs and differentiate their implications from those driven by hiring
costs supported by firms which are influenced by labor market institutions.13 Like Alvarez
and Shimer [2011], workers experience mobility costs as they have to search for a job
before switching from one sector to another.14 Intuitively, because searching for a job is
time-consuming, such an activity is costly in utility terms. As a result, following higher
productivity of tradables relative to non tradables, traded firms have to pay higher wages
in order to compensate for the workers’ costs of switching. Hence, the relative wage of non
tradables must fall. Because non traded wages increase less rapidly than traded wages,
mobility costs mitigate the appreciation in the relative price of non tradables (see eq.
(6)). Since higher prices of non traded goods are not high enough to even lower relative
11Since series for the unemployment rate differential do not display a unit root process, we express the
labor productivity in growth rate. Moreover, on average, the time horizon is too short to recourse to
cointegration techniques.
12In the second (third) column of Table 3, we include employment protection legislation adjusted with
the share of permanent workers (unemployment benefit replacement rate) since these variables are available
for a yearly basis. The fourth column shows that results are unchanged when we add two control variables.
13A convenient shortcut to generate workers’ mobility costs is to assume limited substitutability in hours
worked across sectors along the lines of Horvath [2000]. Adopting this modelling strategy and calibrating an
open economy version of the neoclassical model with tradables and non tradables, Cardi and Restout [2015]
find that limited labor mobility is key to generating a less than proportional appreciation in the relative
price following a 1% increase in the productivity of tradables relative to non tradables. Beyond the fact that
the causes of workers’ mobility costs remain unexplained, by abstracting from search frictions, the authors
cannot address the implications of labor market institutions.
14From the worker point of view, the mobility costs can be interpreted as psychological costs when
switching from one sector to another (see e.g., Dix-Carneiro [2014]), geographic mobility costs (see e.g.,
Kennan and Walker [2011]) or can be the result of sector-specific human capital (see e.g., Lee and Wolpin
[2006]).
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productivity gains out, traded firms’ hire more which results in a larger decline in the
unemployment rate in tradables relative to that in non tradables.
A way to gauge the role of labor mobility costs in determining the adjustment of the
economy to a productivity differential is to investigate whether elasticities β, γ, and σ (see
(7a)-(8)) vary over time and explore their relationship with the extent of labor reallocation
across sectors triggered by higher relative productivity. To perform this experiment, we
estimate β, γ, and σ in rolling sub-samples. To check results’ robustness, we consider
different windows’ lengths.15 As can be seen in the first row of Figure 1 which reports the
elasticity of the relative wage to relative productivity (i.e., β) in the solid black line, for all
windows’ lengths, the response of ω has increased over time (i.e., β becomes less negative).
One obvious candidate to explaining such an increase in β is the decline in labor mobility
costs. If workers incur lower costs of switching sectors, then a productivity differential would
result in a greater reallocation of labor between the traded and the non traded sector.16
As it clearly stands out, the estimated response of the relative wage tends to increase over
time, especially in the nineties, and such a pattern is associated with more labor reallocation
following higher relative productivity, in line with our hypothesis. The second row of Figure
1 reveals that as more workers shift from one sector to another following higher productivity
gains in tradables relative to non tradables, the relative price appreciates more over time
(until the beginning of 2000’s), i.e., γ takes higher values. Focusing on panels 1(a) and 1(d),
the magnitude of labor reallocation reaches a peak at the beginning of 2000’s and then tends
to be declining. Such a pattern tracks pretty well the fall in γ from 2002 onwards and to
a lesser extent the merely declining path of β which starts later, in 2005. Another piece
of evidence which corroborates the role of labor reallocation in shaping the labor market
adjustment is the increase in σ which captures the response of the unemployment differential
to a rise in relative productivity, as can be seen in Figure 1(f).17
< Please insert Figure 1 about here >
15When estimating β and γ, we run the same regression as in eqs. (7a)-(7b), except that we consider
overlapping subperiods of different fixed lengths, i.e., T = 20, T = 25, T = 30 years. More specifically, for
T = 20, we estimate eqs. (7a)-(7b) over 1970-1990, 1971-1991, ...,1987-2007, for T = 25, over 1970-1995,
..., 1982-2007, and for T = 30, 1970-2000, ..., 1977-2007. To save space, we do not show the results for the
relative price when T = 30.
16Following Wacziarg and Wallack [2004], we compute the labor reallocation index in year t for country




j=T |Lji,t − Lji,t−τ | −









where τ = 5 and Lji,t denotes employment in sector j = T,N . To estimate the effect of higher relative
productivity on labor reallocation, we run the following regression in rolling sub-samples:





Since the labor reallocation index is stationary, relative productivity is expressed in growth rate.
17When running the regression of the unemployment differential on relative productivity of tradables in
growth rate, we add unemployment benefit replacement as a control; due to data availability, we consider
one unique window’s length (i.e., T = 12) and exclude BEL, DNK, JPN, USA as the time horizon for
sectoral unemployment data taken from ILO is too short for these countries.
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While above evidence suggests that workers’ mobility costs matter in producing a de-
cline in non traded wages relative to traded wages following higher relative productivity of
tradables, our estimates also show that the size of the decline in the relative wage varies
greatly across countries. Since labor market institutions influence the elasticity of hiring
with respect to productivity gains, international differences in labor regulation could be
responsible for the cross-country dispersion in the decline in the relative wage. Moreover,
by determining the extent of hirings and thus output changes within each sector, the degree
of labor market regulation should affect the extent of the decline in the relative unemploy-
ment rate of tradables along with the magnitude of the appreciation in the relative price of
non tradables following a productivity differential.
As will be clear later when we will further develop the transmission mechanism, labor
market regulation influences goods and labor market variables through two distinct channels
according to the type of labor market institutions:
• First, we expect the traded wage to increase more and the relative price of non trad-
ables to appreciate less in countries where unemployment benefits are more generous
or workers have a larger bargaining power.18 As a result, these economies should also
experience a larger decline in the unemployment rate of tradables.
• Second, we conjecture that in countries with higher firing costs, the non traded wage
should rise less, the unemployment rate of non tradables should decrease by a smaller
amount and the relative price should appreciate more.19
2.5 Labor Market Regulation and Cross-Country Differences
We consider three dimensions of labor market regulation:
• The first aspect is the difficulty of redundancy that we measure by the employment
protection legislation (EPL hereafter) index provided by the OECD; this index which
captures the strictness of legal protection against dismissals for permanent workers
has the advantage to be available for all countries of our sample over the period 1985-
2007. In order to have a more accurate measure of the difficulty of redundancy, we
adjust EPL for regular workers with the share of permanent workers in the economy
18Intuitively, as these economies display a low labor market tightness, hiring is more profitable following
productivity gains because it is easier to fulfill job vacancies. As will be detailed subsequently, a larger
increase in hirings in the short-run leads a higher rise in net exports in the long-run. Higher demand
for tradables tends to mitigate the appreciation in the relative price caused by a productivity differential.
Because labor demand in the traded sector is more elastic to productivity gains in countries where the
replacement rate or the worker bargaining power is higher, the traded wage is expected to increase by a
larger amount. Because traded firms recruit more, uT will decline by a larger amount.
19Because a productivity shock tends to lower aggregate labor supply through the positive wealth effect
while the non traded sector experiences relatively low productivity gains, the shrinking non traded estab-
lishments are subject to the redundancy cost. As a result, they are less prone to recruit more workers when
productivity increases. Labor demand in the non traded sector is thus less elastic to productivity gains
in countries where employment protection is more pronounced, which mitigates increases in wN and the
decline in uN . Since traded output increases more relative to non traded output, we expect p to appreciate
by a larger amount.
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(see Boeri and Van Ours [2008]). The indicator is denoted by EPLadj .
• The generosity of unemployment benefit systems is measured by using the replace-
ment rate, denoted by %. The data we use are taken from the OECD database which
calculates the average of the net unemployment benefit for three durations of unem-
ployment (1st year, 2nd and 3rd year, 4th and 5th year).
• In the empirical literature, the worker bargaining power is commonly captured by the
bargaining coverage; we thus use this indicator, denoted by BargCov, which gives
the proportion of employees covered by collective bargaining. Data are taken from
the ICTWSS database (Visser [2009]).
To empirically explore our conjecture according to which the relative wage falls more
following a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables in countries with
more regulated labor market, we perform a simple split-sample analysis. Hence, we compare
the relative wage behavior of 9 countries with high and 9 economies with low labor market
regulation by running the regression (7a) of ω on relative productivity for each sub-sample.
We thus expect βH , which captures the response of ω to a productivity differential in
countries with higher labor market regulation, to be larger (in absolute terms) than βL
which reflects the reaction of ω in countries with lower labor market regulation. Because
labor market regulation influences the magnitude of responses of labor to productivity gains,
labor market institutions should affect the extent of the appreciation in p. Adopting the
same strategy than that for ω, we run the regression (7b) of the relative price on relative
productivity for each sub-sample.20 More specifically, we investigate whether p appreciates
more in countries with stricter legal protection against dismissals (i.e., we expect γH > γL)
and increases less in countries with more generous unemployment benefit scheme or a higher
worker bargaining power (i.e., we expect γH < γL).
The DOLS and FMOLS estimates are reported in Table 4 for countries with high and
low labor market regulation. The last two lines of Table 4 gives the sub-sample’s average
of the corresponding labor market regulation index. As the results in panel A of Table
4 show, the decline in the relative wage is significantly greater for countries with more
regulated labor markets, i.e., |βH | > |βL|. While countries providing lower unemployment
benefits experience a decline in ω of -0.16% approximately, the second set of countries with
generous unemployment benefits experience a fall in ω of -0.26%. Furthermore, as shown
in the second column of Table 4, ω falls by -0.24% in countries where the worker bargaining
power is relatively higher instead of -0.18% in economies with a lower bargaining coverage.
A similar pattern emerges when we exploit a third dimension of labor market regulation,
namely the strictness of employment protection. Since series for EPL are available over
20Because the movements in p can be influenced by changes in the cost of entry in product market triggered
by competition-oriented policies, we add country-specific linear time trends when we run the regression (7b)
for each sub-sample in order to control for these effects.
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1985-2007, we run again the regression (7a) for each sub-sample over this period to be
consistent. We find that ω declines by 0.17% in countries with higher firing costs while
ω declines by only 0.13% in the second set of countries. Because labor market regulation
includes three indicators, we have recourse to a principal component analysis in order to
have one overall indicator reflecting all the dimensions of labor market institutions. As
displayed in the last column of Table 4, we find that countries with more regulated labor
markets experience a larger decline in ω. Finally, we detect a significant difference in the
responses of the relative wage between countries with low and high labor market regulation
as shown in the third line of Table 4 which indicates that imposing the restriction βL = βH
is strongly rejected at a 1% significance level.
< Please insert Table 4 about here >
Turning to the relative price, the first two columns of panel B of Table 4 show that
higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables causes an appreciation in p which
is significantly smaller in countries with more generous unemployment benefits or a higher
bargaining coverage. Conversely, as displayed in the third column of Table 4, stricter em-
ployment protection legislation tends to amplify the increase in p, in line with our conjec-
ture. However, the difference in the relative price responses caused by firing costs between
the two sub-samples is not statistically significant. Because EPLadj does not seem to exert
substantial effects on the relative price responses to a productivity differential, it is thus
not surprising to find that labor market regulation tends to mitigate the appreciation in p
as shown in the last column of Table 4. As discussed later, this finding is in line with our
quantitative results which show that large differences in employment protection legislation
do not cause marked differences in the relative price adjustment following a productivity
differential, the cross-country dispersion in the relative price responses being mostly driven
by differences in unemployment benefit replacement rates.
To explore the implications of labor market regulation for the response of the unemploy-
ment rate differential, we split our sample into groups with less and more regulated labor
markets by using the mean value of the index which encompasses the three dimensions of
labor market regulation. Our analysis covers 14 countries out of which 8 are classified as
countries with more regulated labor markets.21 Contrasting estimates of σH with those of
σL shown in the second and third line of Table 3, respectively, a rise in the relative produc-
tivity of tradables drives down the relative unemployment rate of tradables, and more so in
countries where labor market regulation is higher. More specifically, the unemployment rate
of tradables relative to that of non tradables declines by 0.033 and 0.036 ppt in economies
21Because the effect of an increase in relative productivity of tradables on the unemployment rate differ-
ential is small since the latter variable is the difference between two sectoral ratios, we find it convenient to
base the split-sample analysis on the mean value instead of the median as we obtain more clear-cut results
in this case. In a Technical Appendix, we show that whether we use the median or the mean sample, our
split-sample analysis is robust to the threshold used when we explore the implications of three dimensions
of labor market regulation for the relative wage and relative price effects of a productivity differential.
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with less and more regulated labor markets, respectively. Subsequent columns show that
estimated effects between the two subsamples are more distinct; when controlling for the
replacement rate and employment protection, the unemployment rate differential falls by
0.032 and 0.041 ppt in countries with low and high labor market regulation, respectively.
In the following, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model by allowing for search
frictions which have two distinct dimensions and assess its ability to account for our evi-
dence. The first cause of search frictions is related to the costs supported by workers when
they wish to shift hours worked from one sector to another. We explore the ability of such
mobility costs to mitigate the appreciation in p and lower both ω and the unemployment
rate differential uT − uN in line with our evidence. The second cause of search frictions
relates to the costs supported by firms when they wish to hire workers. Such costs are influ-
enced by labor market institutions which vary substantially across countries. We investigate
whether countries with more regulated labor markets experience a larger decline in both the
relative wage and the relative unemployment rate of tradables, and a smaller appreciation
in the relative price of non tradables in accordance with our empirical findings.
3 The Framework
The country is small in terms of both world goods and capital markets, and faces a given
world interest rate, r?.22 The small open economy is populated by a constant number
of identical households and firms that have perfect foresight and live forever. Households
decide on labor market participation and consumption while firms decide on hirings. The
economy consists of two sectors. One sector produces a traded good denoted by the super-
script T that can be exported while the other sector produces a non-traded good denoted
by the superscript N . The setup allows for traded and non-traded goods to be used for
consumption. The traded good is chosen as the numeraire. The labor market, in the tra-
dition of Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides, consists of a matching process within each sector
between the firms who post job vacancies and unemployed workers who search for a job.
Time is continuous and indexed by t.23
3.1 Households
At each instant the representative agent consumes traded goods, CT (t), and non-traded
goods, CN (t), which are aggregated by a constant elasticity of substitution function:
C
(










φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (CN (t))φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (10)
22The price of the traded good is determined on the world market and exogenously given for the small
open economy. Hence, real exchange rate movements are exclusively caused by the long-run adjustment in
the relative price of non tradables.
23Our paper builds on Heijdra and Ligthart [2009]. Unlike the authors, we consider a two-sector framework
where the sectoral elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin determines the transition between the
traded and the non traded sector labor force and we explore the implications of labor market regulation.
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where ϕ is the weight of the traded good in the overall consumption bundle (0 < ϕ < 1)
and φ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution (φ > 0).
The economy that we consider consists of a representative household with a measure
one continuum of identical infinitely lived members. At any instant, members in the house-
hold derive utility from consumption goods C and experience disutility from working and
searching efforts. More precisely, the representative household comprises members who en-
gage in only one of the following activities: working and searching a job in each sector, or
enjoying leisure. Assuming that the representative individual is endowed with one unit of
time, leisure is defined as 1− F T (t)− FN (t), with F j(t) the labor force in sector j = T,N
defined as the sum of units of labor time, Lj(t), and time spent on searching for a job
in sector j, U j(t), i.e., F j(t) = Lj(t) + U j(t). Unemployed agents are randomly matched
with job vacancies according to a matching function described later. Since the timing of a
match is random, agents face idiosyncratic risks. To simplify the analysis, we assume that
members in the household perfectly insure each other against variations in labor income.
Because the labor force is not constant, we allow for the transition between employment
and unemployment and the transition between leisure and labor force. Since the labor force
in sector j is not constant as well, we allow for the transition between the traded and the non
traded sector. More specifically, we consider that the utility function is additively separable
in the disutility received by working and searching in the two sectors. Such a specification
makes it impossible to switch from one sector to another instantaneously without going
through a spell of search unemployment, as in Alvarez and Shimer [2011]. This can be
justified on the grounds of sector-specific skills as well as geographical or psychological
mobility costs. The representative household chooses the time path of consumption and






















where ζj > 0 parametrizes the disutility from working and searching efforts in sector j =
T,N , β > 0 is the consumer’s subjective time discount rate, and σC > 0 is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution for consumption; σjL > 0 is the elasticity of labor supply at the
extensive margin in sector j = T,N ; it measures the extent of workers’ moving costs: the
smaller the elasticity of labor supply, the larger the utility loss when switching, and thus
the lower the degree of labor mobility across sectors.24 For later use, we denote by uj the
sectoral unemployment rate defined as uj(t) = U j(t)/F j(t).
Denoting by mj(t) the rate at which unemployed agents find jobs and sj the exogenous
rate of job separation, employment in sector j evolves gradually according to:
L˙j(t) = mj(t)U j(t)− sjLj(t). (12)
24Workers’ switching costs are the result of an endogenous sectoral labor force participation decision which
implies that the allocation of the labor force across sectors is elastic to the ratio of sectoral reservation wages.
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Households supply Lj(t) units of labor services in sector j = T,N for which they receive
the product wageW j(t). We denote by A(t) the stock of financial wealth held by households
which comprises internationally traded bonds, B(t), and shares on domestic firms. Because
foreign bonds and domestic shares are perfect substitutes, the stock of financial wealth yields
net interest rate earnings r?A(t). Denoting by T (t) the lump-sum taxes, the flow budget
constraint is equal to households’ real disposable income less consumption expenditure:






RjU j(t)− T (t)− PC (P (t))C(t), (13)
where PC(P ) is the consumption price index which is a function of the relative price of non
tradables, P , and Rj represents unemployment benefits received by job seekers in sector j.
Denoting by λ(t) and ξj(t) the shadow prices of wealth and finding a job in sector j,





















W j(t)− ζj (F j(t))1/σjL
λ(t)
 , (14d)
and the appropriate transversality conditions. In order to generate an interior solution, we
impose β = r?; hence, (14c) implies that λ must remain constant over time, i.e., λ(t) = λ¯.
Eq. (14b) shows that labor market participation increases with the reservation wageW jR(t),
which is defined as the sum of the expected value of a job,mj(t)ξj(t), and the unemployment
benefit, Rj . For the sake of clarity, we drop the time argument below when this causes no
confusion.






= P φ. (15)
An appreciation in the relative price of non tradables P increases expenditure on tradables
relative to expenditure on non tradables (i.e. CT /PCN ), only when φ > 1. Applying
Shephard’s lemma and denoting by αC =
(1−ϕ)P 1−φ
ϕ+(1−ϕ)P 1−φ the share of non traded goods in
consumption expenditure yields expenditure in non tradables and tradables, i.e., PCN =
αCPCC, CT = (1− αC)PCC.
3.2 Firms
Each sector consists of a large number of identical firms which use labor, Lj , as the sole
input in a linear technology, Y j = AjLj . Firms post job vacancies V j to hire workers and









λW j − ζj (F j)1/σjL]. Denoting by ξj ≡ ξ′,j/λ, using (14a) and (14c), we get (14b) and
(14d).
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face a cost per job vacancy κj which is assumed to be constant and measured in terms
of the traded good. Firms pay the wage W j decided by the generalized Nash bargaining
solution. As producers face a labor cost W j per employee and a cost per hiring of κj , the
profit function of the representative firm in sector j is:





where Ξj is the marginal revenue of labor; xj is a firing tax paid to the government when
layoffs are higher than hirings, i.e., if L˙j < 0 (see e.g., Heijdra and Ligthart [2002], Veracierto
[2008]). The firing tax is introduced to capture the strictness of legal protection against
dismissals and is modelled as a tax on reducing employment.26
Denoting by f j the rate at which a vacancy is matched with unemployed agents, the
law of motion for labor is given by:
L˙j = f jV j − sjLj . (17)
Denoting by γj the shadow price of employment to the firm, the maximization problem
yields the following first-order conditions:







)− (Ξj − xjsj −W j) . (18b)
Eq. (18a) requires the marginal cost of vacancy, κj , to be equal to the expected marginal










Ξj (τ)− xjsj −W j (τ)] e(sj+r?)(t−τ)dτ. (19)
Eq. (19) states that γj is equal to the present discounted value of the cash flow earned
on an additional worker, consisting of the excess of marginal revenue of labor Ξj over the
wage W j and the expected firing cost xjsj . Following higher productivity Aj , the marginal
revenue of labor Ξj rises; hence hiring becomes more profitable which induces firms to post
job vacancies, but less so in countries with a higher firing cost xj .
3.3 Matching and Wage Determination
In each sector, there are job-seeking workers U j and firms with job vacancies V j which are
matched in a random fashion. Assuming a constant returns to scale matching function, the
number of labor contracts M j concluded per job seeker U j gives the job finding rate mj
which is increasing in the labor market tightness θj :
mj =M j/U j = Xj
(
V j/U j
)αjV = Xj (θj)αjV , (20)
26While employment is lowered, the shrinking establishment is hiring; thus assuming a tax on reducing
employment implies that the representative firm simultaneously pays a tax on employment exits and receives
a hiring subsidy, the former being higher than the latter amount, i.e., −xjL˙j = xjsjLj − xjf jV j > 0.
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where αjV represents the elasticity of vacancies in job matches and X
j corresponds to the
matching efficiency. The number of matches M j per job vacancy gives the worker-finding
rate for the firm, f j , which is decreasing with θj :
f j =M j/V j = Xj
(
θj
)αjV −1 . (21)
When a vacancy and a job-seeking worker meet, a rent is created which is equal to
ξj + γj + xj , where ξj is the value of an additional job, γj is the value of an additional
worker, and xj corresponds to the hiring subsidy.27 The division of the rent between the
worker and the firm determined by generalized Nash bargaining leads to the product wage
W j defined as a weighted sum of the labor marginal revenue plus the interest income from
the hiring subsidy and the reservation wage:









where αjW and 1− αjW correspond to the bargaining power of the worker and the firm.
3.4 Government
The final agent in the economy is the government. Unemployment benefits RTUT +RNUN

















RjU j . (23)
3.5 Market Clearing Conditions
We have to impose the market clearing condition for the non traded good:
Y N (t) = CN (t). (24)
Using the definition of the stock of financial wealth A(t) ≡ B(t) +∑j γj(t)Lj(t), differ-
entiating with respect to time, substituting the accumulation equations of labor (12) and
financial wealth (13) together with the dynamic equation for the shadow value of an addi-
tional worker (18b), using (23) and (24), the current account is:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) + Y T (t)− CT (t)− κTV T (t)− κNV N (t). (25)
27As mentioned above, the firing tax is modelled as a tax on reducing employment; because firms experi-
ence simultaneously outflow and inflow of workers, this shortcut to encompass the strictness of employment
protection implies that establishments pay firing taxes and receive hiring subsidies at the same time, the
former being larger than the latter amount.
28In the numerical analysis, we consider government spending for calibration purpose. In this case, eq.











+ GT + PGN where GT
and GN government spending on tradables and non tradables, respectively.
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3.6 Steady-State
We now describe the steady-state of the economy. Due to the lack of empirical estimates at
a sectoral level, and to avoid unnecessary complications, we impose αjV = αV , α
j
W = αW ,
σjL = σL from now on.
First, setting B˙ = 0 into (25), denoting by υNX ≡ NX/Y T the ratio of net exports to
traded output, and using (24) yields the goods market equilibrium:29






where we have inserted the allocation of aggregate consumption expenditure between traded
and non traded goods given by (15). According to (26), following a rise in traded output
relative to non traded output, the relative price of non tradables, P , must appreciate to
clear the goods market and all the more so as the elasticity of substitution φ is smaller.
Second, setting γ˙j = 0 into (18b), using (18a) to eliminate γj , and inserting W j given
by (22) leads to the vacancy creation equation which states that the marginal benefit of an
additional worker to the firm, i.e., (1−αW )
sj+r?
Ψj (with Ψj given by (1)) equalizes the expected
costs of recruitment per worker, i.e., κj/f j . Inserting (21) and combining hiring decisions














ΞT + r?xT −W TR
ΞN + r?xN −WNR
, (27)
where ΞT = AT and ΞN = PAN . According to the vacancy creation equation described
by (27), higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables has an expansionary
effect on labor demand in the traded sector and thus pushes up θT /θN as long as φ > 1.
Intuitively, higher AT /AN appreciates P . If φ > 1, the share of tradables rises which in
turn stimulates hirings in the traded sector relative to those in the non traded sector.
Third, setting ξ˙j = 0 into (14d) leads to ξj = αWΨ
j
sj+r?
. Rewriting the latter equation
by inserting the vacancy creation equation for sector j to eliminate Ψj gives the expected
value of finding a job, i.e., mjξj = αW1−αW κ
jθj . Plugging this equation into (14b) leads to





, and the marginal benefit from search, αW1−αW κ
jθj + Rj = W jR. Combining the















where we set L˙j = 0 into (12) to eliminate U j . According to (28), a rise in θT /θN has an
expansionary effect on hours worked in the traded sector because more unemployed agents
29Denoting by υB ≡ r?BY T the ratio of interest receipts to traded output and υjV ≡ κ
jV j
Y T
the ratio of the
cost of hiring in sector j = T,N to traded output, the zero current account equation implies υB−υTV −υNV =
−υNX . While for simplicity purposes, we refer to υNX as the ratio of net exports to traded output, it also
includes hiring expenditure, i.e., NX ≡ Y T−CT = NX+κTV T+κNV N with NX ≡ Y T−CT−κTV T−κNV N
corresponding to the ’true’ definition of the trade balance.
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find a job while workers are also encouraged to increase their participation to the labor
force in this sector, and all the more so as σL is larger.
The long-term equilibrium comprise three equations (26)-(28) which can be solved for
relative employment, LT /LN , the ratio of sectoral labor market tightness, θT /θN , and the
relative price, P , as functions of relative productivity, AT /AN , and υNX . Inserting these
solutions into the Nash bargaining wage (22) and the unemployment rate differential (4)
allows us to express the relative wage, Ω = WN/W T and the relative unemployment rate
uT /uN , in terms of AT /AN and υNX . This procedure to solve for the steady-state enables
us to break down analytically the effects of a productivity differential between tradables
and non tradables into two components as detailed in the next section.30
4 Higher Relative Productivity and Labor Market Frictions
Since the forces which shape the relative wage and relative price responses to an increase
in AT /AN determine the behavior of the unemployment rate differential between tradables
and non tradables, we first explore their adjustment. We thus analytically break down
the relative wage and relative price effects in two components to shed some light on the
transmission mechanism and investigate the implications of labor market institutions.31
Then we extend this analysis to the unemployment rate differential between tradables and
non tradables and investigate the transitional adjustment of sectoral unemployment rates
by using phase diagrams.
4.1 Inspecting the Transmission Mechanism
Equating demand (26) and supply (27)-(28) of tradables in terms of non tradables, leads
to a relationship between the deviation in percentage of the relative price from its initial





aˆT − (1 + ΘN) aˆN
(φ+ΘN )
+
d ln (1− υNX)
(φ+ΘN )
, (29)
30When solving the steady-state, changes in the net foreign asset position and thus in net exports as
reflected by changes in υNX are assumed to be exogenous. Such a procedure allows us to isolate the effects
stemming from changes in the trade balance and hiring expenditure. The ratio υNX can be expressed in
terms of sectoral productivities by using the intertemporal solvency condition obtained by linearizing (25)
and invoking the intertemporal solvency condition. More details can be found in the Technical Appendix.
31It compares the steady-state of the model before and after the productivity shock biased towards the
traded sector.
32Totally differentiating the goods market equilibrium (26) yields:
(
yˆT − yˆN) = φpˆ − d ln (1− υNX).
Remembering that wˆjR = χ
j θˆj and totally differentiating the vacancy creation equation for sector j
gives the deviation in percentage of the sectoral labor market tightness from its initial steady-state,
i.e., θˆj = Ξ
j Ξˆj
[(1−αV )Ψj+χjW jR]








θˆj . Substituting the former into the latter, differentiating the production func-




at the steady-state, one obtains yˆj = aˆj +ΘjΞˆj
where Θj is given by (30). The output differential along the labor market equilibrium is thus given by(












Ψj [(1− αV ) (sj + r?) + αWmj ] , (30)
in order to write expressions in a compact form. The elasticity Θj of sectoral employment
Lj w.r.t. the marginal revenue of labor Ξj is a measure of the degree of labor mobility
across sectors which captures both the size of workers’ mobility costs and the extent of
search frictions. In order to facilitate the discussion, we assume that Θj ' Θ.33 Under this







d ln (1− υNX)
(φ+Θ)
, (31)
where d ln (1− υNX) ' −dυNX by using a first-order Taylor approximation.
Eq. (31) breaks down the relative price response into two components: a labor market
frictions effect and a labor accumulation effect. The first term on the RHS of (31) corre-
sponds to the labor market frictions effect. Through this channel, higher productivity gains
in tradables relative to non tradables tend to appreciate p. The reason is that a productivity
shock biased toward the traded sector raises traded output relative to non traded output
so that p must increase to clear the goods market. Importantly, the size of the relative
price appreciation is given by the elasticity (1+Θ)(φ+Θ) . When we let σL tend toward infinity,
workers no longer experience a utility loss when shifting from one sector to another; hence
the case of perfect mobility of labor across sectors is obtained as reflected by the term Θ
that tends toward infinity; in this configuration, a productivity differential between trad-
ables and non tradables by 1% appreciates p by 1% as well. As long as σL < ∞, workers
experience a mobility cost when moving from one sector to another so that the term Θ takes
finite values. In this configuration, the relative price of non tradables is jointly determined
by technological and demand conditions. Hence, the elasticity φ between traded and non
traded goods in consumption plays a pivotal role in the determination of the relative price
response. If φ > 1 (φ < 1), p appreciates by less (more) than aˆT − aˆN .
The second term on the RHS of (31) reveals that a productivity differential between
tradables and non tradables also impinges on p by affecting the trade balance and hiring
expenditure expressed as a share of traded output, as summarized by dυNX . More precisely,
through the labor accumulation channel, higher productivity gains in tradables relative to
non tradables increase υNX which exerts a negative impact on p by raising the demand
for tradables in the long-run. Intuitively, higher productivity, Aj , raises the shadow value
of an additional worker γj and thus induces firms in both sectors to hire more. Because
job vacancies V j are a jump variable, it overshoots on impact. Since hiring is a costly
activity, recruiting expenditures rise substantially. While employment builds up, the open
economy finances the accelerated hiring process by running a current account deficit in the
33For the baseline calibration, while labor market parameters are allowed to vary across sectors ΘT and
ΘN are very similar if not identical. It is only when the firing costs are important that ΘT and ΘN differ
substantially.
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short-run. For the country to remain solvent, the deterioration in the net foreign asset
position must be offset by a steady-state increase in net exports. The combined effect of
the improvement in the trade balance and the permanently increased hiring expenditure
has an expansionary effect on the demand for tradables which drives down p, regardless of
the value of the elasticity of substitution, φ. To conclude, as long as the elasticity of labor
supply takes finite values (i.e., σL <∞), we will have to determine numerically if the labor
accumulation effect more than offsets the labor market frictions effect when φ < 1 so that
pˆ < 1% following a rise in the productivity of tradables relative to non tradables by 1%.
We now explore the long-run response of the relative wage of non tradables to a pro-
ductivity differential. To do so, we first totally differentiate the vacancy creation equation
that we substitute into the Nash bargaining wage (22) expressed in rate of change relative
to the steady-state:34











[(1− αV ) (sj + r?) + αWmj ] > 0, (32)
where ΞˆT = aˆT and ΞˆN = pˆ+ aˆN . Calculating ωˆ ≡ wˆN − wˆT by using (32) and substituting
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When assuming perfect mobility of labor across sectors, i.e., if we let σL tend toward
infinity, we have Θ→∞; hence (34) shows that a productivity differential leaves unaffected
ω. Conversely, as long as workers experience a utility loss when shifting (i.e., assuming
σL < ∞), higher productivity gains in tradables relative to non tradables impinge on ω
through two channels.
When keeping fixed υNX , (34) reduces to −Ω (φ−1)φ+Θ
(
aˆT − aˆN). Hence, through the labor
market frictions channel, a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables
lowers the relative wage ω only if φ > 1. With an elasticity of substitution φ greater
than one, the demand for tradables rises more than proportionally. By raising the share
of tradables in total expenditure, higher productivity gains in tradables relative to non
tradables induce traded firms to hire more which lowers ω. Conversely, with an elasticity
φ smaller than one, the share of non tradables rises which has an expansionary effect on
recruitment in the non traded sector. Hence, in this case, ω increases instead of declining,
in contradiction with our empirical findings.
34Totally differentiating (22) gives wˆj = αWΞ
j
W j





θˆj . Inserting in the above equa-
tion the vacancy creation equation expressed in percentage deviation from initial steady-state, i.e., θˆj =
Ξj Ξˆj
[(1−αV )Ψj+χjW jR]





, one obtains (32).
35For the baseline scenario of our quantitative analysis, i.e., when calibrating to a typical OECD economy,
ΩT and ΩN are almost identical.
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As captured by the second term on the RHS of (34), a productivity differential between
tradables and non tradables also impinges on ω through a labor accumulation channel.
More specifically, higher demand for tradables triggered by the improvement in the trade
balance encourages traded firms to hire more which exerts a negative impact on the relative
wage.
While ω unambiguously declines if the elasticity of substitution is larger than one, when
φ < 1, the relative wage response to a productivity differential is ambiguous. In the latter
case, higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables drives down ω through the
labor accumulation channel while it increases the relative wage through the labor market
frictions channel. We address this ambiguity numerically later.
In our model, the elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin, σL, plays a key role
in the determination of the relative wage adjustment. When the labor force participation
decision is endogenized, the situations of total immobility (σL = 0) and perfect mobility
(σL → ∞) of labor emerge as special cases. If we let σL = 0, the situation of total labor
immobility is obtained. Because the mobility costs are prohibitive, the labor force is fixed in
both sectors. As will be clear later when discussing quantitative results, such a configuration
reduces the likelihood that our model trustfully replicates our empirical findings.
Conversely, when we let σL tend toward infinity, workers are no longer subject to switch-
ing costs; in this configuration, we have Θj → ∞ so that (29) reduces to pˆ = (aˆT − aˆN),
as in the standard BS model. Inserting the relative price equation into ΞˆN = pˆ + aˆN , the
deviation in percentage of the relative wage from its initial steady-state (33) can be rewrit-
ten as ωˆ =
(
ΩN − ΩT ) aˆT . Such an equality reflects the fact that even if mobility costs are
absent, technological change biased toward the traded sector may produce different sectoral
wage responses because search parameters vary across sectors. However, the quantitative
analysis conducted in section 5 reveals that the elasticity Ωj of sectoral wages w.r.t. the
marginal revenue of labor is almost identical across sectors (as long as firing costs are low),
i.e., ΩT ' ΩN ; hence, if σL →∞, we would have ωˆ ' 0. Standard search frictions are thus
insufficient on their own to produce significant long-run movements in the relative wage.
4.2 Implications of Labor Market Regulation
We now explore the ability of our model to account for our empirical findings established
in section 2.5. So far, we have shown that the relative wage of non tradables no longer
remains fixed following higher productivity gains in tradables relative to non tradables
because workers experience a mobility cost (as captured by 0 < σL < ∞) which must be
covered by higher wages. While searching for a job is costly because it is time consuming,
in a model with search in the labor market, hiring is also a costly activity. By affecting
the marginal benefit of hiring, labor market institutions determine the elasticity of labor
demand to productivity gains. Because labor market regulation influences the hiring process
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and the subsequent adjustment of sectoral output to technology shocks, we also address the
implications of labor institutions for the relative price adjustment. Since the transmission
mechanism varies according to the type of labor market institution, we differentiate between
the firing cost on the one hand, the generosity of the unemployment benefit scheme and
the worker bargaining power on the other.
4.2.1 Higher Firing Tax
In our model, the strictness of legal protection against dismissals is captured by a firing
tax denoted by xj paid to the State by the representative firm in the sector which reduces
employment. Productivity gains exert two opposite effects on labor Lj . On the one hand,
by producing a positive wealth effect, as reflected by a fall in the shadow value of wealth λ¯, a
higher productivity exerts a negative impact on employment by driving down labor supply
(see eq. (14b)). On the other hand, by increasing the marginal revenue of labor, a rise in Aj
induces firms to recruit more which pushes up employment. Because productivity shocks
are biased toward the traded sector, hours worked increase in the traded sector while labor
in the non traded sector declines. As non traded establishments are shrinking, firms must
pay a firing cost on reducing employment. Thus, according to (19), higher productivity
induces non traded firms to post more job vacancies but less so as the firing tax is increased
because the surplus from hiring rises by a smaller amount. Since hirings in the non traded
sector are relatively less profitable in countries where the firing tax is higher, the labor
market tightness θN (and thus WN ) increases by a smaller amount.
When φ > 1, higher productivity gains in tradables relative to non tradables increases
the surplus of hirings in the traded sector relative to that in non traded sector. Hence, the
ratio of labor market tightness (i.e., θT /θN ) rises, and more so as the firing cost paid by
non traded firms to the State is higher because hiring in the non traded sector is limited by
the firing tax. Consequently, ω declines more, in line with our empirical findings, through
a stronger labor market frictions effect. Because non traded firms tend to recruit less in
countries where the firing tax is higher, labor and thus output of non tradables tends to
increase by a smaller amount so that the relative price appreciates more. However, a higher
firing tax also mitigates the decline in ω and the appreciation in p since net exports increase
less. Intuitively, as recruiting expenditure are curbed by the firing tax, the productivity
differential leads to a smaller current account deficit, thus moderating the necessary trade
balance improvement.
In terms of (33), a higher firing tax (paid by non traded firms) lowers substantially the
term ΩN which is the elasticity of the non traded wage to the marginal revenue of labor.
The term in braces in (33) which captures the labor market frictions channel is thus higher
in absolute terms (or more negative) when φ > 1. Conversely, when φ < 1, the term in
braces in (33) becomes positive but smaller as the firing tax x is increased. Regarding the
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relative price equation (29), a stricter employment legislation against dismissals lowers ΘN
and thus amplifies the effect of higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables
on p. Moreover, as mentioned above, in countries where the firing tax is higher, net exports
increase less which lowers dυNX > 0 in the last term of (29) and (33). Thus, the firing tax
moderates the labor accumulation effect and thus mitigates the negative impact on p and
ω.
4.2.2 Higher Unemployment Benefit Replacement Rate or Worker Bargaining
Power
In our framework, the generosity of the unemployment benefit scheme is captured by the
level of Rj ; unemployment benefits are assumed to be a fixed proportion % of the wage rate
W j , i.e., Rj = %W j . Additionally, a higher worker bargaining power measured empirically
by the bargaining coverage is captured by the parameter αW .
In contrast to a firing tax, raising % or αW leads to a larger long-run rise in net exports
and thus amplifies the decline in ω and mitigates the appreciation in the relative price
through the labor accumulation channel. The reason is as follows. In countries where
unemployment benefits are more generous or the worker bargaining power is larger, there
are more job-seeking workers and less job vacancies, thus resulting in lower labor market
tightness θj in both sectors. Consequently, following higher productivity, firms are more
willing to recruit additional workers because hiring is more profitable as the probabilities
of fulfilling vacancies (f j) are much higher. Hence, the open economy experiences a larger
current account deficit along the transitional path which must be matched in the long-run
by a greater improvement in the balance of trade. By amplifying the rise in net exports and
thus the demand for tradables, a productivity shock biased toward the traded sector exerts
a larger negative impact on ω and p in countries with a higher % or a larger αW . While a
productivity differential lowers further ω and p through higher net exports, increased labor
mobility tends to mitigate the impact of the trade balance. More precisely, larger values of
%, by reducing the expected cost of hiring (because the probability f j is higher), or higher
values of αW , by raising the marginal benefit of search, increase the mobility of labor across
sectors (captured by Θj). Because workers are more willing to search for a job in countries
with higher αW or %, larger values of Θj mitigate the negative impact of increased net
exports on ω and p.
Since it is found analytically that the three dimensions of labor market regulation exert
opposite effects on the elasticity of ω and p to a productivity differential, we conduct a
quantitative analysis in section 5.
4.3 Effects on Sectoral Unemployment Rates
We now emphasize the implications of labor market frictions for unemployment effects of
higher relative productivity. Importantly, our framework is tractable enough to analyze the
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adjustment of sectoral unemployment in the long- and the short-run as well.
We begin with the long-run effect of AT /AN on the unemployment rate differential
between tradables and non tradables. Setting L˙j = 0 into (12) gives us the standard





The labor market steady-state in sector j = T,N is described by a decision of search- and
a vacancy creation-schedule (henceforth labelled DSj and V Cj), respectively:36
Lj =
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where W jR and Ψ
j are the reservation wage and overall surplus from an additional job
in sector j. Eqs. (35) and (36a) determine the DSj-schedule which is downward-sloping
in the (uj , Lj)-space. Intuitively, a rise in θj raises the probability of finding a job and
thereby the marginal benefit of search which increases Lj and lowers uj . Eqs. (35) and
(36b) determine the V Cj-schedule which is vertical in the traded sector (see Figure 2(a))
and upward-sloping in the non traded sector (see Figure 2(b)).37 Intuitively, a rise in LN
increases non traded output and thereby exerts a downward pressure on the relative price;
because the marginal benefit of hiring falls, θN declines, and thus uN increases. Since the
terms of trade are fixed, a rise in LT leaves uT unaffected along the V CT -schedule.
The initial steady-state is at point Hj0 in the first row of Figure 2 while the final steady-
state is at Hj1 . A rise in relative productivity produces a positive wealth effect which lowers
labor supply and thus shifts the DSj-schedule downward in sector j. At the same time,
by raising the surplus from hiring, higher labor productivity shifts the V Cj-schedule to
the left. As firms recruit more, the labor market tightness θj increases which lowers the
unemployment rate in both sectors. Under certain conditions we detail below, the shift of
the V Cj-schedule to the left is larger in the traded sector which results in a greater decline
in uT than in uN .
Steady-State Effects. Setting Σj = Ξ
j
(1−αV )Ψj+χjW jR
, the steady-state change in the
labor market tightness is θˆj = ΣjΞˆj . Using the latter result, totally differentiating (35) and
using (31), subtracting duN from duT , the change in the unemployment rate differential
between tradables and non tradables in percentage point reads as:









36Setting L˙j = 0 into (12) and ξ˙j = 0 into (14b) leads to the DSj-schedule in sector j. Setting γ˙j = 0
into (18b), and inserting W j given by (22) leads to the V Cj-schedule in sector j.























> 0 where Ξj
Lj
= ∂Ξj/∂Lj ≤ 0.
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where we assume that search parameters are such that Θj ' Θ, uj ' u, Σj ' Σ to facilitate
the discussion. When we let σL →∞, the term Θ tends toward infinity as well so that the
unemployment rate differential remains unchanged.38 Intuitively, when job search costs are
absent, p appreciates by the same amount as aˆT − aˆN so that the marginal revenue of labor
and thus labor market tightness rises evenly across sectors.
As captured by the first term on the RHS of (37), if φ < 1, higher AT /AN lowers
uT less than uN , i.e., duT − duN > 0, through the labor market frictions channel. The
second term on the RHS of (37) reveals that the long-run improvement in the balance of
trade drives down the unemployment rate differential, i.e., duT − duN < 0, through the
labor accumulation channel. Whilst numerical results discussed in the next section show
that the latter channel predominates, labor market regulation should amplify the decline
in the relative unemployment rate of tradables. Intuitively, in countries where the worker
bargaining power or the replacement rate is higher, net exports and thus the demand for
tradables increases more. In addition, as employment protection legislation becomes more
stringent, θN increases less though the labor market frictions channel.
Short-Run Effects. The dynamic effects of a productivity differential on sectoral
unemployment rates are depicted in Figure 2(a) and 2(b). The stable branch labelledXjXj
is downward-sloping and flatter than the DSj-schedule.39 Along the stable transitional
path, employment and unemployment rate vary in opposite direction. Because labor is a
state variable, Lj remains unchanged on impact. On the contrary, U j , is a control variable
which falls sharply on impact since the positive wealth effect encourages agents to reduce
time devoted to job search. Thus sectoral unemployment rates decrease at time t = 0.
Graphically, the economy jumps initially at Hj,′.
As can be seen in the first row of Figure 2, uN overshoots its new steady-state level and
thus should decline more on impact than uT . Intuitively, while the positive wealth effect
lowers U j in both sectors, higher AT /AN mitigates the decline in uT by exerting a positive
impact on the marginal benefit of search. The adjustment in Lj along the transitional path
reverses this outcome though since the technology shock is biased toward the traded sector.
As employment builds up in the traded sector, thus lowering uT along the stable path, the
gradual decrease in LN raises uN . In the long-run, higher AT /AN lowers the unemployment
rate differential, i.e., duT − duN < 0, as long as the labor accumulation channel more than
offsets the labor market frictions channel.
< Please insert Figure 2 about here >




















where we used the fact that limσL→∞ pˆ = aˆ
T − aˆN . The term in brackets on the RHS of the above equation
is merely positive for the baseline calibration.
39The formal proofs can be found in a Technical Appendix.
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Implications of labor market regulation for impact effects. Labor market regu-
lation amplifies the rise in uT (0)−uN (0) on impact. In economies where % or αW is higher,
uj declines more in both sectors because the wealth effect is greater. At the same time, the
greater trade balance improvement further biases firms’ hirings toward the traded sector.
Because the marginal benefit of search in the traded sector increases more, UN falls by
a larger amount relative to UT on impact. Graphically, the V CN -schedule shifts less as
a result of a smaller appreciation in p in the long-run so that the stable path XNXN is
lower in Figure 2(b). As legal protection against dismissals becomes stricter, non traded
establishments post less job vacancies and thus agents devote less time to searching for a
job in the non traded sector. Since UN decreases more on impact, the fall in uN is larger
on impact.
5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we analyze the effects of a labor productivity differential between trad-
ables and non tradables quantitatively. For this purpose we solve the model numerically.40
Therefore, first we discuss parameter values before turning to the quantitative analysis.
5.1 Calibration
To calibrate our model, we estimated a set of parameters so that the initial steady state is
consistent with the key empirical properties of a representative OECD economy. While at
the end of the section we move a step further and calibrate the model for each economy, we
first have to evaluate the ability of the two-sector open economy model with labor market
frictions to accommodate our evidence. Our sample covers the eighteen OECD economies
in our dataset. Since we calibrate a two-sector model with labor market frictions, we pay
particular attention to match the labor market differences between the two sectors. To
do so, we carefully estimate a set of sectoral labor market parameters shown in Table 6.41
Because we consider an open economy setup with traded and non traded goods, we calculate
the non-tradable content of employment, consumption, and government spending, and the
productivity in tradables in terms of non tradables, for all countries in our sample, as
summarized in Table 5. Our reference period for the calibration of the non tradable share
given in Table 5 is running from 1990 to 2007 while labor market parameters have been
computed over various periods due to data availability. To capture the key properties a
typical OECD economy which is chosen as the baseline scenario, we take unweighed average
values shown in the last line of Tables 5 and 6. Some of the values of parameters can be
taken directly from the data, but others like κT , κN , XT , XN , ζN , ϕ, together with initial
40Technically, the assumption β = r? requires the joint determination of the transition and the steady
state.
41To calibrate the labor market for the traded and the non traded sector, we need to estimate the job
finding and the job destruction rate for each sector. To do so, we apply the methodology developed by
Shimer [2012].
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conditions (B0, LT0 , L
N
0 ), need to be endogenously calibrated to fit a set of labor market
and non tradable content features.42 We choose the model period to be one month and
therefore set the world interest rate, r?, which is equal to the subjective time discount rate,
β, to 0.4%.
We start with the values of the labor market parameters which are chosen so as to
match a typical OECD economy. We set the matching efficiency in the traded (non traded)
sector XT (XN ) to 0.307 (0.262) to target a monthly job finding rate mT (mN ) of 17.4%
(17.0%). In accordance with estimates shown in the last line of column 6 (column 8) of
Table 6, the job destruction rate sT (sN ) in the traded (non traded) sector is set to 1.48%
(1.54%), which together with the job finding rate mT (mN ) leads to an unemployment rate
uT (uN ) of 7.9% (8.3%). We obtain an overall unemployment rate u of 8.1%. To target
the labor market tightness in the traded sector, θT = 0.24, and in the non traded sector,
θN = 0.34, displayed in the last line of columns 10 and 11 of Table 6, we set the recruiting
cost κT and κN to 1.482 and 0.575, respectively.43
Unemployment benefit replacement rates and the firing cost shown in the latter two
columns of Table 6 correspond to averages over 1980-2007 (except Korea: 2001-2007) and
1980-2005, respectively. The unemployment benefits replacement rate, %, has been set
to 52.4%. To calibrate the firing cost, we take data from FRDB-IMF Labor Institutions
Database [2010]; we add the advance notice and the severance payment which are averages
after 4 and 20 years of employment. Since the advance notice and the severance payment
are both expressed in monthly salary equivalents, we have xj = τW j with τ ≥ 0. For the
baseline calibration, we set the firing tax τ to 4.2.44
Because the features of labor markets vary substantially across OECD economies, we
also analyze two different calibrations of the model, one aimed at capturing the U.S. labor
market, the other aimed at capturing Europe with its more ’rigid’ labor market. To calibrate
a typical European labor market, we take the EU-12 unweighed average.45
Using U.S. data, Barnichon [2012] reports an elasticity of the matching function with
respect to unemployed workers of about 0.6, an estimate which lies in the middle of the
plausible range reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides [2001]. Hence, we set 1 − αV to
0.6. As it is common in the literature, we impose the Hosios condition, and set the worker
42As detailed in a Technical Appendix, the steady-state can be reduced to seven equations which jointly
determine θT , θN , mT , mN , LT /LN (and thus LN/L), P (and thus αC), B (and thus υNX). Among the
20 parameters that the model contains, 14 have empirical counterparts while the remaining 6 parameters,




0 ) must be set in order to match
θT , θN , mT , mN , LN/L, αC , υNX .
43The share of recruiting costs in GDP is 2.3%.
44We model firing costs as a tax that firms have to pay to the State when their employment levels decline,
i.e., if L˙j < 0. As mentioned previously, because traded employment monotonically increases while the non
traded sector reduces continuously employment following a productivity differential, only the non traded
sector is subject to the firing tax.
45For sectoral unemployment rates, and monthly job finding and job destruction rates, we take the EU-10
unweighed average due to data availability. See section B.3 that provides the list of countries for EU-12 and
EU-10.
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bargaining power αW to 0.6 in the baseline scenario.
Next, we turn to the elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin which is assumed
to be symmetric across sectors. We choose σL to be 0.6 in our baseline setting but conduct a
sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter.46 Furthermore, in order to target a non
tradable content of labor of 66% which corresponds to the 18 OECD countries’ unweighted
average shown in the last line of Table 5, we normalize ζT to 1 and choose a value for ζN
that parametrizes the disutility from working and searching for a job in the non traded
sector, of 0.18 (see eq. (11)).
< Please insert Table 5 and Table 6 about here >
We now turn to the calibration of consumption-side parameters. Building on our panel
data estimations, we set the elasticity of substitution to 1 in the baseline calibration.47
But we conduct a sensitivity analysis by considering alternatively a value of φ smaller or
larger than one (i.e., φ is set to 0.6 and 1.5, respectively).48 The weight of consumption
in non tradables 1− ϕ is set to 0.42 to target a non-tradable content in total consumption
expenditure (i.e., αC) of 42%, in line with the average of our estimates shown in the last
line of Table 5. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption σC is set to 1.
For calibration purposes, we introduce government spending on traded and non traded
goods in the setup. We set GN and GT so as to yield a non-tradable share of government
spending of 90%, and government spending as a share of GDP of 20%. We assume that, in
the initial steady-state, net exports are nil and thus choose initial conditions (B0, LT0 , L
N
0 )
in order to target υNX = 0.
We consider a permanent increase in the productivity index Aj of both sectors biased
towards the traded sector so that the labor productivity differential between tradables and
non tradables, i.e., aˆT − aˆN , is 1%. While in our baseline calibration we set φ = 1, σL = 0.6,
αW = 0.6, % = 0.524, τ = 4.2, we conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to these five
parameters by setting alternatively: φ to 0.6 and 1.5, σL to 0, 0.2 and 1, αW to 0.9, % to
0.782, and τ to 13.49 Finally, in the latter two columns of Table 7, we compare the results
for the US economy with those obtained for a typical European economy (EU-12).
46Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Fiorito and Zanella [2012] find that aggregate
time-series results deliver an extensive margin elasticity in the range 0.8-1.4, which is substantially larger
than the corresponding estimate (0.2-0.3) reported by Chetty, Friedman, Manoli, and Weber [2011]. A value
of 0.6 is halfway between these two sets of findings.
47In Appendix B.2, we describe the empirical strategy to estimate φ. In particular, we derive a testable
equation by combining market clearing conditions for tradables and non tradables and the demand for
tradables in terms of non tradables. Details of the derivation of the equation we explore empirically can be
found in the Technical Appendix of a longer version of the paper. Excluding estimates of φ for Italy which
are negative (see Table 9), column 1 of Table 8 reports consistent estimates for the elasticity of substitution
φ between traded and non traded goods which average to a value close to 1.
48These values for φ of 0.6 and 1.5 correspond roughly to the averages of estimates of φ for countries with
φ < 1 and φ > 1, respectively.
49When conducting the sensitivity analysis, we raise % from 52.4% to 78.2% and τ from 4.2 to 13, which




We now assess the ability of the model to account for our empirical findings according to
which a productivity differential (by 1%) lowers the relative wage (by 0.22%), appreciates
the relative price (by 0.64%), and lowers the unemployment rate of tradables relative to
that of non tradables (by 0.034 ppt). We also investigate the implications of the three
dimensions of labor market regulation for the effects of higher AT /AN .
No mobility costs. The responses of ω and p computed numerically are summarized
in Table 7. Since the response of ω is ambiguous when φ < 1, it is convenient to first discuss
the numerical results in this configuration. Panels D and E of Table 7 report the long-run
changes for ω and p expressed as a percentage. The numbers reported in the first line of each
panel give the (overall) responses of these variables to a productivity differential aˆT − aˆN
of 1%. Column 1 of Table 7 shows that when abstracting from labor market frictions, i.e.,
setting κj = 0 and σL →∞, the model cannot account for our empirical evidence.
With mobility costs. Conversely, numerical results summarized in column 2 show
that when calibrating to a typical OECD economy, a model with labor market frictions
can produce a decline in ω and a less than proportional increase in p as found in the data.
To shed light on the transmission mechanism of higher productivity in tradables relative
to non tradables in a model with labor market frictions, we numerically break down the
responses into two components: a labor market frictions channel stemming from changes in
the share of tradables and a labor accumulation channel triggered by the accelerated hiring
process which increases the demand for tradables in the long-run.
As shown in the second line of panels D and E, a rise by 1% in the productivity of
tradables relative to non tradables raises ω by 0.29% and appreciates p by 1.33% through
the labor market frictions effect. Intuitively, when φ < 1, a productivity shock biased toward
the traded sector raises the share of non tradables into expenditure and thus encourages
non traded firms to recruit relatively more than traded firms. To attract workers who
experience mobility costs when shifting from one sector to another, wN must rise relative to
wT . As shown in the third line of panels D and E, the labor accumulation effect counteracts
the labor market frictions effect. More specifically, higher AT /AN also raises net exports
which has an expansionary effect on hirings in the traded sector, thus driving down ω by
0.45%. Higher demand for tradables also depreciates p by 0.47%. Importantly, the labor
accumulation effect more than offsets the labor market frictions effect so that ω declines by
0.16% and p appreciates by 0.85%, as summarized in the first line of panels D and E.
Our model with search in the labor market and an endogenous sectoral labor force
participation sheds light on two sets of factors influencing the mobility of labor across sectors
and thus the responses of ω and p to a productivity differential: the workers’ mobility cost
reflected by a utility loss when increasing the search intensity for a job in one sector (as
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captured by σL) and labor market institutions (captured by αW , %, τ) determining the
elasticity of hiring to labor productivity.
Role of labor supply at the extensive margin. As we move from column 3 to
column 5, the elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin σL is raised from zero to 1.
Column 3 of panels D and E of Table 7 shows numerical results if labor is totally immobile
across sectors as captured by setting σL = 0. In this configuration, the labor force is fixed in
both sectors because the mobility cost is prohibitive. Since the decision of search is inelastic
to the sectoral wage, ω falls by 0.48% instead of 0.16% in the baseline scenario. Hence, such
a polar case tends to substantially overstate the decline in ω and thus confirms the pivotal
role of an endogenous labor force participation decision. As shown, in columns 4 and 5 of
panels D and E of Table 7, raising σL from 0.2 to 1 lowers the utility loss induced by the
shift from one sector to another which in turn moderates the decline in ω and amplifies the
appreciation in p.
Implications of higher unemployment benefits and worker bargaining power.
Scenarios summarized in columns 6 and 7 of Table 7 show that, in line with our evidence,
raising the worker bargaining power αW or the unemployment benefit replacement rate %
amplifies the decline in ω from 0.16% to 0.21% and 0.25%, respectively. In accordance with
our model’s predictions, in countries with a higher αW or %, higher AT /AN lowers more ω
through the labor accumulation effect, as shown in the third line of panel D. The stronger
labor accumulation effect also moderates the appreciation in p from 0.85% to 0.81% and
0.76%, respectively, as shown in the first line of panel E, because the demand for tradables
increases more than in the baseline scenario. The second line of panel D also reveals that ω
rises less than in the baseline scenario through the labor market frictions channel because
the mobility of labor across sectors rises.
Implications of higher firing costs. Column 8 of Table 7 gives results when the
firing cost, τ , is about three times larger than in the baseline scenario. In accordance
with our empirical findings, raising τ drives down further ω from -0.16% to -0.19%. As
shown in the third line of panel D, the labor accumulation channel is merely affected by τ .
On the contrary, the second line of panel D reveals that ω increases by a smaller amount
because the firing cost curbs the expansionary effect of higher productivity gains on hiring
by non traded firms and thus moderates the rise in wN relative to wT from 0.29% to 0.25%.
Moreover, as shown in the first line of panel E, countries with stringent legal protection
against dismissals also experience a larger appreciation in p, in line with our empirical
findings, because traded output increases more relative to non traded output.
EU-12 vs. USA. The latter two columns of Table 7 compare the responses of ω and
p between a typical European country and the US. Because the legal protection against
dismissals is stricter while unemployment benefits are higher, a typical European economy
experiences a smaller increase in wN through the labor market frictions channel and a
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larger increase in wT through the labor accumulation channel. As a result, ω falls by 0.20%
in EU-12 and declines by only 0.09% in the US. While a higher τ tends to amplify the
appreciation in p, a larger % tends to moderate it. The first line of panel D shows that the
latter effect dominates so that a productivity differential raises p more in the US (0.90%)
than in a European economy (0.82%).
Implications of φ = 1. In panels A and B of Table 7, we consider the scenario φ = 1.
Keeping fixed net exports, a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables
by 1% would have no effect on ω while p would appreciate by 1% if labor market parameters
were identical because the share of tradables in total expenditure remains unchanged. As
shown in the second line of panel A, ω falls very slightly because the elasticity of hiring
in the traded sector is merely higher than that in the non traded sector. The third line of
panel A and B reveals that higher AT /AN produces a decline in ω and a rise in p close to
our estimates due to the improvement in the balance of trade.
Unemployment rate differential between tradables and non tradables. We
now explore the effects of a rise in AT /AN on the unemployment rate differential between
tradables and non tradables shown in panel C of Table 7. Since the transmission mechanism
is identical to that described above for p and ω, we focus on the situation of φ = 1.
This case is particularly interesting for the study of duT − duN since the second line of
panel C gives the change in the relative unemployment rate that would prevail if labor
mobility costs were absent.50 Through the labor market frictions channel, a productivity
differential merely influences the relative unemployment rate of tradables. On the contrary,
as displayed in the third line of panel C, the unemployment rate differential falls as a result
of higher demand for tradables. Intuitively, when workers incur costs of switching sectors,
p appreciates by a smaller amount than aˆT − aˆN so that the labor market tightness in the
traded sector increases more which produces duT − duN < 0 in line with our empirical
findings. Whereas at first sight, the magnitude appears to be small, changes in sectoral
unemployment rates are substantial as the aggregate unemployment rate declines by 0.11
percentage point.
Implications of labor market regulation for the unemployment rate differ-
ential. Contrasting the figure in column 2 with those in columns 6,7,8, numerical results
reveal that the three dimensions of labor market regulation amplifies the decline in the rela-
tive unemployment rate of tradables in line with our evidence. While such an amplification
operates through higher demand for tradables when αW or % is raised, increasing the firing
cost curbs non traded firms’ hiring and thus mitigates the rise in uT −uN through the labor
market frictions channel.
50A unitary elasticity of substitution between tradables and non tradables implies that the share of non
tradables remains fixed and thus neutralizes the labor market frictions channel. In this case, the figures in
the second line of panel C shows the change in the relative unemployment rate due to differences in standard
search frictions between the traded and the non traded labor market, i.e., the change in uT −uN that would
prevail if labor mobility costs were shut off.
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Implications of φ > 1. We briefly discuss the scenario φ > 1. Panels F and G of
Table 7 report the long-run responses of ω and p. Because the labor accumulation channel
reinforces the labor market frictions channel, the first line of panel F reveals that the model
tends to overstate the decline in ω when φ > 1. As shown in the first line of panel G,
the model also tends to understate the rise in p because the relative price appreciates less
than proportionately through the labor market frictions effect while the rise in net exports
depreciates p.
< Please insert Table 7 about here >
5.3 Model Performance
We now move a step further and compare the predicted values with estimates for each
country and the whole sample and thus restrict our attention to relative wage and relative
price effects since unemployment differential effects cannot be estimated empirically by
country due to data limitation (see Appendix B.3). We use the same baseline calibration
for each economy, except for the elasticity of substitution φ between traded and non traded
goods, and labor market parameters which are allowed to vary across countries. More
specifically, φ is set in accordance with its estimates shown in the first column of Table
8.51 The parameters which capture the degree of labor market regulation such as the firing
cost, τ , and the replacement rate, %, are set to their values shown in the latter two columns
of Table 6. The matching efficiency Xj in sector j = T,N is set to target the job finding
rate mj displayed in columns 5 and 7 of Table 6. The job destruction rate in sector j, sj ,
is set in accordance with its value reported in columns 6 and 8 of Table 6. The costs per
job vacancy κT and κN are chosen to target the aggregate labor market tightness θ shown
in column 13 and the ratio of sectoral labor market tightness θT /θN obtained by dividing
column 10 by column 11.52
Before discussing the performance of the model, we relate our analytical results to the
elasticity of p and ω with respect to the productivity differential, i.e., γ and β (see eqs. (7a)-
(7b)), which are estimated empirically. When search frictions are similar across sectors, the
long-run responses of p and ω reduce to (31) and (34), respectively. In this configuration,




empirical estimates of γ and β, respectively. In contrast, when search frictions vary across
sectors, we have to correct for the inherent discrepancy between theoretical and empirical
values for γ and β. This discrepancy originates from sector-varying Θj and Ωj which makes
51We also choose the weight of consumption in non tradables 1 − ϕ to target a non-tradable content in
total consumption expenditure (i.e., αC) for each country in line with our estimates shown in column 2 of
Table 5.
52Ideally, the recruiting cost κj would be set in order to target θj ; however, the series for job vacancies
by economic activity are available for a maximum of seven years and for a limited number of countries. On
the contrary, the OECD provides data for job openings (for the whole economy) over the period 1980-2007
allowing us to calculate the labor market tightness, i.e., θ = V/U , for several countries that we target along
with the ratio θT /θN by choosing κT and κN .
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the theoretical elasticity of p (resp. ω) w.r.t. aˆT − aˆN different. To map the deviation in
percentage of p and ω from their initial steady-state into elasticities estimated empirically,
we need to adjust numerically computed values with a term that captures the extent to
which search frictions vary across sectors. Once the discrepancy is accounted for, we are
able to relate γ and β estimated empirically to their analytical counterpart which we denote
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d ln (1− υNX)
aˆT − aˆN , (38b)
where the second term on the RHS of (38a) and (38b) captures the negative impact on p
and ω of the long-run adjustment in net exports caused by rise in AT /AN
Results are shown in Table 8. Columns 2 and 5 of Table 8 give the predicted responses of
ωˆ and pˆ to a rise in the productivity of tradables relative to non tradables by 1%. Columns 3
and 6 report FMOLS estimates of ωˆ and pˆ for each country, EU-12 and the whole sample.54
Columns 4 and 7 give the difference between the actual and the predicted values. As can be
seen in the last line, the correlation coefficient between simulated and estimated values for
the relative wage response is high which indicates that the model generates a cross-country
pattern in the relative wage responses which is similar to that in the data. More specifically,
column 4 reveals that our model’s predictions for ωˆ are relatively close to the evidence for
almost half of the countries in our sample, including France, the UK, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, Spain and the United States, and to a lesser extent Germany, Austria
and EU-12. The model predicts fairly well the relative price response for nine countries of
our sample, including Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Spain, and the UK. The prediction error is also moderate in Denmark and France. However,
the correlation coefficient in the last line of the table indicates that the ability of the model
to account for the cross-country pattern in the relative price responses is less than that in
the relative wage responses. It is worthwhile mentioning that, whether we focus on ωˆ or pˆ,
the prediction error is large for Australia, Canada, and Norway which are important natural
resources exporters. Hence, for these three economies, we believe that our assumption of
given terms of trade is too strong.
When calibrating to the whole sample, the model predicts remarkably well the relative
wage response; we find numerically a decline in ω of 0.218% while in the data, ω falls by
0.223%. When we turn to the relative price, the prediction error increases substantially as
our model produces an appreciation of 0.778% while we find empirically a rise of 0.636%.

























aˆN , respectively. It is worth mentioning that the
magnitude of the bias originating from sector-varying search frictions is quantitatively low.
54We reach similar conclusions when using DOLS estimates.
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We now investigate whether the long-run response in ω is more pronounced and p appre-
ciates less in countries where labor markets are more regulated, in line with our empirical
findings documented in subsection 2.5. In Figure 3, we plot the simulated responses of
the relative wage on the vertical axis against the employment protection legislation index
adjusted with the share of permanent workers in the economy in Figure 3(a). Figure 3(b)
plots simulated responses of the relative wage against an indicator of labor market regula-
tion which encompasses two dimensions, namely the generosity of the unemployment benefit
scheme and the extent of the worker bargaining power.55 Despite the wide dispersion in
the relative wage responses that our model generates, the trend line in Figure 3(a) reveals
that the relative wage falls more in countries where legal protection against dismissals is
stricter. In Figure 3(b) countries where unemployment benefits are more generous or the
worker bargaining power is higher also experience a larger decline in the relative wage.
In sum, while productivity gains biased toward the traded sector drive down non traded
wages relative to traded wages as the result of job search costs experienced by workers,
international differences in hiring costs and thus in the degree of labor market regulation
can account for the dispersion in the relative wage responses across countries.
Figure 3(c) plots the simulated responses for the relative price against our measure
of labor market regulation which encompasses the extent of the worker bargaining power,
the generosity of the unemployment benefit scheme and the strictness of legal protection
against dismissals. While both empirical and numerical results show that higher firing costs
put upward pressure on the relative price, the trend line in Figure 3(c) indicates that more
generous unemployment benefits exert a stronger influence. More specifically, in line with
the evidence documented in section 2.5, we find quantitatively that the relative price of non
tradables tends to appreciate less in countries with more regulated labor markets.
< Please insert Table 8 and Figure 3 about here >
5.4 Long- and Short-Run Adjustment of Sectoral Unemployment Rates
An additional major implication of our two-sector model with search frictions is that higher
relative productivity leads to a decline in the unemployment rate differential in the long-
run as long as the effect of increased demand for tradables is larger than the impact of
changes in the share of tradables when φ < 1. Column 8 of Table 8 reports the numerical
counterpart of σ which corresponds to the estimated effect of higher relative productivity on
the unemployment rate differential adjusted with the bias originating from sector-varying
search frictions, i.e.,




d ln (1− υNX)
aˆT − aˆN , (39)
55The labor market regulation index in Figure 3(b) is obtained by using a principal component analysis
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)]
. As shown in column 8 of Table
8, the unemployment rate differential falls by 0.011 ppt for an average OECD economy.
Column 9 of Table 8 shows the adjustment of the unemployment rate differential that
would prevail if labor mobility costs were absent, i.e., if σL → ∞. In this situation, the
unemployment rate differential increases in a representative OECD economy along with
most of the countries in our sample as its response is only driven by differences in standard
search frictions between the traded and non traded labor markets.
While the baseline model (for an average OECD economy) tends to understate the
magnitude of the decrease in uT relative to uN we estimate empirically (see the first row of
Table 3), its decline remains substantial though in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Spain where duT−duN varies from −0.061 to −0.022 ppt. In this regard, Figure 3(d) reveals
that the long-run adjustment of the unemployment rate differential to a rise in AT /AN is
quite distinct between countries with low and high labor market regulation. In line with
our evidence, uT falls more than uN in economies with higher labor market regulation.
While so far we have investigated the long-run effects, Figure 2(c) plots the dynamics for
sectoral unemployment rates and contrasts the results for a representative OECD economy
(shown in solid lines) with those obtained for an economy with more regulated labor markets
(shown in dashed lines).56 Focusing first on a representative OECD economy, the first
conclusion that emerges is that the adjustment is rapid, the sectoral unemployment rates
reaching their steady-state values after 3 years approximately. Secondly, whilst in the long-
run sectoral unemployment rates decline by about 0.12 ppt with duT < duN < 0, the fall
in job search in the non traded sector is such that uN decreases by 0.24 ppt on impact,
thus reversing duT − duN in the short-run. Thirdly, labor market regulation slows down
the transitional adjustment toward the steady-state because the probability of finding a job
is much lower in countries where % and/or τ is higher. Fourthly, as can be seen in dashed
lines in Figure 2(c), the change in the unemployment rate differential is amplified both in
the short- and the long-run. Because labor market regulation further biases the positive
impact of the technology shock on traded firms’ hiring, less agents search for a job in the
non traded sector on impact while along the transitional path, recruitment by traded firms
lowers uT .
6 Conclusion
While the literature exploring the implications of higher productivity in tradables relative
to non tradables commonly assumes frictionless labor markets, our empirical results show
that the non traded wage tends to decline relative to the traded wage. Because the non
traded wage increases at a lower speed than the traded wage, it is found empirically that
56When we consider an OECD economy with high labor market regulation, we set % to 78.2% and the
firing tax to 13 months, these two figures corresponding to the highest values in our sample.
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the relative price appreciates less than that predicted by the standard neoclassical model
abstracting from labor market frictions. Our estimates also reveal that the unemployment
rate of tradables falls more than that of non tradables since the appreciation in the relative
price of non tradables does not compensate for lower productivity gains. We also report
evidence suggesting that such responses to a productivity differential have increased as the
result of decreasing labor mobility costs. Whilst time-varying costs of switching sectors
can rationalize the rise in the responses of variables to higher relative productivity, our
estimates reveal that their adjustment is quite distinct whether labor market regulation
is high or low. We report results which indicate that both the relative wage and the
unemployment differential fall more while the relative price appreciates less in countries
with more regulated labor markets.
To account for the evidence, we develop a two-sector open economy model with search
in the labor market and an endogenous sectoral labor force participation decision. As
in Alvarez and Shimer [2011], workers cannot reallocate hours worked from one sector to
another without searching for a job in this sector. Because such an activity is costly in utility
terms, workers experience a switching cost. We find analytically that two sets of parameters
play a pivotal role in the determination of the relative wage and relative price responses to
higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables: i) preference parameters such as
the elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin and the elasticity of substitution in
consumption between tradables and non tradables, ii) parameters capturing labor market
institutions such as the firing tax, the unemployment benefit replacement rate and the
worker bargaining power.
Our quantitative analysis indicates that, regardless of the value of the elasticity of sub-
stitution between tradables and non tradables, when the elasticity of labor at the extensive
margin takes finite values, the relative wage falls while workers’ mobility costs curtail the
appreciation in the relative price following a productivity differential, thus producing a
fall in the unemployment rate differential between tradables and non tradables. On the
contrary, the situations of total immobility or perfect mobility of labor across sectors that
emerge as special cases cannot account for the evidence. When we investigate the impact
of labor market institutions, we find that the relative price appreciates less when raising
the replacement rate or the worker bargaining power because net exports and thus demand
for tradables increase more. Moreover, the relative wage falls by a larger amount because
traded firms are encouraged to hire more, thus amplifying the rise in the traded wage along
with the decline in the relative unemployment rate of tradables. Increasing the firing cost
curbs hiring in the non traded sector, and thus produces a larger decline in the relative wage,
in accordance with our evidence. Because strictness of legal protection against dismissals
further biases the positive influence of the productivity shock on traded firms’ hirings, the
unemployment rate of tradables decreases more relative to that of non tradables. Since non
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traded output increases less, the relative price of non tradables must appreciate more to
clear the goods market.
To explore quantitatively the implications of labor market institutions for the cross-
country dispersion in the estimated effects, we calibrate the model to country-specific data.
We thus allow for the elasticity of substitution between tradables and non tradables and
labor market parameters to vary across countries. Whilst simulated responses display a wide
dispersion across countries, both the relative wage and the unemployment rate differential
decline more in countries where labor market regulation is higher, in line with the evidence.
The relative price of non tradables also appreciates less in countries where labor markets are
more regulated, in accordance with the empirical findings, the strictness of legal protection
against dismissals playing a secondary role in determining the movements in the relative
price.
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Table 1: Panel Cointegration Estimates of β and γ for the Whole Sample (eqs. (7))
Relative wage eq. (7a) Relative price eq. (7b)
DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS








t(β) = 0 0.000 0.000
t(γ) = 1 0.000 0.000
Number of countries 18 18 18 18
Number of observations 680 680 680 680
Notes: all regressions include country fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses. a denotes significance at 1% level. The
rows t(β) = 0 and t(γ) = 1 report the p-value of the test of H0 : β = 0 and H0 : γ = 1
respectively.
Table 2: Panel Cointegration Estimates of βi and γi for Each Country (eqs. (7))








































































































































































Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels.
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Table 3: Panel OLS Estimates of σ for the Whole and Sub-Samples (eq. (8))
Relative unemployment eq. (8)
Without control with EPLadj with % with EPLadj and %

























Number of observations 164 164 164 164
Number of countries 14 14 14 14
Notes: all regressions include country fixed effects. a (c) denotes significance at 1% (10%) level. We split the sample of
14 OECD countries into two subsamples on the basis of the mean sample of the labor market regulation (’LMR’) index
obtained by using a principal component analysis. The number of observations of the sub-sample of countries with high
(low) labor market regulation is 94 (70). We estimate eq. (8) for the high and low labor market regulation countries
without (column 1) or with one (columns 2 and 3) or two (column 4) labor market control variable; coefficient σH (σL)
captures the response of the unemployment rate differential between tradables and non tradables in countries with high
(low) labor market regulation. ’EPLadj ’ is the strictness of employment protection against dismissals adjusted with the
share of permanent workers, ’%’ is the unemployment benefits replacement rate.
















Elasticity of Relative Wage to a Producivity Differential, left axis
Response of Labor Reallocation to a Productivity Differential, right axis
(a) β (window’s length
T = 20)

















Elasticity of Relative Wage to a Producivity Differential, left axis
Response of Labor Reallocation to a Productivity Differential, right axis
(b) β (window’s length
T = 25)





















Elasticity of Relative Wage to a Producivity Differential, left axis
Response of Labor Reallocation to a Productivity Differential, right axis
(c) β (window’s length
T = 30)

















Elasticity of Relative Price to a Producivity Differential, left axis
Response of Labor Reallocation to a Productivity Differential, right axis
(d) γ (window’s length
T = 20)



















Elasticity of Relative Price to a Producivity Differential, left axis
Response of Labor Reallocation to a Productivity Differential, right axis
(e) γ (window’s length
T = 25)



















Response of Unemployment Differential to a Productivity Differential, left axis
Response of Labor Reallocation to a Productivity Differential, right axis
(f) σ (window’s length
T = 12)
Figure 1: Plot of Estimates of β, γ, and σ in Rolling Sub-Samples against the Magnitude of
Intersectoral Labor Reallocation Caused by Higher Productivity Gains in Tradables Notes:
We estimate β (see eq. (7a)), γ (see eq. (7b)), σ (see eq. (8)), and the extent of labor reallocation following higher
relative productivity in rolling sub-samples. The first row of Figure 1 plots FMOLS estimates for the response of
the relative wage to a rise in the relative productivity of tradables (shown in the solid line) against the magnitude of
intersectoral labor reallocation following a rise in the productivity differential (shown in the dashed line). The first
two figures in the second row of Figure 1 plot FMOLS estimates for the response of the relative price to a rise in the
relative productivity of tradables (shown in the solid line) against the magnitude of intersectoral labor reallocation
following a rise in the productivity differential (shown in the dashed line). Sample: 18 OECD countries, 1970-2007.
Figure 1(f) plots the estimated response of the unemployment rate differential to a rise in the productivity differential
(shown in the solid line) against the magnitude of intersectoral labor reallocation following a rise in the productivity
differential (shown in the dashed line). Sample: 10 OECD countries, 1987-2007.
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Table 4: Panel Cointegration Estimates of β and γ for Sub-Samples
LMR % BargCov EPLadj LMR




































































t(γˆL = γˆH) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.987 0.011 0.000
Time period 1970-2007 1970-2007 1985-2007 1985-2007
Countries 17 17 18 17
Observations 642 642 414 390
mean LMR (high) 0.609 0.864 2.280 1.376
mean LMR (low) 0.391 0.491 1.296 -0.512
Notes: a denotes significance at 1% level. To investigate whether labor market regulation influences the responses of the relative
wage, β, and the relative price, γ, to a productivity differential, we split the sample of 18 OECD countries into two subsamples and
run the regressions (7a)-(7b) for the high and low-labor market regulation countries. βH (βL) and γH (γL) capture the responses
of the relative wage and the relative price, respectively, in countries with high (low) labor market regulation. The row t(βˆL = βˆH)
(t(γˆL = γˆH)) reports the p-value of the test of H0 : βˆL = βˆH (γˆL = γˆH). ’%’ is the unemployment benefits replacement rate,
’EPLadj ’ the strictness of employment protection against dismissals adjusted with the share of permanent workers, ’BargCov’ the
bargaining coverage and ’LMR’ the labor market regulation index obtained by using a principal component analysis.
Table 5: Data to Calibrate the Two-Sector Model (1990-2007)
Countries Non tradable Share Gj/Y j Relative Productivity
Labor Consumption Gov. Spending G/Y GT /Y T GN/Y N AT /AN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AUS 0.68 0.43 n.a. 0.18 n.a. n.a. 1.30
AUT 0.64 0.42 0.90 0.19 0.05 0.27 1.05
BEL 0.68 0.42 0.91 0.22 0.06 0.30 1.28
CAN 0.69 0.43 0.91 0.20 0.05 0.30 1.32
DEU 0.65 0.40 0.91 0.19 0.05 0.27 1.00
DNK 0.68 0.42 0.94 0.26 0.05 0.36 1.17
ESP 0.66 0.46 0.88 0.18 0.06 0.24 1.18
FIN 0.63 0.43 0.89 0.22 0.06 0.34 1.47
FRA 0.69 0.40 0.94 0.23 0.05 0.31 1.05
GBR 0.70 0.40 0.93 0.20 0.04 0.29 1.54
IRL 0.62 0.43 0.89 0.17 0.04 0.28 1.83
ITA 0.63 0.37 0.91 0.19 0.05 0.27 1.00
JPN 0.64 0.43 0.86 0.16 0.06 0.22 0.96
KOR 0.58 0.44 0.76 0.12 0.06 0.18 1.53
NLD 0.70 0.40 0.90 0.23 0.07 0.32 1.38
NOR 0.66 0.39 0.88 0.21 0.06 0.34 1.44
SWE 0.68 0.45 0.92 0.27 0.06 0.39 1.42
USA 0.73 0.51 0.90 0.16 0.05 0.20 1.12
EU-12 0.66 0.42 0.91 0.21 0.05 0.30 1.28




































































































































































(c) Dynamics for uT (t) and uN (t)
Figure 2: Theoretical and Numerically Computed Adjustment of Sectoral Unemployment
Rates. Notes: Figure 2(c) plots the dynamics of unemployment rates of tradables (shown in the blue line) and non
tradables (shown in the red line) for a representative OECD economy (shown in solid lines) and contrast them with
those for an OECD economy with high labor market regulation (shown in dashed lines), i.e., we set the unemployment


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(a) Relative Wage Responses against EPLadj


























(b) Relative Wage Responses against
Unemployment Benefits and Bargaining
Coverage




























(c) Relative Price Responses against Labor
Market Regulation

























(d) Unemployment Rate Differential against
Labor Market Regulation
Figure 3: Cross-Country Relationship between Simulated Responses to Higher Relative
Productivity and Labor Market Regulation. Notes: Horizontal axes display the indicators
of labor market regulation: the top-left panel shows the employment protection legislation
index adjusted with the share of permanent workers (i.e., EPLadj), the top-right panel shows
a labor market regulation index obtained by using a principal component analysis which
encompasses both the generosity of the unemployment benefit scheme (UBRR) and the
extent of the worker bargaining power (BargCov), the bottom panels show the labor market
regulation index which encompasses the three dimensions of labor market institutions.
Vertical axes in the top panels report simulated long-run responses of the relative wage to
higher relative productivity from the baseline model with search frictions and an endogenous
labor force participation decision. Vertical axes in bottom panels report simulated long-
run responses of the relative price and unemployment rate differential to higher relative
productivity.
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A Data for Empirical Analysis
Country Coverage: Our sample consists of a panel of 18 OECD countries: Australia (AUS),
Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Germany (DEU), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP),
Finland (FIN), France (FRA), the United Kingdom (GBR), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan
(JPN), Korea (KOR), the Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Sweden (SWE), and the United
States (USA).
Period Coverage: The period is running from 1970 to 2007, except for Japan (1974-2007).
Sources: We use the EU KLEMS [2011] database (the March 2011 data release) for all countries
of our sample with the exceptions of Canada and Norway. For these two countries, sectoral data
are taken from the Structural Analysis (STAN) database provided by the OECD [2011]. Both the
EU KLEMS and STAN databases provide annual data at the ISIC-rev.3 1-digit level for eleven
industries.
The eleven industries are split into tradables and non tradables sectors. To do so, we adopt
the classification proposed by De Gregorio et al. [1994]. Following Jensen and Kletzer [2006], we
have updated this classification by treating ”Financial Intermediation” as a traded industry. We
construct traded and non traded sectors as follows (EU KLEMS codes are given in parentheses):
• Traded Sector: ”Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing” (A-B), ”Mining and Quar-
rying” (C), ”Total Manufacturing” (D), ”Transport, Storage and Communication” (I) and
”Financial Intermediation” (J).
• Non Traded Sector: ”Electricity, Gas and Water Supply” (E), ”Construction” (F), ”Whole-
sale and Retail Trade” (G), ”Hotels and Restaurants” (H), ”Real Estate, Renting and Business
Services” (K) and ”Community Social and Personal Services” (L-Q).
Once industries have been classified as traded or non traded, for any macroeconomic variable
X, its sectoral counterpart Xj for j = T,N is constructed by adding the Xk of all sub-industries k
classified in sector j = T,N as follows Xj =
∑
k∈j Xk. In the following, we provide details on data
construction (mnemonics are in parentheses):
• Relative wage of non tradables, Ω, is calculated as the ratio of the nominal wage in the
non traded sector WN to the nominal wage in the traded sector WT , i.e., Ω =WN/WT . The
sectoral nominal wage W j for sector j = T,N is calculated by dividing labor compensation
in sector j (LAB) by total hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP) in that sector.
• Relative price of non tradables, P , corresponds to the ratio of the value added deflator
of non traded goods PN to the value added deflator of traded goods PT , i.e., P = PN/PT .
The value added deflator P j for sector j = T,N is calculated by dividing value added at
current prices by value added at constant prices in sector j. Series for sectoral value added
at current prices (VA) (constant prices (VA QI) resp.) are constructed by adding value at
current (constant resp.) prices of all sub-industries in sector j = T,N .
• Relative productivity of tradables, AT /AN , is calculated as the ratio of traded real
labor productivity AT to the non traded real labor productivity AN . To measure real labor
productivity in sector j = T,N , we divide value-added at constant prices in sector j (VA QI)
by total hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP) in that sector.
• The construction of sectoral unemployment rates is detailed below in subsection B.3.
To empirically assess the role of labor market regulation in the determination of the relative
price and relative wage responses to higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables, we
use a number of indicators which capture the extent of rigidity of labor markets. We detail below
the sources:
• Employment protection legislation, denoted by EPL, is an index available on an annual
basis developed by the OECD which is designed as a multi-dimensional indicator of the
strictness of a comprehensive set of legal regulations governing hiring and firing employees
on regular contracts. Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics database. Data coverage:
1985-2007 (1990-2007 for KOR). Because the legal protection for workers with temporary
contracts has been eased in most European countries, we follow Boeri and Van Ours [2008]
and construct an alternative index in order to have a more accurate measure of employment
protection. This indicator, denoted by EPLadj , is computed by adjusting EPL with the share
of permanent workers in the economy (shareperm) according to EPLadj = EPL × shareperm.
Source for shareperm: OECD Labour Market Statistics database. Data coverage: 1985-2007
(1990-2007 for KOR).
• The generosity of the unemployment benefit scheme is commonly captured by the unemploy-
ment benefit replacement rate. The replacement rate, denoted by %, measure is defined as
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the average of the net unemployment benefit (including social assistance and housing benefit)
replacement rates for two earnings levels and three family situations, and for three dura-
tions of unemployment (1 year, 2&3 years, 4&5 years). Source: OECD, Benefits and Wages
Database. Data coverage: 2001-2007. In order to have longer time series, we calculated %
over the period running from 1970 to 2000, by using the growth rate of the historic OECD
measure of benefit entitlements which is defined as the average of the gross unemployment
benefit replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations and three durations
of unemployment. Source: OECD, Benefits and Wages Database. Data coverage: 1970-2001
for all countries while data are unavailable for Korea.
• The worker bargaining power is measured by the collective bargaining coverage which
corresponds to the employees covered by collective wage bargaining agreements as a proportion
of all wage and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining. This time-varying
indicator is denoted by BargCov. Source: Data Base on Institutional Characteristics of Trade
Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts, 1960-2009 (ICTWSS), version 3.0,
Jelle Visser [2009]. Data coverage: 1970-2007 for AUS, AUT, CAN, DEU, DNK, FIN, GBR,
IRL, ITA, JPN, SWE and USA, 1970-2005 for NLD and NOR, 1970-2002 for BEL and FRA,
1977-2004 for ESP and 2002-2006 for KOR.
Figures 4(a), 4(b), 4(c) plot the absolute values of FMOLS estimates for the relative wage
responses, βi, taken from Table 2 against the EPL index adjusted with the share of permanent
workers, the net unemployment benefit replacement rates, and the bargaining coverage, respectively.
Because time series for the unemployment benefit replacement rate and bargaining coverage are
available only from the beginning of the 2000’s for Korea and thus are too short, we exclude this
country from Figures 4(b) and 4(c). In line with our conjecture, the trend lines in Figures 4(a),
4(b), 4(c) show that the estimated responses of the relative wage and our three measures of labor
market regulation are positively related across countries. We also we have recourse to a principal
component analysis to construct an indicator that gives a more accurate measure of the degree of
labor market regulation. Figure 4(d) displays the traditional distinction between English-speaking
and Continental European economies, labor markets being much less regulated in the former than
the latter countries. Importantly, in accordance with our conjecture, the trend line is upward sloping,
thus suggesting that higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables lowers the relative
wage more in countries where labor market regulation is more pronounced.
B Data for Calibration
B.1 Non Tradable Share
Table 5 shows the non-tradable content of labor, consumption, government spending, and gives the
share of government spending on the traded and non traded goods in the sectoral output. The
last column of Table 5 also shows the ratio of traded real labor productivity to the non traded real
labor productivity, AT /AN . Our sample consists of 18 OECD countries mentioned in section A,
including 12 European countries plus Australia, Canada, Korea, Japan, Norway, the United-States.
Our reference period for the calibration corresponds to the period 1990-2007. The choice of this
period has been dictated by data availability.
To calculate the non tradable share of employment we split the eleven industries into traded and
non traded sectors by adopting the classification proposed by De Gregorio et al. [1994] and updated
by Jensen and Kletzer [2006] (Source: EU KLEMS [2011]). The non-tradable share of labor, shown
in column 1 of Table 5 averages to 66%.
To split consumption expenditure (at current prices) into consumption in traded and non traded
goods, we made use of the Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose (COICOP) published
by the United Nations (Source: United Nations [2011]). Among the twelve items, the following
ones are treated as consumption in traded goods: ”Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages”, ”Alcoholic
Beverages Tobacco and Narcotics”, ”Clothing and Footwear”, ”Furnishings, Household Equipment”,
”Transport”, ”Miscellaneous Goods and Services”. The remaining items are treated as consumption
in non traded goods: ”Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and Fuels”, ”Health”, ”Communication”,
”Education”, ”Restaurants and Hotels”. Because the item ”Recreation and Culture” is somewhat
problematic, we decided to consider it as both tradable (50%) and non tradable (50%) with equal
shares. Data coverage: 1990-2007 for AUS, AUT, CAN, DNK, FIN, FRA, GBR, ITA, JPN, KOR,
NLD, NOR, and USA, 1991-2007 for DEU, 1993-2007 for SWE, 1995-2007 for BEL and ESP and
1996-2007 for IRL. Note that the non-tradable share of consumption shown in column 2 of Table 5
averages to 42%.
Sectoral government expenditure data (at current prices) were obtained from the Government
Finance Statistics Yearbook (Source: IMF [2011]) and the OECD General Government Accounts
database (Source: OECD [2012b]). Adopting Morshed and Turnovsky’s [2004] methodology, the
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(a) Relative Wage Responses against Firing Cost























(b) Relative Wage Responses against Generosity
of Unemployment Benefit Scheme























(c) Relative Wage Responses against Worker
Bargaining Power























(d) Relative Wage Responses against Labor
Market Regulation Index
Figure 4: Labor Market Regulation and The Relative Wage Response to Higher Produc-
tivity of Tradables relative to Non Tradables Notes: Figure 4 plots fully modified OLS
estimates of relative wage responses to a labor productivity differential against indicators
of labor market regulation. Horizontal axis displays the FMOLS estimates for each country
which are taken from Table 2. For easier reading, we show the absolute value of the change
in the relative wage (i.e., |βi|). Firing cost is captured by the employment protection legis-
lation index adjusted with the share of permanent workers in the economy (source: OECD);
the generosity of unemployment benefit scheme is measured by the average of net unem-
ployment benefit replacement rates for three duration of unemployment (source: OECD);
the worker bargaining power is measured by the bargaining coverage (source: Visser [2009]);
in Figure 4(d), we have recourse to a principal component analysis in order to have one
overall indicator encompassing the three dimensions of labor market regulation.
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following four items were treated as traded: ”Fuel and Energy”, ”Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and
Hunting”, ”Mining, Manufacturing, and Construction”, ”Transport and Communications”. Items
treated as non traded are: ”Government Public Services”, ”Defense”, ”Public Order and Safety”,
”Education”, ”Health”, ”Social Security and Welfare”, ”Environment Protection”, ”Housing and
Community Amenities”, ”Recreation Cultural and Community Affairs”. Data coverage: 1990-2007
for BEL, DNK, FIN, GBR, IRL, ITA, JPN, NOR and USA, 1990-2006 for CAN, 1991-2007 for DEU,
1995-2007 for AUT, ESP, FRA, NLD and SWE and 2000-2007 for KOR (data are not available for
AUS). The non-tradable component of government spending shown in column 3 of Table 5 averages
to 90%. While government spending as a share in GDP is shown in column 4, the proportion of
government spending on the traded and non traded good (i.e., GT /Y T and GN/Y N ) are shown in
columns 5 and 6 of Table 5. They average 5% and 29%, respectively.
The last column of Table 5 displays the ratio of labor productivity of tradables relative to non
tradables (AT /AN ) averaged over the period 1990-2007 for all countries. Source: the EU KLEMS
[2011] and STAN database. As shown in column 7, the traded sector is in average 28 percent more
productive than the non traded sector.
B.2 Elasticity of Substitution in consumption (φ)
To estimate the elasticity of substitution in consumption φ between traded and non traded goods,
we first derive a testable equation by inserting the optimal rule for intra-temporal allocation of





Y N−EN where NX ≡
B˙ − r?B is net exports, ET ≡ GT + IT + F (with F ≡ κTV T + κNV N ) and EN ≡ GN + IN ;
note that we include investment in order to be consistent with accounting identities. Inserting the
optimal rule for intra-temporal allocation of consumption (15) into the goods market equilibrium,
and denoting the ratio of ET to traded value added adjusted with net exports at current prices by
υET = P
TET
PTY T−PTNX , and the ratio of E
N ≡ GN + IN to non traded value added at current prices
by υEN = P
NEN
PNY N
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. Adding an error term µ, we estimate φ by running the regression of the
(logged) output of tradables adjusted with net exports at constant prices in terms of output of non







= fi + ft + αit+ φi lnPi,t + µi,t, (40)
where fi and ft are the country fixed effects and time dummies, respectively. Because the term α
is composed of ratios which may display a trend over time, we add country-specific linear trends, as
captured by αit.
Instead of using time series for sectoral value added, we can alternatively make use of series











and then by ρ
T
ρN
with ρj = W
jLj
P jY j , denoting by γ
T =
(
WTLT − ρTPTNX) (with ρT ≡ WTLTPTY T ) and





= η+(φ− 1) lnP where η is a term composed of
both preference (i.e., ϕ) and production (i.e., ρj) parameters, and the (logged) ratio of ET (EN ) to







= gi + gt + ηit+ δi lnPi,t + ζi,t, (41)
where δi = (φi − 1); gi and gt are the country fixed effects and time dummies, respectively; we add
country-specific trends, as captured by ηit, because η is composed of ratios that may display a trend
over time.
Time series for sectoral value added at constant prices, labor compensation, and the relative
price of non tradables are taken from EU KLEMS [2011] (see section A). Net exports correspond to
the external balance of goods and services at current prices taken from OECD Economic Outlook
Database. To construct time series for net exports at constant prices NX, data are deflated by the
traded value added deflator of traded goods (i.e., PT ).
Since the LHS term of (40) and (41) and the relative price of non tradables as well display
trends, we ran unit root and then cointegration tests. Having verified that these two assumptions
are empirically supported, we estimate the cointegrating relationships by using DOLS and FMOLS
estimators for cointegrated panel proposed by Pedroni [2000], [2001]. DOLS and FMOLS estimates
are reported in Table 9, considering alternatively eq. (40) or eq. (41). Estimates of φ are reported
in column 1 of Table 8 when calibrating the model for each country. As a reference model, we
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Notes: Data coverage: 1970-2007 (except Japan: 1974-2007). All re-
gressions include country fixed effects, time dummies and country spe-
cific trends. a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% lev-
els. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are
reported in parentheses.
consider FMOLS estimates when exploring the empirical relationship (40); running regression (40)
gives an estimate for the whole sample of 0.800 which is close to the value documented by Mendoza
[1995] who reports an estimate of 0.74. As shown in Table 9, the estimated value of φ for Belgium
is statistically significant only when exploring the empirical relationship (41) for this economy; in
column 1 of Table 8, we set φ to 0.749 for Belgium. Because estimates for Italy are negative by
using alternatively eq. (40) or eq. (41), the estimate of φ for this country is left blank in column
1 of Table 8 and φ is set to our panel data estimation for EU-12, i.e., 0.599, when calibrating the
model for each country.
B.3 Labor Market Variables
We now describe the data employed to calibrate the model, focusing on labor market variables.
To begin with, EU-10 refers to the following ten European countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Denmark, Spain, Finland, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Sweden; EU-12 includes EU-10 along
with France and the Netherlands.
We construct the following labor market variables:
• Sectoral unemployment rate denoted by uj (j = T,N) is the number of unemployed
workers U j in sector j as a share of the labor force F j ≡ Lj +U j in this sector. LABORSTA
database from ILO provides series for unemployed workers by economic activity for fifteen
OECD countries out of eighteen in our sample. The longest available period ranges from 1987
to 2007. On average, our data covers 12.8 years per country. Series cover 18 sectors, according
to ISIC Rev.3.1 classification. To construct Lj and U j for j = T,N , we map the classifica-
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tion used previously to compute series for sectoral wages, prices and real labor productivity
indexes (see section A) into the 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 classification. The mapping was clear for
all industries except for ”Not classifiable by economic activity” (1-digit ISIC-Rev.3, code: X)
when constructing Lj and U j , and, ”Unemployed seeking their first job” to identify U j . These
two categories have been split between tradables and non tradables according to the shares of
total unemployment (excluding the two categories) between tradables and non tradables by
year and country. In a few rare cases, the sum of sectoral employment provided by ILO did
not correspond to total unemployment. These differences were usually due to missing data for
some industries in the sectoral databases. In these cases, we added these differences in level,
keeping however the share of each sector constant. In Table 10 we provide an overview of
the classifications used to construct traded and non traded sectors variables. Once industries
have been classified as traded or non traded, series for unemployed and employed workers
are constructed by adding unemployed and employed workers of all sub-industries k in sector
j = T,N in the form U j =
∑
k∈j Uk and L
j =
∑
k∈j Lk. Data coverage: AUS (1995-2007),
AUT (1994-2007), BEL (2001-2007), CAN (1987-2007), DEU (1995-2007), DNK (1994-1998
and 2002-2004), ESP (1992-2007), FIN (1995-2007), GBR (1988-2007), IRL (1986-1997), ITA
(1993-2007), JPN (2003-2007), KOR (1992-2007), SWE (1995-2007) and USA (2003-2007).
Data for unemployed workers by economic activity are not available for FRA, NLD and NOR.
• Sectoral labor market tightness denoted by θj (j = T,N) is calculated as the ratio of
job vacancies in sector j (V j) to the number of unemployed workers in that sector (U j). To
construct θj , we collect information on job vacancies and unemployed workers by economic
activity. Sources for V j : Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) provided by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for USA, Eurostat database (NACE 1-digit) for a range of
European Countries, Labour Market Statistics from the Office for National Statistics for the
UK. Sources for U j : Current Population Survey (CPS) published by the BLS for USA and
LABORSTA (ILO) for European Countries.57 As shown in Table 10, the level of detail in
the definition of traded and non traded sectors differs across databases in two dimensions.
First, the number of items to split disaggregated data varies across nomenclatures from a
low eleven categories in the Eurostat database to a high of eighteen items in the LABORSTA
database. Second, the definitions of items are not harmonized across the different sets of data.
To generate sectoral variables in a consistent and uniform way, series on disaggregated data
for vacancies and unemployed workers are added up to form traded and non traded sectors
following, as close as possible, the classification we used for value added, hours worked and
labor compensation. Once industries have been classified as traded or non traded, series for
employment vacancies (unemployed workers resp.) are constructed by adding job openings




k∈j Uk resp.). Data coverage for V
j and U j : AUT (2004-2005), DEU
(2006-2007), FIN (2002-2007), GBR (2001-2007), SWE (2005-2007) and USA (2001-2007).
• Aggregate labor market tightness denoted by θ is also computed because series for θj
are available over a too short time horizon and for a few countries only; θ is calculated as the
ratio of job vacancies to registered unemployment. Source: Registered Unemployed and Job
Vacancies Dataset, OECD. Coverage: AUS (1980-2007), BEL (1982-2003), DEU (1980-2007),
ESP (1980-2004), FIN (1981-2007), GBR (1980-2007), NOR (1980-2007), SWE (1982-2007).
• Job finding rate denoted by mj (j = T,N) is computed at a sectoral level by adopting
the methodology proposed by Shimer [2012]. As Shimer [2012], we ignore movements in and
out of the overall labor force. Since we compute the job finding rate for the traded and the
non traded sector, we have to further assume that labor force is fixed at a sectoral level, i.e.,
we ignore reallocation of labor across sectors. More details on the model and the derivation
of the results below can be found in the Technical Appendix. The monthly job finding rate
mj,<1(t) for sector j at time t is computed as follows:
mj,<1(t) = − ln (1−M j,<1(t)) , (42)
where t indexes months and the probability of finding a job M j,<1 within one month is given
by






with αj,<1(t) = U
j,<1(t)
Uj(t) the share of unemployment less than one month (U
j,<1(t)) among
total monthly unemployment (U j(t)) in sector j. Source: LABORSTA database from ILO for
57The JOLTS and CPS databases provide (not seasonally adjusted) monthly data on vacancies and un-
employed workers. We convert monthly data series into annual data series by summing the twelve monthly
data points.
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data on employment and unemployment at the sectoral level, and, OECD for unemployment
by duration.
• Job destruction rate denoted by sj (j = T,N) is estimated by solving this equation:








1− ψj(t))U j(t− 1), (44)
where ψj is the monthly rate of convergence to the long-run sectoral unemployment rate:
ψj(t) = 1− e−(sj(t)+mj,<1(t)). (45)
When estimating sj by using (44), the unemployment rate has not necessarily reached its long-
run equilibrium. Since we calibrate the model so that the initial steady state is consistent
with the empirical properties of each OECD economy, we have computed values for sj which




actual value taken from the data and mj is computed by using (42). Reassuringly, average
values for job destruction rates obtained from eq. (44) are close to those derived from the
long-run equilibrium of the unemployment rate. More details can be found in the Technical
Appendix.
• Unemployment benefit net replacement rate denoted by % is shown in column 14 of
Table 6 and is defined in section A. Replacement rates are averaged over 1980-2007 for all
countries except Korea (2001-2007). Average EU-12 unemployment benefit replacement rate
shown in Table 6 is the unweighted average of twelve EU members’ replacement rates. Source:
OECD, Benefits and Wages Database.
• Firing cost denoted by τ is shown in the last column of Table 6 is a measure of the strictness
of legal protection against dismissals captured by the firing tax x = τ .W in our model; it
is calculated as the sum of the average advance notice and average severance payment after
4 and 20 years of employment. τ is expressed in monthly salary equivalents and is averaged
over the period 1980-2005. Source: Fondazione de Benedetti.
Series of employment and unemployment by economic activity provided by ILO are not available
for France, the Netherlands, Norway; while such data is available for Korea, unemployment by
duration provided by the OECD is not available and thus prevents the estimation of the monthly
job finding and job destruction rates. For these four countries, we proceeded as follows:
• Monthly job finding rates denoted by m come from Hobijn and Sahin [2009] who give
average values for France (1975-2004), the Netherlands (1983-2004), Norway (1983-2004).
For Korea, we average the job finding rates taken from Chang et al. [2004] over 1993-1994.
• Unemployment rate denoted by u is is the number of unemployed people as a percentage
of the labor force. Coverage: FRA (1975-2004), the NLD (1983-2004), NOR (1983-2004).
Source: OECD, LFS database.
• Monthly job separation rate denoted by s is computed so as to be consistent with the
steady-state unemployment rate given by u = ss+m .
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SEARCH UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN
OPEN ECONOMY
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
NOT MEANT FOR PUBLICATION
Luisito BERTINELLI, Olivier CARDI, and Romain RESTOUT
• Section A presents the source and construction of the data used in the empirical and quanti-
tative analysis, and provides summary statistics as well.
• Section B starts with a quick look at the data and provides additional empirical results related
to panel unit root and cointegration tests and shows alternative cointegration estimates as
well. The section also gives more details and results on the split-sample analysis.
• Sections C-E give more details on the model. Section C develops an open economy version of
the neoclassical model with search frictions and sectoral endogenous labor supply, and derives
first-order conditions. Section D presents the matching process and derives the Nash bargain-
ing wage. Section E sets out the approach taken to solve the model, analyzes equilibrium
dynamics, and provides formal solutions.
• Section F provides the main steps leading to equations in the main text of section 2.1.
• Section G characterizes the initial steady-state and the transitional paths by using phase
diagrams.
• In section H, we derive analytically the steady-state effects of higher productivity in tradables
relative to non tradables and investigate the adjustment along the stable path by using phase
diagrams whose constructions are presented in section G. In section I, we describe the graph-
ical framework which allows us to characterize initial steady-state values for the relative wage
and the relative price.
• In section J, we decompose analytically the steady-state changes in the relative wage and
the relative price following higher relative productivity of tradables. In section L, we break
down the change in the unemployment rate differential into labor market frictions and labor
accumulation effects.
• In section K, we analyze graphically the long-term adjustment in the relative price, the relative
wage, and the unemployment differential following a productivity shock biased toward the
traded sector and investigate the implications of labor market regulation.
• In section M, we explore the case of total immobility and perfect mobility as well in order to
highlight the role of the elasticity of the labor supply at the extensive margin.
• Section N gives more details about the calibration of the model to data.
1
A Data Description
A.1 Data for Empirical Analysis: Source and Construction
Country Coverage: Our sample consists of a panel of 18 countries: Australia (AUS), Austria
(AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Germany (DEU), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), Finland
(FIN), France (FRA), the United Kingdom (GBR), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Korea
(KOR), the Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Sweden (SWE), and the United States (USA).
These countries have the most extensive coverage of variables of our interest.
Period Coverage: The period is running from 1970 to 2007, except for Japan (1974-2007).
Sources: We use the EU KLEMS [2011] database (the March 2011 data release) for all countries
of our sample with the exceptions of Canada and Norway. For these two countries, sectoral data
are taken from the Structural Analysis (STAN) database provided by the OECD [2011]. Both the
EU KLEMS and STAN databases provide annual data at the ISIC-rev.3 1-digit level for eleven
industries.
The eleven 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 industries are split into tradables and non tradables sectors. To do
so, we adopt the classification proposed by De Gregorio et al. [1994] who treat an industry as traded
when it exports at least 10% of its output. Following Jensen and Kletzer [2006], we have updated
the classification suggested by De Gregorio et al. [1994] by treating ”Financial Intermediation” as
a traded industry. Jensen and Kletzer [2006] use the geographic concentration of service activities
within the United States to identify which service activities are traded domestically. The authors
classify activities that are traded domestically as potentially traded internationally. The idea is that
when a good or a service is traded, the production of the activity is concentrated in a particular
region to take advantage of economies of scale in production.
Jensen and Kletzer [2006] use the two-digit NAICS (North American Industrial Classification
System) to identify tradable and non tradable sectors. We map their classification into the NACE-
ISIC-rev.3 used by the EU KLEMS database. The mapping was clear for all sectors except for ”Real
Estate, Renting and Business Services”. According to the EU KLEMS classification, the industry
labelled ”Real Estate, Renting and Business Services” is an aggregate of five sub-industries: ”Real
estate activities” (NACE code: 70), ”Renting of Machinery and Equipment” (71), ”Computer and
Related Activities” (72), ”Research and Development” (73) and ”Other Business Activities” (74).
While Jensen and Kletzer [2006] find that industries 70 and 71 can be classified as tradable, they do
not provide information for industries 72, 73 and 74. We decided to classify ”Real Estate, Renting
and Business Services” as non tradable.
Traded Sector comprises the following industries: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing;
Mining and Quarrying; Total Manufacturing; Transport, Storage and Communication; and Financial
Intermediation.
Non Traded Sector comprises the following industries: Electricity, Gas and Water Supply;
Construction; Wholesale and Retail Trade; Hotels and Restaurants; Real Estate, Renting and Busi-
ness Services; and Community Social and Personal Services.
Relevant to our work, the EU KLEMS and STAN database provides series, for each industry
and year, on value added at current and constant prices, permitting the derivation of sectoral
deflators of value added, as well as details on labor compensation and employment data, allowing
the construction of sectoral wage rates. We describe below the construction for the data employed
in Section 2 (mnemonics are given in parentheses):
- Sectoral value-added deflator P jt for j = T,N : value added at current prices (VA) over value
added at constant prices (VA QI) in sector j. Source: EU KLEMS database. The relative
price of non tradables Pt corresponds to the ratio of the value added deflator of non traded
goods to the value added deflator of traded goods: Pt = PNt /P
T
t .
- Sectoral labor Ljt for j = T,N : total hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP) in sector j.
Source: EU KLEMS database.
- Sectoral nominal wage W jt for j = T,N : labor compensation in sector j (LAB) over total
hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP) in that sector. Source: EU KLEMS database.
The relative wage, Ωt is calculated as the ratio of the nominal wage in the non traded sector
WN to the nominal wage in the traded sector: Ωt =WNt /W
T
t .
• The construction of sectoral unemployment rates is detailed below in section A.2.
Because data source and construction are heterogenous across variables as a result of different
nomenclatures, Table 11 provides a summary of the classification adopted to split value added and
its demand components as well into traded and non traded goods.
Summary statistics of the data used in the empirical analysis are displayed in Table 12. As
shown in the first three columns, all countries of our sample experience higher productivity gains
in tradables relative to non tradables, an appreciation in the relative price of non tradables (except














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To empirically assess the role of labor market institutions in the determination of the relative
wage response to higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables, we use three indicators
aimed at capturing the stringency of labor market regulation. We detail below the construction and
the source of these three indicators:
• The strictness of legal protection against dismissals for permanent workers is measured by
the employment protection legislation index, EPLi,t in country i at time t, provided
by OECD. Source for EPLi,t: OECD Labour Market Statistics database. Data coverage:
1985-2007 (1990-2007 for KOR). This index can be misleading since regulation was eased for
temporary contracts (in Spain) while the regulation for workers with permanent contracts
hardly changed. To have a more accurate measure of legal protection against dismissals,
we construct a new index denoted by EPLadji,t in country i at time t by adjusting EPLi,t
for regular workers with the share share permi,t of permanent workers in the economy, i.e.,
EPLadji,t = EPLi,t×share permi,t. Source for share permi,t: OECD Labour Market Statistics
database. Data coverage: 1985-2007 (1990-2007 for KOR).
• The generosity of the unemployment benefit scheme, %i,t in country i at time t, is commonly
captured by the unemployment benefit replacement rate. It is worthwhile noticing
that the unemployment benefit rates are very similar across counties when considering short-
term unemployment (less than one year) but display considerable heterogeneity for long-term
unemployment. To have a more accurate measure of the generosity of the unemployment
benefit scheme, we calculate % as the average of the net unemployment benefit (including
social assistance and housing benefit) replacement rates (for two earnings levels and three
family situations) for three durations of unemployment (1 year, 2&3 years, 4&5 years). Source:
OECD, Benefits and Wages Database. Data coverage: 2001-2007. In order to have longer time
series, we calculated % over the period running from 1970 to 2000, by using the growth rate
of the historic OECD measure of benefit entitlements which is defined as the average of the
gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations
and three durations of unemployment. Source: OECD, Benefits and Wages Database. Data
coverage: 1970-2001 for all countries while data are unavailable for Korea.
• The worker bargaining power is measured by the collective bargaining coverage, BargCovi,t,
which corresponds to the employees covered by collective wage bargaining agreements as a
proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining. Source:
Data Base on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention
and Social Pacts, 1960-2010 (ICTWSS), version 3.0, Jelle Visser [2009]. Data coverage: 1970-
2007 for AUS, AUT, CAN, DEU, DNK, FIN, GBR, IRL, ITA, JPN, SWE and USA, 1970-2005
for NLD and NOR, 1970-2002 for BEL and FRA, 1977-2004 for ESP and 2002-2006 for KOR.
Summary statistics of the labor market regulation indicators used in the empirical analysis are
displayed in the three last columns Table 12.
A.2 Calibration of the Labor Market
To calibrate the labor market for the traded and the non traded sector, we need to estimate the
sectoral unemployment rate, the job finding and the job destruction rate for each sector, and the
sectoral labor market tightness. We provide below the source and construction of the data.
A.2.1 Source and Construction of Data
In this subsection, we first describe the data employed to calibrate some key features of OECD labor
markets. Then, we present the dataset we use to estimate a set of sectoral search unemployment
parameters. Summary statistics for the key indicators of the labor market are displayed in Table
13.
• Sectoral unemployment rate, uj , is the number of unemployed workers U j in sector
j = T,N as a share of the labor force Lj + U j in this sector. LABORSTA database from
the International Labour Organization (ILO) provides annual data for unemployed and em-
ployed workers at the 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 level. To construct Lj and U j for j = T,N , we
map the classification used previously to compute series for sectoral wages, prices and real
labor productivity indexes (see section A.1) into the 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 classification used by
the LABORSTA database. The mapping was clear for all industries except for ”Not classifi-
able by economic activity” (1-digit ISIC-Rev.3 code: X) when constructing Lj and U j , and,
”Unemployed seeking their first job” to identify U j . These two categories have been split
between tradables and non tradables according to the shares of total unemployment (exclud-
ing the two sectors) between tradables and non tradables by year and country. In a few rare
4
Table 12: Summary Statistics per Country
Countries Variables
pˆ ωˆ aˆT − aˆN % BargCov EPLadj
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AUS 0.91 -0.27 1.83 0.50 0.71 1.21
AUT 1.97 -0.72 2.89 0.50 0.97 2.48
BEL 2.26 -0.04 2.53 0.67 0.94 1.65
CAN 0.54 -0.42 1.55 0.54 0.36 0.81
DEU 0.85 -0.62 1.62 0.72 0.69 2.36
DNK 0.78 -0.91 2.21 0.61 0.82 1.93
ESP 2.62 -0.97 3.67 0.41 0.76 2.04
FIN 2.56 -0.78 4.22 0.59 0.86 2.02
FRA 2.14 -0.98 2.68 0.47 0.85 2.11
GBR 1.57 -0.50 2.31 0.63 0.45 1.02
IRL 2.55 -0.88 4.37 0.54 0.58 1.32
ITA 2.02 -0.92 3.05 0.08 0.83 2.53
JPN 2.60 -0.44 2.68 0.51 0.24 1.49
KOR 3.35 -2.15 6.49 0.38 0.11 1.98
NLD 1.86 -0.39 2.38 0.67 0.85 2.60
NOR -0.37 -0.39 1.96 0.43 0.70 2.06
SWE 2.34 -0.11 2.76 0.48 0.89 2.31
USA 1.74 -0.23 2.64 0.26 0.20 0.24
Average 1.79 -0.65 2.88 0.50 0.66 1.79
Notes: pˆ is the relative price of non tradables average growth rate, ωˆ is the
relative wage of non tradables average growth rate and (aˆT − aˆN ) is the
average growth rate of the labor productivity differential between tradables
and non tradables. Data coverage for pˆ, ωˆ and (aˆT − aˆN ) is 1970-2007
(1974-2007 for Japan). % is the unemployment benefit replacement rate.
Data coverage: 1970-2007 (2001-2007 for KOR). BargCov is the collective
bargaining coverage. Data coverage: 1970-2007 for AUS, AUT, CAN, DEU,
DNK, FIN, GBR, IRL, ITA, JPN, SWE and USA, 1970-2005 for NLD and
NOR, 1970-2002 for BEL and FRA, 1977-2004 for ESP and 2002-2006 for
KOR. EPLadj is the employment protection legislation index adjusted with
the share of permanent workers in the economy. Data coverage: 1985-2007
(1990-2007 for KOR).
cases, the sum of sectoral employment provided by ILO did not correspond to total unemploy-
ment. These differences were usually due to missing data for some industries in the sectoral
databases. In these cases, we added these differences in level, keeping however the share of
each sector constant. In Table 13 we provide a overview of the classifications used to construct
traded and non traded sectors variables. Once industries have been classified as traded or non
traded, series for unemployed and employed workers are constructed by adding unemployed





k∈j Lk. Data coverage: AUS (1995-2007), AUT (1994-2007), BEL (2001-2007),
CAN (1987-2007), DEU (1995-2007), DNK (1994-1998 and 2002-2004), ESP (1992-2007),
FIN (1995-2007), GBR (1988-2007), IRL (1986-1997), ITA (1993-2007), JPN (2003-2007),
KOR (1992-2007), SWE (1995-2007) and USA (2003-2007). Data for unemployed workers by
economic activity are not available for FRA, NLD and NOR.
• Labor market tightness, θj for j = T,N , is calculated as the ratio of employment vacancies
in sector j (V j) to the number of unemployed workers in that sector (U j). To construct the
variables θj , we collect information on job vacancies and unemployed workers by economic
activity. Sources for V j : Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) provided by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for USA and Eurostat database (NACE 1-digit) for a range
of European Countries, Labour Market Statistics from the Office for National Statistics for
the UK. Sources for U j : Current Population Survey (CPS) published by the BLS for USA
and LABORSTA (ILO) for European Countries.58 As shown in Table 13, the level of detail
in the definition of traded and non traded sectors differs across databases in two dimensions.
First, the number of items to split disaggregated data varies across nomenclatures from a
low eleven categories in the Eurostat database to a high of eighteen items in the LABORSTA
58The JOLTS and CPS databases provide (not seasonally adjusted) monthly data on vacancies and unem-
ployed workers. We convert monthly data series into a annual data series by summing the twelve monthly
data points.
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database. Second, the definitions of items are not harmonized across the different sets of data.
To generate sectoral variables in a consistent and uniform way, series on disaggregated data
for vacancies and unemployed workers are added up to form traded and non traded sectors
following, as close as possible, the classification we used for value added, hours worked and
labor compensation. Once industries have been classified as traded or non traded, series for
employment vacancies (unemployed workers resp.) are constructed by adding job openings




k∈j Uk resp.). Data coverage for V
j and U j : AUT (2004-2005), DEU
(2006-2007), FIN (2002-2007), GBR (2001-2007), SWE (2005-2007) and USA (2001-2007).
For reason of space, Table 13 does not provide the classification between tradables and non
tradables for job vacancies for the United Kingdom. The classification is detailed below. The
Office for National Statistics provides series for the UK that cover 19 sectors, according to
SIC 2007 classification. Sectors have been aggregated into tradables (Financial and insurance
activities; Information and communication; Manufacturing; Mining and quarrying; Transport
and storage) and non tradables (Accomodation and food service activities; Administrative
and support service activities; Arts, entertainment and recreation; Construction; Education;
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; Human health and social work activities;
Other service activities; Public administration and defense; Compulsory social security; Real
estate activities; Water supply, sewerage, waste and remediation activities; Wholesale and
retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motor cycles).
A.2.2 The Methodology
In this section, we present the approach we adopted to measure the job finding and employment
exit rates by using readily accessible data. We apply the methodology developed by Shimer [2012]
who assume that the labor force is fixed. Applying the same logic to our two-sector model, we need
to impose that the labor force F j is fixed at a sectoral level. The implication of such an assumption
is twofold. First, we explicitly assume that there are no movements into and out of the labor force
at an aggregate level. Second, we assume that there are no movements between the traded and
the non traded sectors. Reassuringly, Shimer [2012] shows that a two-state model where workers
simply transit between employment and unemployment does a good job of capturing unemployment
fluctuations. Because the reallocation of labor across sectors is relatively low, the second assumption
should not substantially affect the results. In particular, Shimer [2012] finds that the job finding
rate to worker averaged 0.44 over the post-war period for the U.S., while our own estimates indicate
that the job finding rate averages about 0.40 from 2003 to 2007.
The presentation below borrows heavily from Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin [2013]. We assume that
during period t, all unemployed workers find a job according to a Poisson process with arrival rate
mj(t) = − ln (1−M j(t)) and all employed workers lose their job according to a Poisson process
with arrival rate sj(t) = − ln (1− Sj(t)). We refer to mj(t) and sj(t) as the job finding and job
destruction rates in sector j and to M j(t) and Sj(t) as the corresponding probabilities.
The evolution over time of the unemployed workers, which we denote by U j(t), can be written
as:
U˙ j(t) = sj(t)Lj(t)−mj(t)U j(t), (46)
where Lj(t) is employment in sector j; the evolution over time of the unemployed workers can be
written alternatively by using the fact that Lj(t) = F j − U j(t):
U˙ j(t) = sj(t)
(
F j − U j(t))−mj(t)U j(t), (47)
where sj(t) is the monthly rate of inflow into unemployment, mj(t) is the monthly outflow rate from
unemployment, and t indexes months.
Collecting terms, assuming that the job destruction rate and the job finding rate are constant
within years and solving eq. (47), pre-multiplying by e−(m+s)τ , and integrating over the time interval
[t− 12, t], leads to the temporal path for unemployed workers:
U j(t) = ψj(t)u˜j(t)F j(t) + (1− ψ(t))U j(t− 12), (48)





and ψj is the annual rate of convergence to the long-run sectoral unemployment rate:























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To infer the monthly outflow probabilityM j(t) and then the monthly job finding rate mj(t), we
follow Shimer [2012] and write the dynamic equations of sectoral unemployment and sectoral short
term unemployment, i.e.,
U˙ j(t+ d) = sj(t)Lj(t)−mj(t)U j(t), , (51a)
U˙ j,<d(t+ d) = sj(t)Lj(t)−mj(t)U j,<d(t), (51b)
where U j,<d(t+d) denotes short-term unemployment, i.e., the stock of unemployed workers who are
employed at some time τ ∈]t, t+ d] but lose their job and thus are unemployed at time t+ d; hence,
by construction, U j,<d(t) = 0 since all short-term unemployed workers were employed at time t.
Combining (51a) and (51b) to eliminate sj(t)Lj(t) leads to a dynamic equation relating changes of
unemployment to changes of short-term unemployment:
U˙ j(t+ d) = U˙ j,<d(t+ d)−mj(t) (U j(t)− U j,<d(t)) . (52)
Solving eq. (52) above by integrating over [t − d, t], and using the fact that at time t, short-term
unemployment is such that U j,<d(t) = 0, leads to:





1−M j,<d(t)) where M j,<d is the probability that an unemployed worker
exits unemployment within d months, one obtains:
U j(t+ d)− U j(t) = U j,<d(t+ d)−M j,<d(t)U j(t). (53)
Eq. (53) states that the change of unemployment in sector j is equal to the inflows into unemploy-
ment U j,<d(t + d) of workers who were employed at time t but are unemployed at time t + d less
the number of unemployed workers who find a job M j,<d(t)U j(t). Solving (53) for M j,<d(t), it is
possible to write the probability that an unemployed worker exits unemployment within d months
as
M j,<d(t) = 1−
[




The probability of finding a job within d months given by eq. (54) can be mapped as the monthly





1−M j,<d(t)) . (55)
To estimate the monthly job finding rate, we use the duration of unemployment lower than one
month. In this configuration, the probability of finding a job can be rewritten as follows:
M j,<1(t) = 1−
[




1−M j,<1(t) = U
j(t)− U j,<1(t)
U j(t− 1) . (56)
Since U j(t−1) corresponds to monthly unemployment, we have to convert annual data on a monthly
basis:
U j(t− 1) = (U j(t− 12))1/12 (U j(t))11/12 . (57)
Using (55) with d = 1, the monthly job finding rate is:
mj,<1(t) = − ln (U j(t)− U j,<1(t))+ ln (U j(t− 1)) , (58)
where the construction of U j(t− 1) is given by eq. (57) while the same logic applies to U j(t).
Since series for unemployment by duration are expressed in percentage, we define αj,<1(t) the





Because the share of short-term unemployment is not available by economic activity, we assume
that αj,<1(t) is identical across sectors:
αj,<1(t) = αT,<1(t) = αN,<1(t). (60)
The job destruction rate can be estimated by solving this equation:








1− ψj(t))U j(t− 1), (61)
where ψj is the monthly rate of convergence to the long-run sectoral unemployment rate:
ψj(t) = 1− e−(sj(t)+mj,<1(t)). (62)
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A.2.3 Computation of the job finding rate and the job separation rate at a
sectoral level
To estimate the monthly job finding rate, mj,<1, and the job destruction rate, sj , for j = T,N , we
proceed as follows:
• We estimate α<1(t) = αj,<1(t) = U<1(t)U(t) where U<1(t) is unemployment of duration less than
one month.
• Using the fact that U j,<1(t) = α<1(t)U j(t), the probability of finding a job is






where U j(t− 1) corresponds to monthly unemployment which is calculated as follows U j(t−
1) =
(
U j(t− 12))1/12 (U j(t))11/12 by using annual data.
• The monthly job finding rate is:
mj,<1(t) = − ln (1−M j,<1(t)) (64)
• The job destruction rate can be estimated by solving the following equation:




U j(t) + Lj(t)
)
+ (1− ψ(t))U j(t− 1), (65)
where ψj is the monthly rate of convergence to the long-run sectoral unemployment rate:
ψj(t) = 1− e−(sj(t)+mj(t)). (66)
To compute mj,<1 and sj , we need series for unemployment by economic activity in order to con-
struct U j , and unemployment less than 1 month in order to estimate α<1(t). For unemployment at
the sectoral level, data are taken from ILOSTAT database (ILO) while unemployment less than one
month is provided by OECD which gives unemployment by duration. Data coverage: AUS (1995-
2007), AUT (1994-2007), BEL (2001-2007), CAN (1987-2007), DEU (1995-2007), DNK (1994-1998
and 2002-2004), ESP (1992-2007), FIN (1991-2007), GBR (1988-2007), IRL (1986-1997), ITA (1993-
2007), JPN (2003-2007), SWE (1995-2007) and USA (2003-2007). Because we calibrate the model
so that the initial steady state is consistent with the empirical properties of each OECD economy
while the series for the sectoral job separation rates are computed when the economy is out of the
steady-state, we need to compute values for sj which are consistent with the steady-state sectoral
unemployment rate u˜j = s
j
sj+mj given the computed value for m
j . The two first columns in Table 14
show the actual values for the sectoral unemployment rates while columns 3 and 4 give the values for
steady-state sectoral unemployment rates computed by using its long-run equilibrium u˜j = s
j
mj+sj
where the job finding rate mj is taken from columns 5 and 7 of Table 6 and the job destruction
rate has been computed by solving eq. (65). The two last columns of Table 14 show the difference
between the actual and the predicted value. Reassuringly, because computed values for mj and sj
by using (64) and (65) are averaged over a long enough time horizon so that the unemployment rate
should have reached its long-run value, actual and predicted values are close in most of the cases,
except for Sweden, Australia and Italy (for uT ), and Ireland (for uN ). The values for sectoral job
destruction rates shown in columns 6 and 8 of Table 6 are thus calculated by using the long-run
equilibrium expression for the sectoral unemployment rate, i.e.,
sj =
mjuj
1− uj , (67)
where uj is taken from columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 and mj is taken from columns 5 and 7 of Table
6. Computed values for sj using (67) are shown in columns 6 and 8 of Table 6.
For France, Korea, the Netherlands, and Norway, data are not available to compute the job
finding and the job separation rate. We proceed as follows to get estimates of m and s when
calibrating the model for each economy:
• Because data for unemployment by economic activity are not available for FRA, NLD, and
NOR, estimates for the job finding rate m = mj are taken from Hobijn and Sahin [2009].
Note that estimates are not available at a sectoral level so that we have to assume that the
job finding rate is identical across sectors, i.e., mj = m. Building on estimates by Hobijn and
Sahin [2009], we set m = 6.7% for France (1975-2004), m = 4.7% for the Netherlands (1983-
2004), and m = 30.5% for Norway (1983-2004). To compute the job separation rate, we use
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Table 14: Comparison of Actual Values with Calculated Values for the Sectoral Unemploy-
ment Rates
Country Actual Calculated Error
uT uN u˜T u˜N uT − u˜T uN − u˜N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AUS 0.072 0.062 0.084 0.066 -0.012 -0.004
AUT 0.037 0.044 0.036 0.037 0.001 0.007
BEL 0.077 0.079 0.075 0.078 0.002 0.001
CAN 0.082 0.084 0.086 0.086 -0.004 -0.002
DEU 0.101 0.091 0.100 0.094 0.001 -0.003
DNK 0.064 0.061 0.067 0.060 -0.003 0.001
ESP 0.147 0.161 0.146 0.155 0.001 0.006
FIN 0.087 0.118 0.088 0.119 -0.001 -0.001
GBR 0.073 0.066 0.071 0.068 0.002 -0.002
IRL 0.130 0.154 0.132 0.144 -0.002 0.010
ITA 0.094 0.098 0.104 0.097 -0.010 0.001
JPN 0.033 0.033 0.024 0.025 0.009 0.008
SWE 0.056 0.060 0.043 0.045 0.013 0.015
USA 0.048 0.053 0.047 0.052 0.001 0.001
the steady-state expression for the unemployment rate u = ss+m where the unemployment
rate is averaged over the appropriate period, i.e., 1975-2004 for France, 1983-2004 for the
Netherlands and 1983-2004 for Norway. Series for harmonized unemployment rates are taken
from Labor Force Survey, OECD.
• While we can construct series for unemployment by economic activity for Korea, series for
unemployment by duration is not provided by the OECD for this economy. We thus average
the job finding rates taken from Chang et al. [2004] over 1993-1994, i.e., m = 26.2% and




j is the sectoral unemployment rate calculated by using the LABORSTA
database from ILO.
A.3 Elasticity of substitution in consumption (φ): Empirical Strategy
When including physical capital investment and denoting recruiting costs by F ≡ κTV T + κNV N ,
according to the goods market equilibrium, we have:
Y T −NX − IT −GT − F




where we used the fact that B˙−r?B = NX withB the net foreign asset position andNX net exports.









into (68) leads to
Y T −NX − IT −GT − F






According to the market clearing condition, we could alternatively use data for consumption or for
sectoral value added along with times series for its demand components to estimate φ. Unfortunately,
classifications for valued added by industry and for consumption by items are different (because
nomenclatures are different) and thus it is most likely that CT differs from Y T −NX−GT −IT −F ,
and CN from Y N −GN − IN as well. Because time series for traded and non traded consumption
display a short time horizon for half countries of our sample while data for sectoral value added
and net exports are available for the 18 OECD countries of our sample over the period running
from 1970 to 2007 (except for Japan: 1974-2007), we find appropriate to estimate φ by computing
Y T −NX−ET and Y N −EN where ET ≡ GT +IT +F and EN ≡ GN +IN . Yet, a difficulty shows
up because the classification adopted to split government spending and investment expenditure into
traded and non traded items is different from that adopted to break down value added into traded
and non traded components. Moreover, the time horizon is short at a disaggregated level for most of
the countries, especially for time series of Gj . To overcome these difficulties, we proceed as follows.
Denoting the ratio of ET ≡ GT +IT +F to traded value added adjusted with net exports at current
prices by υET = P
TET
PTY T−PTNX , and denoting the ratio of E
N ≡ GN + IN to non traded value added
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at current prices by υEN = P
NEN
PNY N
, the goods market equilibrium (69) can be rewritten as follows:(
PTY T − PTNX) (1− υET )








Y T −NX) (1− υET )






















= α+ φ lnP. (72)








= fi + ft + αit+ φi lnPi,t + µi,t, (73)
where fi captures the country fixed effects, ft are time dummies, and µi,t are the i.i.d. error
terms. Because the term (71) is composed of ratios which may display a trend over time, we add
country-specific trends, as captured by αit. Eq. (73) corresponds to eq. (40) in the text.
Instead of using time series for sectoral value added, we can alternatively make use of series for
sectoral labor compensation. Multiplying both sides by P
T
PN
and then by ρ
T
ρN
with ρj = W
jLj
P jY j the






= η + (φ− 1) lnP. (74)
where


















= gi + gt + ηit+ δi lnPi,t + ζi,t, (76)
where δi = (φi − 1); gt are time dummies which capture common macroeconomic shocks. Because
ηi is composed of preference parameters (i.e., ϕ), and (logged) ratios which may display trend over
time, we introduce country fixed effects gi, and add country-specific trends, as captured by ηit.
Once we have estimated δi, we can compute φˆi = δˆi +1 where a hat refers to point estimate in this
context. Eq. (76) corresponds to eq. (41) in the text.
B Empirical results
B.1 A First Glance at the Data
We begin by examining the data for the 18 OECD economies over the period 1970-2007. Figure 5
plots the average relative price growth against the average relative wage growth which have been
scaled (i.e., divided) by the average productivity growth differential between tradables and non
tradables. Quantitatively, the BS model predicts that a productivity differential between tradables
and non tradables of 1% leaves unaffected the relative wage of non tradables and appreciates the
relative price of non tradables by 1%. Hence, according to the BS model, all countries should be
positioned at point BS along the X-axis with coordinates (1,0). However, we find that all countries
are positioned to the south-west of point BS. Quantitatively, we find that a productivity differential
between tradables and non tradables by 1% is associated with a fall in the relative wage which varies
between -0.02% for Belgium and -0.41% for Denmark. Regarding the relative price, we find that its
appreciation varies between 0.34% for Canada to 0.97% for Japan while Norway experiences a fall
in the relative price of non tradables due to the large increase of prices in traded industries such as
’Mining and Quarrying’ (which accounts for about one fourth of GDP) over 1995-2007.
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Figure 5: The Relative Price and the Relative Wage Growth. Notes: Figure 5 plots the
annual average growth of the relative price of non tradables and the relative wage of non
tradables, both scaled by the average productivity growth differential between tradables
and non tradables, for each country of our sample over 1970-2007.
The data seem to challenge the conventional wisdom that labor mobility would gradually elim-
inate wage differences across sectors. If it were the case, the ratio of the non traded wage to the
traded wage would remain unchanged. However, we observe that the relative wage tends to fall.
Moreover, because non traded wages increase by a smaller amount that if labor were perfectly mo-
bile, the relative price of non tradables appreciates by a smaller amount than suggested by the
standard BS model. To confirm these findings, in the following, we have recourse to panel data unit
root tests and cointegration methods.
B.2 Panel Unit Root Tests
We test for the presence of unit roots in the logged relative wage ω (i.e., wN − wT ) and in the
difference between the (log) relative price p (i.e., pN − pT ) and the (log) relative productivities (i.e.,
aT − aN ). If the wage equalization hypothesis was right, sectoral wages would increase at the same
speed so that the relative wage of non tradables would be stationary. As a result, the non tradable
unit labor cost would rise by the same amount as the productivity differential. Hence, the difference
between the (logged) relative price and the (logged) relative productivity should be stationary as
well.
We consider five panel unit root tests among those most commonly used in the literature: i)
Levin, Lin and Chu’s [2002] test based on a homogenous alternative assumption, ii) a t-ratio type test
statistic by Breitung [2000] for testing a panel unit root based on alternative detrending methods,
iii) Im, Pesaran and Shin’s [2003] test that allows for a heterogeneous alternative, iv) Fisher type
test by Maddala and Wu [1999], and v) Hadri [2000] who proposes a test of the null of stationarity
against the alternative of a unit root in the panel data. Results are summarized in Table 15. We
ran these five panel unit root tests for sectoral unemployment rates along with the unemployment
rate differential.
As shown in the first column Table 15, all panel unit root tests, reveal that the relative wage
variable is non-stationary at a 5% significance level. This finding suggests that labor market frictions
prevent wage equalization across sectors in the long run. Regarding the relative price of non tradables
and the productivity of tradables relative to productivity of non tradables, these variables are found
to be non-stationary. As shown in the last column, the difference between the relative price of non
tradables and the relative productivity is integrated of order one which implies that the productivity
differential is not fully reflected in the non tradable unit labor cost and thus the relative price. As
can be seen in The first two columns of Table 17, sectoral unemployment rates are stationary, except
for Hadri’s [2000] test.
The common feature of first generation tests is the restriction that all cross-sections are indepen-
dent. We also consider some second generation unit root tests that allow cross-unit dependencies.
We consider the tests developed by: i) Bai and Ng [2002] based on a dynamic factor model, ii) Choi
[2001] based on an error-component model, iii) Pesaran [2007] based on a dynamic factor model
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Table 15: Panel Unit Root Tests (p-values) for eqs. (7a)-(7b) involving the relative wage
and the relative price
Test Stat Variables
ω p aT − aN p− (aT − aN )
Levin et al. [2002] t-stat 0.075 0.376 0.998 0.510
Breitung [2000] t-stat 0.273 0.667 0.760 0.124
Im et al. [2003] W-stat 0.558 1.000 1.000 0.999
Maddala and Wu [1999] ADF 0.329 0.972 1.000 0.950
PP 0.289 0.953 0.999 0.983
Hadri [2000] Zµ-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: For all tests, except for Hadri [2000], the null of a unit root is not rejected if p-value
≥ 0.05 at a 5% significance level. For Hadri [2000], the null of stationarity is rejected if
p-value ≤ 0.05 at a 5% significance level. ADF and PP are the Maddala and Wu’s [1999] P
test based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron p-values respectively.
Table 16: Panel Unit Root Tests (second generation) for eqs. (7a)-(7b) involving the relative
wage and the relative price
Test Stat Variables
ω p aT − aN p− (aT − aN )
Bai and Ng [2002] Zceˆ 0.267 0.151 0.038 0.530
P ceˆ 0.251 0.150 0.050 0.498
Choi [2001] Pm 0.000 0.988 0.992 0.407
Z 0.053 1.000 1.000 0.653
L? 0.047 1.000 1.000 0.662
Pesaran [2007] CIPS 0.010 0.320 0.450 0.015
CIPS? 0.010 0.320 0.450 0.015
Chang [2002] SN 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: For all tests, the null of a unit root is not rejected if p-value ≥ 0.05 at a 5% significance level. rˆ is the
estimated number of common factors. For the idiosyncratic components, P ceˆ is a Fisher’s type statistic based
on p-values of the individual ADF tests. Under H0, P ceˆ has a χ
2 distribution. Zceˆ is the standardized Choi’s
type statistic. Under H0, Zceˆ has a N(0, 1) distribution. For the idiosyncratic components, the estimated
number of independent stochastic trends in the common factors is reported. The first estimated value is
derived from the filtered test MQc and the second one is derived from the corrected test MQf . The Pm
test is a modified Fisher’s inverse chi-square test. The Z test is an inverse normal test. The L? test is
a modified logit test. All these three statistics have a standard normal distribution under H0. CIPS is
the mean of individual Cross sectionally ADF statistics (CADF). CIPS? denotes the mean of truncated
individual CADF statistics. The SN statistic corresponds to the average of individual non-linear IV t-ratio
statistics. It has a N(0, 1) distribution under H0. Corresponding p-values are in parentheses.
and iv) Chang [2002] who proposes the instrumental variable nonlinear test. The results of second
generation unit root tests are shown in Table 16.
In all cases, except for the Choi [2001] and Pesaran’s [2007] tests applied to ω and p−(aT −aN ),
we fail to reject the presence of a unit root in the relative price, the relative wage, the productivity
differential, and the difference p− (aT − aN), when cross-unit dependencies are taken into account.
B.3 Cointegration Tests and Alternative Cointegration Estimates
To begin with, we report the results of parametric and non parametric cointegration tests developed
by Pedroni ([1999]), ([2004]). Cointegration tests are based on the estimated residuals of equations
(5) and (6). Table 18 reports the tests of the null hypothesis of no cointegration. All Panel tests
reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between p and aT − aN at the 1% significance level
while three Panel tests reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between ω and aT − aN at the
5% significance level. Group-mean parametric t-test confirm cointegration between p and the labor
productivity differential and between ω and aT − aN at 5% and 1% significance level, respectively,
while group-mean non parametric t-tests are somewhat less pervasive. Pedroni [2004] explores finite
sample performances of the seven statistics. The results reveal that group-mean parametric t-test
is more powerful than other tests in finite samples. By and large, panel cointegration tests provide
evidence in favor of cointegration between the relative price and relative productivity, and between
the relative wage and relative productivity.
As robustness checks, we compare our group-mean FMOLS estimates and group-mean DOLS
estimates with one lag (q = 1), with alternative estimators. First, we consider the group-mean DOLS
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Table 17: Panel Unit Root Tests (p-values) for eq. (8) involving sectoral unemployment
rates
Test Stat Variables∑
duT duN duT − duN
Levin et al. [2002] t-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000
Breitung [2000] t-stat 0.049 0.045 0.000
Im et al. [2003] W-stat 0.000 0.003 0.000
Maddala and Wu [1999] ADF 0.000 0.003 0.000
PP 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hadri [2000] Zµ-stat 0.074 0.051 0.013
Notes: For all tests, except for Hadri [2000], the null of a unit root is not rejected if p-value
≥ 0.05 at a 5% significance level. For Hadri [2000], the null of stationarity is rejected if
p-value ≤ 0.05 at a 5% significance level. ADF and PP are the Maddala and Wu’s [1999] P
test based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron p-values respectively.
Table 18: Panel cointegration tests results (p-values)
wage equation price equation
eq. (5) eq. (6)
Panel tests
Non-parametric ν 0.000 0.000
Non-parametric ρ 0.012 0.003
Non-parametric t 0.004 0.002
Parametric t 0.046 0.000
Group-mean tests
Non-parametric ρ 0.388 0.449
Non-parametric t 0.167 0.220
Parametric t 0.016 0.001
Notes: The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected if the p-value
is below 0.05 (0.10 resp.) at 5% (10% resp.) significance level.
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Table 19: Alternative Cointegration Estimates of β and γ
Relative wage eq. (5) Relative price eq. (6)
βˆ t(β = 0) γˆ t(γ = 1)













































Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity and au-
tocorrelation consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses. a denotes signif-
icance at 1% level. The columns t(β) = 0 and t(γ) = 1 report the p-value of the
test of H0 : β = 0 and H0 : γ = 1 respectively.
estimator with 2 lags (q = 2) and 3 lags (q = 3). Second, we estimate cointegration relationships (7a)
and (7b) using the panel DOLS estimator (Mark and Sul [2003]). We also use alternative econometric
techniques to estimate cointegrating relationships (3): the dynamic fixed effects estimator (DFE),
the mean group estimator (MG, Pesaran and Smith [1995]), the pooled mean group estimator (PMG,
Pesaran et al. [1999]). All results are displayed in Table 19 and show that estimates of βˆ and γˆ are
close to those shown in Table 1 of the paper, except for the dynamic fixed effects estimator which
suggests a fall in ω of 0.1% instead of 0.2%.
B.4 Split-Sample Analysis
In this subsection, we provide more details about the split-sample analysis we perform in the main
text in order to differentiate the effects of a productivity differential according to the degree of labor
market regulation.
B.4.1 Relative Wage and Relative Price Effects of Higher Relative Productiv-
ity of Tradables: Implications of Labor Market Regulation
To empirically explore the implications of labor market regulation for the effects of a productivity
differential between tradables and non tradables, we apply cointegration techniques and perform a
simple split-sample analysis. We consider three indicators which capture the extent of regulation on
labor markets: the unemployment benefit replacement rate, the collective bargaining coverage, and
the employment protection legislation index. We also we have recourse to a principal component
analysis to construct an indicator that gives a more accurate measure of the degree of labor market
regulation. Source and data construction are detailed in section A. We take the median to split the
sample of 18 countries in 9 countries with high and 9 economies with low labor market regulation.
Table 20 shows values of each labor market indicator for each country. For each indicator, countries
are ranked in decreasing order.
We first compare the relative wage behavior of 9 countries with high and 9 economies with low
labor market regulation by running the regression of the relative wage on relative productivity for
each sub-sample:




+ vi,t, c = H,L, (77)
where βH (βL) captures the response of the relative wage to a productivity differential in countries
with higher (lower) labor market regulation.
We adopt a similar approach for the relative price. Because the movements in the relative price
of non tradables can be influenced by changes in the cost of entry in product market triggered by
competition-oriented policies, we add country-specific linear time trends when we run the regression
for each sub-sample in order to control for these effects:




+ ui,t, c = H,L, (78)
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where γH (γL) captures the response of the relative price to a productivity differential in countries
where the index that captures the extent of labor market regulation is above (below) the median.
Building on our model’s predictions, we expect the relative wage to decline more (i.e., |βH |
is expected to take higher values) and the relative price to appreciate less (i.e., |γH | is expected
to take lower values) in countries where the unemployment benefit scheme is more generous (i.e.,
% is higher) or the collective bargaining coverage is greater (i.e., BargCov is higher). While we
expect the relative wage to decline more in countries with strictness legislation against dismissals
(i.e., EPLadj takes higher values), the relative price should appreciate by a larger amount. While
estimates summarized in Table 4 in the main text corroborate all of our conjectures related to
the implications of labor market regulation for the relative wage and relative price effects of a
productivity differential, Table 21 shows results when we base the split-sample analysis on sample
mean for the three dimensions of labor market regulation. Reassuringly, all of our conclusions hold
when we base the split of the sample of 18 OECD countries on sample mean. In a nutshell, our
results are robust to the threshold used to perform the split-sample analysis.
Table 20: Split-Sample Analysis: Labor Market Indicators
Collective Bargaining Unemployment Benefit Employment Protection Labor Market
Coverage Replacement Rate Legislation Regulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AUT 97.10 DNK 72.21 NLD 2.60 AUT 1.82
BEL 94.22 BEL 66.86 ITA 2.53 NLD 1.81
SWE 89.08 NLD 66.70 AUT 2.48 SWE 1.51
FIN 86.07 GBR 63.04 DEU 2.36 FRA 1.32
FRA 85.38 DEU 61.39 SWE 2.31 DNK 1.31
NLD 84.50 FIN 59.33 FRA 2.11 FIN 1.28
ITA 83.26 IRL 53.65 NOR 2.06 BEL 1.16
DNK 82.45 CAN 53.60 ESP 2.04 ESP 1.09
ESP 75.51 JPN 51.24 FIN 2.02 DEU 1.07
AUS 70.89 AUT 49.85 KOR 1.98 ITA 0.89
NOR 69.89 AUS 49.62 DNK 1.93 NOR 0.80
DEU 69.38 SWE 48.19 BEL 1.65 IRL -0.17
IRL 57.58 FRA 47.18 JPN 1.49 AUS -0.19
GBR 44.83 NOR 43.18 IRL 1.32 GBR -0.86
CAN 35.75 ESP 41.34 AUS 1.21 JPN -0.92
JPN 24.15 KOR 37.51 GBR 1.02 CAN -1.18
USA 20.28 USA 25.72 CAN 0.81 USA -2.47
KOR 10.50 ITA 7.68 USA 0.24 KOR n.a.
Mean 65.60 Mean 49.91 Mean 1.79 Mean 0.40
Notes: Data coverage for Unemployment benefit replacement rate: 1970-2007 (2001-2007 for KOR). Data coverage for
collective bargaining coverage: 1970-2007 for AUS, AUT, CAN, DEU, DNK, FIN, GBR, IRL, ITA, JPN, SWE and USA,
1970-2005 for NLD and NOR, 1970-2002 for BEL and FRA, 1977-2004 for ESP and 2002-2006 for KOR. Data coverage
for the employment protection legislation index adjusted with the share of permanent workers in the economy: 1985-2007
(1990-2007 for KOR). The labor market regulation index is obtained by using a principal component analysis and thus the
data coverage corresponds to the shortest period among the three indicators used.
B.4.2 Effect on Unemployment Rate Differential of Higher Relative Produc-
tivity of Tradables: Implications of Labor Market Regulation
One prediction of the two-sector model with search frictions developed in the paper is that a pro-
ductivity differential between tradables and non tradables lowers the unemployment rate in both
the traded and non traded sector, the decline of the former being larger than that of the latter.
When we investigate the implications of labor market regulation, our model also predicts that the
decline in the unemployment rate differential between tradables and non tradables following higher
relative productivity of tradables is more pronounced in countries where labor markets are more
regulated. To test these predictions, we proceed in two stages.
Firstly, indexing countries and time by i and t respectively, we explore the following relationship
empirically:




+ λ .LMRi,t + zi,t, (79)
where ηi are the country fixed effects and zi,t are i.i.d. error terms. The dependent variable is the
difference between the change in the unemployment rate in the traded sector and the change in the
unemployment rate in the non traded sector (so that the unemployment rate differential is expressed
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Table 21: Panel Cointegration Estimates of β and γ for Sub-Samples
LMR % BargCov EPLadj LMR




































































t(γˆL = γˆH) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.723 0.999 0.804 1.000
Time period 1970-2007 1970-2007 1985-2007 1985-2007
Countries 17 17 18 17
Observations 642 642 414 390
mean LMR (high) 0.609 0.823 2.221 1.280
mean LMR (low) 0.391 0.365 1.108 -0.964
Notes: a and b denote significance at 1% and 5% levels. To investigate whether labor market regulation influences the responses
of the relative wage, β, and the relative price, γ, to a productivity differential, we split the sample of 18 OECD countries into two
subsamples and run the regressions (7a)-(7b) for the high and low-labor market regulation countries. βH (βL) and γH (γL) capture
the responses of the relative wage and the relative price, respectively, in countries with high (low) labor market regulation. The row
t(βˆL = βˆH) (t(γˆL = γˆH)) reports the p-value of the test of H0 : βˆL = βˆH (γˆL = γˆH). ’%’ is the unemployment benefits replacement
rate, ’EPLadj ’ the strictness of employment protection against dismissals adjusted with the share of permanent workers, ’BargCov’
the bargaining coverage and ’LMR’ the labor market regulation index obtained by using a principal component analysis.
in percentage point); we construct the productivity differential by taking growth rates in order to
remove the time trend, i.e., aˆTi,t − aˆNi,t, since aTit − aNit displays a unit root process, see section B.2.
Since sectoral unemployment rates can be directly affected by labor market regulation, we add
a control LMRit which varies over time. Since bargaining coverage is available on a yearly basis for
four countries only, whilst data availability is erratic for the rest of countries, we do not include this
indicator in our analysis. On the contrary, the adjusted employment protection legislation index,
ELPadj , and the unemployment benefit replacement rate, %, are available on a yearly basis since
1985, except Korea. While in the baseline regression, we add EPLadj as a control variable in the
baseline regression, we conducted a robustness check and replaced it with the unemployment benefit
replacement rate. Our results are merely quantitatively affected.
Turning to the implications of labor market regulation, we perform a split-sample analysis on
the basis of the labor market regulation index, LMRit, shown in the last column of Table 20 which is
an overall indicator reflecting all the dimensions of labor market institutions obtained by running a
principal component analysis. We explore the following relationship empirically for each sub-sample:




+ λk .LMRi,t + zi,t, k = H,L, (80)
where σH (σL) captures the response of the relative unemployment rate of tradables to a rise in
the productivity differential in countries where the labor market regulation index, LMRit, is above
(below) the mean.
Results are shown in Table 22 which reports both estimated values for σ and λ. In accordance
with our model’s predictions, estimated values of σ in eq. (79) are negative across all specifications,
i.e., higher productivity of tradables relative to non tradables lowers more the unemployment rate of
tradables than tthat of non tradables. When we run the regression (80), we also find empirically that
the unemployment rate of tradables falls more relative to the unemployment rate of non tradables
in countries where labor market regulation is more pronounced, i.e., σH < σL.
C First-Order Conditions
It is worthwhile noticing that we employ below in the formal analysis the term ”short-run static
solutions”. This terminology refers to solutions of static optimality conditions which are inserted in
dynamic optimality conditions in order to analyze the equilibrium dynamics. The term ”short-run”
refers to first-order conditions, and the term ”static” indicates that the solution holds at each instant
of time, and thus in the long-run.
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Table 22: Panel OLS Estimates of σ for the Whole and Sub-Samples (eqs. (79)-(80))
Unemployment differential eqs. (79)-(80)
Without Control with EPLadj with % with EPLadj and %

















































Number of observations 164 164 164 164
Number of countries 14 14 14 14
Notes: all regressions include country fixed effects. a (c) denotes significance at 1% (10%) level. We split the sample of
14 OECD countries into two subsamples on the basis of the mean sample of the labor market regulation (’LMR’) index
obtained by using a principal component analysis. The number of observations of the sub-sample of countries with high
(low) labor market regulation is 94 (70). We estimate the regression (8) for the high and low-labor market regulation
countries without (column 1) or with one (columns 2 and 3) or two (column 4) labor market control variable. σH (σL)
capture the responses of the unemployment rate differential between tradables and non tradables, respectively, in countries
with high (low) labor market regulation. ’EPLadj ’ is the strictness of employment protection against dismissals adjusted


















Lj(t) + U j(t)
)
is the disutility function from working and searching efforts. We drop the
time index when it is obvious. The current-value Hamiltonian for the representative household’s
optimization problem is:
HH = ρ+ λ [r?A+WTLT +WNLN +RTUT +RNUN − PCC − T ]
+ ξT,′
[
mTUT − sTLT ]+ ξN,′ [mNUN − sNLN] , (82)
where A, Lj (j = T,N) are state variables; λ, ξj,′ (with j = T,N) are the corresponding co-state
variables; C and U j are the control variables.













= mNξN,′ +RNλ, (83c)










ξN,′ − [λWN + vNF (LN + UN)] , (83f)
where ξj,′ (with j = T,N) is the utility value of the marginal job and λ the marginal utility of
wealth.
Since ξj,′ represents the utility value from an additional job and λ¯ corresponds to the marginal
utility of wealth, the pecuniary value of the marginal job is ξj(τ) ≡ ξj,′(τ)
λ¯
for τ ∈ [t,∞). Using this


















, has to be equal to the wage rate W j . In this case, the shadow price of employment
ξj is null. As long as agents face search costs, the real wage rate must exceed the disutility from en-








can be viewed as being the worker’s reservation




as the worker’s surplus (by keeping in mind that vjF < 0).
Solving (84) forward and using the transversality condition limt→∞ ξjLj exp










where W jR is the reservation wage given by







ξj +Rj . (86)
Differentiating ξj(t)Lj(t) w. r. t. time and substituting the law of motion for employment L˙j(t)




































where F j ≡ Lj + U j is the labor force and we have inserted eqs. (83b)-(83c), i.e., we used the fact

























ξj +Rj w. r. t. time and inserting (84), we can derive the












































































We consider a traded sector which produces a good denoted by the superscript T that can be
exported or consumed domestically. We also consider a non traded sector which produces a good
denoted by the superscript N that can be consumed only domestically. Each sector consists of a
large number of identical firms. Both the traded and non-traded sectors use labor, LT and LN ,
according to constant returns to scale production functions:
Y T = ATLT , and Y N = ANLN . (89)
Firms post job vacancies V j to hire workers and face a cost per job vacancy κj which is assumed
to be constant and measured in terms of the traded good. Firms pay the wage W j decided by the
generalized Nash bargaining solution. We also consider that firms must pay a firing tax xj per job
loss which captures the extent of employment protection legislation (see e.g., Heijdra and Ligthart
[2002], Veracierto [2008]).
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As producers face a labor cost W j per employee, a cost per hiring of κj , the profit function of
the representative firm in the traded sector is:





where xT is a firing tax in the traded sector when L˙T < 0 otherwise xT = 0.
Symmetrically, denoting by P the price of non traded goods in terms of traded goods, the profit
function of the representative firm in the non traded sector is:





where xN is a firing tax in the non traded sector when L˙N < 0 otherwise xN = 0.
Denoting by f j the rate at which a vacancy is matched with unemployed agents, the law of
motion for labor is given by:
L˙j = f j
(
θj
)− sjLj , (92)
where f jV j represents the flow of job vacancies which are fulfilled; note that f j decreases with labor
tightness θj .
The current-value Hamiltonian for the sector j’s representative firm optimization problem is:
Hj = ΞjLj −W jLj − κjV j + (γj + xj) (f jV j − sjLj) , (93)
where Ξj is the marginal revenue of labor with ΞT ≡ AT and ΞN ≡ PAN and γj is the co-state
variable associated to the labor motion equation (92).
First-order conditions can be written as follows:







)− (Ξj − xjsj −W j) , (94b)
where γj represents the pecuniary value of an additional job to the representative firm of sector
j = T,N . This can be seen more formally by solving (94b) forward and using the appropriate





Ξj (τ)−W j (τ)− xjsj] e(sj+r?)(t−τ)dτ. (95)
Differentiating γj(t)Lj(t) w. r. t. time and inserting the law of motion for employment L˙j(t)










Lj + xjsjLj − (Ξj −W j)Lj + γj (f jV j − sjLj) ,
= r?γjLj − [ΞjLj −W jLj − γjf jV j − xjsjLj] = r?γjLj − pij ,
where we used the fact that γj = κj/f j−xj , pij = ΞjLj−W jLj+xjL˙j−κjV j and L˙j = f jθj−sjLj .

















D Matching and Wage Determination
In each sector, there are job-seeking workers U j and firms with job vacancies V j which are matched
in a random fashion. Assuming a constant returns to scale matching function, the number of labor
contracts M j concluded per job seeker U j gives the job finding rate mj which is increasing in the













, αjV ∈ (0, 1) , (97)
where αjV represents the elasticity of vacancies in job matches and X
j corresponds to the matching







)αjV −1 . (98)
59Note that the flows of workers in and out of employment are equal to each other in any symmetric
equilibrium, i.e., mjU j = f jV j . Hence equations L˙j = f jV j − sjLj and L˙j = mjU j − sjLj indicate that
the demand for labor indeed equates the supply.
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Eq. (98) shows that the instantaneous probability of the firm finding a worker is higher the lower
the labor market tightness θj .
The representative firm of sector j posts job vacancies in order to hire workers. We assume that
the wage rate is derived from a bargaining between the firm and the worker. The wage rate W j is
set so as to maximize the following expression:
W j(t) = argmax HjW = argmax
(
ξj(t)
)αjW (γj(t) + xj)1−αjW , 0 ≤ αjW ≤ 1, (99)
where αjW and 1−αjW correspond to the bargaining power of the worker and the firm, respectively.

















Differentiating (85) and (95) w.r.t. the wage rate W j , we get: ∂ξ
j(t)
∂W j(t) = 1 and
∂γj(t)
∂W j(t) = −1;










By differentiating (101) w. r. t. time, inserting the dynamic equations for ξj given by (84) and for




ξj (see eq. (100)), rearranging terms, leads
to the wage rate:









where W jR = −vjF /λ¯ represents the reservation wage.











, inserting (94a), i.e., γj + xj = κj/f j , and using the fact that mj/f j = θj , the
reservation wage can be rewritten as follows:















κjθj +Rj . (103)
E Solving the Model
E.1 Short-Run Static Solutions
In this subsection, we compute short-run static solutions for consumption and the relative price of
non tradables. Static efficiency condition (83a) can be solved for consumption which of course must




















where σC corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption.
Denoting by φ the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the tradable and the non
tradable good and inserting short-run solution for consumption (83a) into intra-temporal allocations
between non tradable and tradable goods, i.e., CN = P ′CC and C
T =
[
PC − PP ′C
]
C, allows us to



























[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] < 0, (107d)









(106) into the market clearing condition for non tradables (24) allows us to solve for the relative
price of non tradables:
P = P
(


























Inserting (109) into (106), the short-run static solutions for CT and CN become:
CT = CT
(
LN , λ¯, AN
)
, CN = CN
(
LN , λ¯, AN
)
, (110)










= − (φ− σC)



























with αC the non tradable content of consumption expenditure, ωC the GDP share of consumption
expenditure and ωN the non tradable content of GDP.
E.2 Derivation of the Dynamic Equation of the Current Account
Using the fact that A ≡ B + γTLT + γNLN , differentiating with respect to time, noticing that
˙(γjLj) = r?γjLj − pij , the accumulation equation of traded bonds is given by:
B˙ = A˙− γ˙TLT − γT L˙T − γ˙NLN − γN L˙N ,
= r?
(
A− γTLT − γNLN)+ piT + piN +WTLT +WNLN +RTUT +RNUN − T − PCC.




, inserting the market clearing
condition for the non traded good (24) and the balanced government budget (23), the current
account equation reduces to:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +ATLT (t)− CT (t)−GT − κTV T (t)− κNV N (t). (112)
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E.3 Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions
E.3.1 Dynamic System



























Inserting the Nash bargaining wage W j given by (102) into
[(
Ξj + r?xj
)−W j], the dynamic equa-




































where the short-run static solution for the relative price of non tradables (108) has been inserted
























































The adjustment of the open economy towards the steady-state is described by a dynamic system
which comprises six equations. We consider that the utility function is additively separable in the
disutility received by working and searching in the two sectors. Such a specification makes it
impossible to switch from one sector to another instantaneously without going through a spell of
search unemployment, as in Alvarez and Shimer [2011]. Because workers must search for a job to
switch from one sector to another, i.e., cannot relocate hours worked from one sector to another
instantaneously, the dynamic system is block recursive. The first (second) dynamic system consists
of the law of motion of employment in the traded (non traded) sector described by (12), the dynamic
equations for labor tightness and job seekers given by (114) and (88), respectively. We denote the
steady-state value with a tilde.
Traded Sector
Linearizing the accumulation equation for traded labor (12) by setting j = T and the dynamic
equations for labor market tightness (114) and job seekers (88) in the traded sector, we get in matrix
form: (








where JT is given by
JT ≡





































































The determinant denoted by Det of the linearized 3×3 matrix (118) is unambiguously negative:











while the determinant is given by:
DetJT = − (sT + r?) (sT + r? + m˜T ) (sT + m˜T ) < 0. (122)
From now on, for clarity purpose, we impose the Hosios condition in order to avoid unnecessary
complications. We relax this assumption when analyzing steady-state effects and conducting a
quantitative exploration of the effects of higher productivity of tradables relative to non tradables.
Note that all conclusions related to the analysis of equilibrium dynamics hold whether the Hosios
conditions is imposed or not.
Denoting by νT the eigenvalue in the traded sector, the characteristic equation for the matrix
J (118) of the linearized system writes as follows:
(
sT + r? − νTi
){(
νTi
)2 − r?νTi + DetJTsT + r?
}
= 0. (123)







(r?)2 − 4 DetJ
T
sT + r?
 ≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (124)
We denote by νT1 < 0 and ν
T
2 > 0 the stable and unstable eigenvalues respectively which satisfy:
νT1 < 0 < r
? < νT2 . (125)
Let νT3 be the second unstable characteristic root which writes as:
νT3 = s
T + r? > 0. (126)
Since the system features one state variable, LT , and one negative eigenvalue, two jump variables, θT
and UT , and two positive eigenvalues, the equilibrium yields a unique one-dimensional saddle-path.












Linearizing the accumulation equation for non traded labor (12) by setting j = N and the
dynamic equations for labor market tightness (114) and job seekers (88) in the non traded sector,
we get in matrix form:(




LN (t)− L˜N , θN (t)− θ˜N , UN (t)− U˜N
)T
, (128)
where JN is given by
JN ≡











































































αNW − (1− αV )
]
. (130)
The determinant denoted by Det of the linearized 3×3 matrix (129) is unambiguously negative:























where PLN < 0.






while the determinant is given by:


















































)PLN L˜NAN (sN + r?)
Ψ˜N
(















κN θ˜N = −χ˜N vNF
λ¯
















, multiplying the numerator and the denominator by P˜ and rearranging terms to get
the last line.
We impose the Hosios condition in order to avoid unnecessary complications. Denoting by νN
the eigenvalue, the characteristic equation for the matrix J (129) of the linearized system writes as
follows: (
sN + r? − νNi
){(
νNi











(r?)2 − 4 DetJ
N
sN + r?
 ≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (136)
We denote by νN1 < 0 and ν
N
2 > 0 the stable and unstable eigenvalues respectively which satisfy:
νN1 < 0 < r
? < νN2 . (137)







which can be rewritten as follows
DetJN
sN + r?

















where we used the fact that C
N
ANLN




Let νN3 be the second unstable characteristic root which writes as:
νN3 = s
N + r? > 0. (139)
Since the system features one state variable, LN , and one negative eigenvalue, two jump variables,
θN and UN , and two positive eigenvalues, the equilibrium yields a unique one-dimensional saddle-
path.
E.4 Formal Solutions for θT (t) and UT (t)
Setting the constant DT2 = 0 to insure a converging adjustment for all macroeconomic aggregates,
the stable paths are given by :
LT (t)− L˜T = DT1 eν
T
1 t, (140a)
θT (t)− θ˜T = ωT21DT1 eν
T
1 t, (140b)
UT (t)− U˜T = ωT31DT1 eν
T
1 t, (140c)
where DT1 = L
T
0 − L˜T , and elements ωT21 and ωT31 of the eigenvector (associated with the stable




































ωT21 ≶ 0. (141b)
We have normalized ωT11 to unity. Inserting ν
T
1 = s
T + m˜T (see (127)) into (141a) and (141b),
eigenvectors reduce to:
ωT21 = 0, ω
T
31 = −1. (142)
From (142), the dynamics for labor market tightness θT degenerate while job seekers are negatively
correlated with employment along a stable transitional path.
E.5 Formal Solutions for θN(t) and UN(t)
Setting the constant DN2 = 0 to insure a converging adjustment for all macroeconomic aggregates,
the stable paths are given by:
LN (t)− L˜N = DN1 eν
N
1 t, (143a)
θN (t)− θ˜N = ωN21DN1 eν
N
1 t, (143b)
UN (t)− U˜N = ωN31DN1 eν
N
1 t, (143c)
where DN1 = L
N
0 − L˜N , and elements ωN21 and ωN31 of the eigenvector (associated with the stable














































ωN21 ≶ 0. (144b)
26
We have normalized ωN11 to unity. The signs of (144a) and (144b) will be determined later.
E.6 Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Bonds B(t)
Substituting first the short-run static solutions for consumption in tradables given by (110), and
using the fact that V j = U jθj , the accumulation equation for traded bonds (112) can be written as
follows:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +ATLT (t)− CT (LN (t), λ¯, AN)−GT − κT θT (t)UT (t)− κNθN (t)UN (t). (145)
Linearizing (145) in the neighborhood of the steady-state and inserting stable solutions given by















ΛT = AT − κT U˜TωT21 − κT θ˜TωT31 = AT + κT θ˜T > 0, (147a)
ΛN = −CTLN − κN U˜NωN21 − κN θ˜NωN31,















θN/mN = αNV to get (147b); note that
CTLN ' 0 because our estimates of φ average about 1 while we set σC to one. The sign of (147b)
follows from the fact that ωN21 < 0 (see (189)) and s
N + νN1 < 0; the latter result stems from the







νN1 < −(sN + m˜N ) < 0 and thereby sN + νN1 < 0.
Solving the differential equation (146) yields:























Invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency, and using the fact that DT1 =
LT0 − L˜T and DN1 = LN0 − L˜N , we obtain the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal budget
constraint:















AT + κT θ˜T
)
(sT + m˜T + r?)









, BLT = Φ
T < 0, BLN = Φ
N < 0. (151)
For the national intertemporal solvency to hold, the terms in brackets of equation (148) must be
zero so that the stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to:









F Revisiting the Theory Developed by Balassa [1964] and
Samuelson [1964]: Derivation of Equations in Section 2.1
This Appendix presents the formal analysis underlying the results described in section 2.1. For sim-
plicity purposes, we abstract from firing costs. Additionally, we assume that the worker bargaining
power αjW is symmetric across sectors.
As defined by eq. (113) that we repeat for convenience, the overall surplus from hiring in sector
j, Ψj , is defined as the difference between the marginal product of labor (Ξj) and the reservation
wage (W jR):
Ψj = Ξj −W jR. (153)
Eq. (153) corresponds to eq. (1) in the text. The reservation wage, W jR, is equal to the





jθj +Rj , (154)
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where we used the fact that mjξj = αW1−αW κ
jθj . Totally differentiating eq. (154), the change of the
reservation wage in percentage is proportional to the labor market tightness:
wˆjR = χ
j θˆj , (155)
where χj ≡ mjξj
W jR
corresponds to the share of the surplus associated with a labor contract; the share
χj is smaller than one as long as job seekers receive unemployment benefits, Rj , from the State
since W jR = m
jξj +Rj .
The product wage W j paid to the worker in sector j is equal to the reservation wage W jR plus
a share αW of the overall surplus Ψj :
W j = αWΨj +W
j
R. (156)
Eq. (156) corresponds to eq. (2) in the text. Totally differentiating (156), the change in the
product wage in percentage is proportional to the changes in the labor market tightness and the
















where we substituted (155) to get the last line. Subtracting wˆT from wˆN yields the wage differential
between the non traded and the traded sector:
























where we assume that initially, sectoral wages, W j , the share of the surplus associated with a
labor contract, χj , reservation wages, W jR, and overall surpluses, Ψ
j , are similar across sectors, i.e.,
W j 'W , χjW jR ' χWR and Ψj ' Ψ. Eq. (158) corresponds to eq. (3) in the text.
Denoting the job destruction rate by sj and the job finding rate by mj , and using the fact at the
steady-state, the flow of unemployed workers who find a job is equalized with the flow of employed





Totally differentiating (159) and assuming that the elasticity of vacancies in job matches, denoted
by αV , is symmetric across sectors, the change in unemployment rate in sector j reads as:






1− uj) θˆj , (160)
where we used the fact that 1 − uj = mjsj+mj(θj) . Subtracting duT from duN yields negative rela-
tionship between the unemployment rate differential between tradables and non tradables and the
percentage change in labor market tightness in the traded relative to the non traded sector:





where we assume that at the initial steady-state, search parameters are such that uj ≡ u. Eq.
(161) corresponds to eq. (4) in the text.
When a labor contract is concluded, a surplus Ψj is created. The firm obtains a share 1− αW
of the surplus which is equal to the difference between the marginal product of labor and the Nash
bargaining wage W j :
(1− αW )Ψj = Ξj −W j .
The equation above can be rewritten as follows:
Ξj = (1− αW )Ψj +W j . (162)
Eq. (162) corresponds to eq. (5) in the text. According to the definition of the representative
firm’s profit (16), i.e., pij = ΞjLj −W jLj − κjV j (we set xj = 0 since we abstract from the firing
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cost in this section for simplicity purposes), the share of the surplus obtained by the firm is equal
to the dividend plus the hiring cost per worker:
(1− αW )Ψj = pi
j + κjV j
Lj
. (163)








Subtracting ΞˆT from ΞˆN while assuming that initially W j 'W , Ξj ' Ξ, Ψj ' Ψ, leads to:









wˆN − wˆT ) . (165)
Using the fact that ΞˆN = pˆ+ aˆN and ΞˆT = aˆT , one obtains a relationship between the relative price
growth and both the productivity and the wage differential:









wˆN − wˆT ) . (166)
Eq. (166) corresponds to eq. (6) in the text.
G Graphical Apparatus
Before turning to the derivation of steady-state effects, we investigate graphically the long-run effects
of a productivity differential.
G.1 Steady-State






















































) = (1− αNW ) Ψ˜N
sN + r?
, (167g)
AN L˜N = C˜N , (167h)
r?B˜ +AT L˜T − C˜T − κT θ˜T U˜T − κN θ˜N U˜N , (167i)
and the intertemporal solvency condition









where CN = P ′CC and C
T = (1− αC)PCC and we used the fact that V j = U jθj . The steady-state
equilibrium defined by ten equations jointly determines C˜, L˜T , L˜N U˜T , U˜N , θ˜T , θ˜N , P˜ , B˜, λ¯.
G.2 Isoclines and Stable Path in the (θT , LT )-space
The labor market in the traded sector can be summarized graphically by Figure 6(a) that traces
out two schedules in the (θT , LT )-space. More precisely, eliminating U˜T from eq. (167d) by using
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(167b), i.e., U˜T = s
T L˜T
m˜T

















) = (1− αTW )
(sT + r?)
Ψ˜T , (168b)



















(see eq. (103)), the overall surplus from hiring in the traded sector is given
by:














where u˜T = s
T
sT+m˜T






< 1. The slope of the L˙T = 0 schedule in the













Hence the decision of search (henceforth labelled DST ) schedule is upward-sloping in the (θT , LT )-
space. According to (170), a fall in the marginal utility of wealth λ¯ shifts downward the DST -
schedule.






Ψ˜T + χ˜T W˜TR
]
= AT aˆT , (172)
where we used (167f) and the fact that − (fT )′ θT /fT = (1− αTV ). The slope of the θ˙T = 0 schedule







Hence the vacancy creation (henceforth labelled V CT ) schedule is a vertical line in the (θT , LT )-
space. According to (172), a rise in labor productivity in the traded sector AT shifts to the right
the V CT -schedule.
Having determined the patterns of isoclines in the (θT , LT )-space, we now analyze the slope of











Using the fact that ωT21 = 0 (see (142)), the slope of the stable branch labelled SS








According to (175), the stable branch coincides with the V CT -schedule (see Figure 6(a)) as the
dynamics for θT degenerate.
G.3 Isoclines and Stable Path in the (θN , LN)-space
The labor market in the non traded sector can be summarized graphically by Figure 6(b) that traces
out two schedules in the (θN , LN )-space. More precisely, eliminating U˜N from eq. (167e) by using
(167c), i.e., U˜N = s
N L˜N
m˜N








(θ˙T (t) = 0)
DST









































(b) (θN , LN )-space
Figure 6: Phase Diagrams in the (θj , Lj)-space
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tradables given by (108) implies that the system which comprises eqs. (167c), (167e), (167g), and
















) = (1− αNW )
(sN + r?)
Ψ˜N , (176b)



















(see eq. (103)), the overall surplus from hiring in the non traded
sector is given by:














where u˜N = s
N
sN+m˜N






< 1. The slope of the L˙N = 0 schedule in the













Hence the decision of search (henceforth labelled DSN) schedule is upward-sloping in the (θN , LN )-
space. According to (178), a fall in the marginal utility of wealth λ¯ shifts downward the DSN -
schedule.












ˆ˜LN + σCαCωC ˆ¯λ+ [ωN − ωCαC ((1− αC)φ+ αCσC)] aˆN+
}
αCωC [(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] , (180)
where we used (167g) and the fact that − (fN)′ θN/fN = (1− αNV ). The slope of the θ˙N = 0













αCωC [(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ]
ωN
< 0. (181)
Hence the vacancy creation (henceforth labelled V CN) schedule is downward-sloping in the (θN , LN )-
space. According to (181), since [ωN − ωCαC ((1− αC)φ+ αCσC)] R 0, a rise in labor productivity
in the non traded sector AN may shift to the left or to the right the V CN -schedule depending on
whether φ takes high or low values; it is worthwhile mentioning that higher productivity in trad-
ables relative to non tradables shifts to the right the V CN -schedule by appreciating the relative
price and thus by raising the marginal revenue of labor in the non traded sector, i.e., by increasing
ΞN ≡ PAN . Moreover, a fall in the marginal utility of wealth λ¯ shifts to the right the V CN -schedule
by appreciating the relative price of non tradables.
Having determined the patterns of isoclines in the (θN , LN )-space, we now analyze the slope of
the stable path. To do so, we use the third line of the Jacobian matrix (129) to rewrite the element





















sN + m˜N + r? − νNi
) . (182)



























is equal to the determinant of the Jacobian matrix (129) given by (134). To











Inserting (138) into (184), the slope of the stable branch labelled SNSN in the (θN , LN )-space

























where we denote by a hat the rate of change relative to initial steady-state. According to (185), the
stable branch SSN is downward-sloping in the (θN , LN )-space.
To get (185), we proceed as follows. We first have rewritten the numerator of eigenvector ωN21
given by (182) (set i = 1) by using (183) and by inserting DetJ
N
sN+r?





































= − ωN P˜A
N









































































αCωC [(1−αC)φ+αCσC ] to get the second line, m˜







to get (188). Inserting
(188) into (186), rearranging terms, we get (187).
Inserting first (188), and multiplying ωN21 (setting setting i = 1 into (182)) by L˜




















sN + m˜N + r? − νN1
) < 0, (189)




θN/mN = αNV and u˜







Because both the V CN -schedule and the stable branch SNSN are downward sloping, we have
now to determine whether the stable branch SNSN is steeper or flatter than the V CN -schedule.


























(s+r?) , inspection of (181) and (185) implies that the S
NSN -schedule is steeper than the
V CN -schedule (see Figure 6(b)).
We turn now to the transitional adjustment along the stable path in the (LN , UN )-space by
making use of (144b):






where ωN31 is given by eq. (144b). To sign the slope of the transitional path in the (L
N , UN )-space,

















sN + m˜N + r? − νN1
) . (192)
where Ψ˜LN and Ψ˜UN and the partial derivatives (evaluated at the steady-state) of the overall surplus



















































)− (2sN + r?)− m˜N Ψ˜LN
Ψ˜UN(











sN + m˜N + r? − νN1
) < 0, (194)
where νN1 < 0 is the stable root for the non traded labor market. Since according to (193), Ψ˜LN < 0
and Ψ˜UN < 0, we have ωN31 < 0. Hence, as employment declines in the non traded sector, job seekers
increase in this sector.
G.4 Isoclines and Stable Path in the (uT , LT )-space
One can alternatively analyze the transitional adjustment in the (uT , LT )-space. To do so, we first
determine the slopes of the isoclines L˙T = 0 and θ˙T = 0 in the (uT , LT )-space. Hence, we first
determine the relationship between labor market tightness and the unemployment rate by using the
definition of the latter, i.e. u˜T = s
T
sT+mT (θ˜T ) . To alleviate the notation, we assume:
αV = α
j
V , σL = σ
j
L. (195)
Totally differentiating the equation that describes the steady-state level of the unemployment
rate, we have:
ˆ˜



















Hence the DST -schedule is downward-sloping in the (uT , LT )-space, as displayed in Figure 7(a).











Ψ˜T + χ˜T W˜TR
]
= AT aˆT .






As a result, the V CT -schedule is a vertical line in the (uT , LT )-space, as displayed in Figure 7(a).
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Having determined that the patterns of isoclines, we turn now to the transitional adjustment
along the stable path labelled XXT . We begin by linearizing uj(t) = s
j
sj+mj(θj(t)) in the neighbor-
hood of the steady-state which leads to:
uj(t)− u˜j = 1
F˜ j
[(





1− u˜j)ωj31 − u˜j]Dj1eνj1t. (199)























(1− u˜j)ωj31 − u˜j
] , (200)





















since U˜ j/L˜j = sj/m˜j .
Focusing on the traded sector, inserting the stable path (see section E.4) for job seekers, i.e.,
UT (t) − U˜T = ωT31D1eν
T
1 t with ωT31 = −1 (see eq. (142)), the stable path XXT shown in Figure








u˜T < 0, (201)
= − u˜
T
1− u˜T . (202)
Eq. (202) reveals that in countries where the unemployment benefit scheme is more generous (i.e., %
takes higher values) or worker bargaining power is greater (i.e., αW takes higher values), the stable
path becomes steeper since labor market tightness is initially low and thus the unemployment rate
uT is high.
We now demonstrate that the slope of the eigenvector (202) in the (uT , LT )-space is larger (i.e.,


















Since the term on the RHS of inequality is unambiguously negative, the stable branch which corre-
sponds to the XXT -schedule is flatter than the DST -schedule.
The adjustment of labor and unemployment rate in the traded sector is depicted in Figure
2(a). Following an increase in productivity of tradables relative to non tradables, the decision of
search-schedule shifts (slightly) to the left as a result of the positive wealth effect (captured by a
decline in λ¯, see eq. (170)); at the same time, the vacancy creation-schedule which is vertical also
shifts to the left (see eq. (172)) as a result of the rise in AT which encourages firms to post more
job vacancies; as a result, θT increases which raises the probability of finding a job and thus lowers
unemployment. The unemployment rate declines on impact. Along the stable path, uT falls while
employment builds up.
G.5 Isoclines and Stable Path in the (uN , LN)-space



















































































(b) (uN , LN )-space
Figure 7: Phase Diagrams in the (uj , Lj)-space
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Totally differentiating eq. (204) leads to:
ˆ˜



















Hence the DSN -schedule is downward-sloping in the (uN , LN )-space, as displayed in Figure 7(b).
Inserting first (108) and totally differentiating eq. (176b) leads to:[










where PLN < 0.
















where the positive sign of eq. (208) follows from eq. (110) indicating that PLN < 0. As a result,
the V CN -schedule is an upward-sloping line in the (uN , LN )-space, as displayed in Figure 7(b).
Having determined the patterns of isoclines, we turn now to the transitional adjustment along











(1− u˜N )ωN31 − u˜N
] . (209)














sN + m˜N + r? − νN1
) . (210)
Then, we use (210) to derive an expression for
(
1− u˜N)ωN31 − u˜N :
(
1− u˜N)ωN31 − u˜N = −
(




1− u˜N) m˜NPLNAN λ¯vNFF(
sN + m˜N + r? − νN1
) . (211)









sN + m˜N + r? − νN1
)(
sN + m˜N + r? − νN1
)
+ (1− u˜N ) m˜NPLNAN λ¯vNFF
< 0. (212)
Since vNFF < 0 and PLN < 0, the stable branch XX
N is downward-sloping in the (uN , LN )-space.
We now demonstrate that the slope of the stable branch (212) in the (uN , LN )-space is larger
(i.e., less negative) than the slope of the DSN -schedule described by eq. (206):




sN + m˜N + r? − νN1
)(
sN + m˜N + r? − νN1
)
+ (1− u˜N ) m˜NPLNAN λ¯vNFF

































1− u˜N) m˜NPLNAN λ¯
vNFF
. (213)
Since the term on the RHS of inequality is unambiguously positive, the stable branch which corre-
sponds to the XXN -schedule is flatter than the DSN -schedule, as can be seen in Figure 7(b).
The adjustment of labor and unemployment rate in the non traded sector is depicted in Figure
2(b). Following an increase in productivity of tradables relative to non tradables, the decision of
search-schedule shifts to the left as a result of the positive wealth effect (captured by a decline in λ¯);
at the same time, the vacancy creation-schedule which is upward-sloping also shifts to the left (see
eq. (207)) as a result of the rise in AN which encourages firms to post more job vacancies. More
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specifically, a rise in AN has an ambiguous effect on PAN . Assuming σC = φ = 1, AN has no impact
whilst the positive wealth effect stimulates consumption in non tradables and thus appreciates the
relative price of non tradables which increases the surplus from an additional job. Consequently,
θN increases which raises the probability of finding a job and thus lowers uN in the long-run. The
unemployment rate declines significantly on impact and overshoots its new steady-state level. Along
the stable path, uN increases while employment declines. Intuitively, as LN falls along XXN , the
relative price appreciates which induces non traded firms to post more job vacancies. The rise in
the labor market tightness θN leads agents to search for a job and thus increases the number of job
seekers. The decline in employment LN triggered by the positive wealth effect and the rise in the
number of job seekers UN produces an increase in uN along the stable path.
H Steady-State and Short-Run Effects of Higher Relative
Productivity
In this section, we first solve the steady-state and derive the long-term changes following a rise in
the productivity differential between tradables and non tradables, aˆT − aˆN . Steady-state values
are denoted with a tilde while the rate of change relative to initial steady-state is denoted by a
hat. Then, we analyze the dynamic adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium following higher
productivity in tradables relative to non tradables.60
H.1 Steady-State
We now describe the steady-state of the economy consisting of six equations which can be solved












, and the shadow value of wealth, λ¯.
First, setting θ˙j = 0 into eq. (114), we obtain the vacancy creation equation (which holds for










Ψ˜j , Ψ˜j ≡ (Ξj + r?xj)− W˜ jR, j = T,N, (214)
where ΞN = P (.)AN with P (.) given by eq. (108). The LHS term of eq. (214) represents the
expected marginal cost of recruiting in sector j = T,N . The RHS term represents the marginal
benefit of an additional worker which is equal to the share, received by the firm, of the rent created
by the encounter between a vacancy and a job-seeking worker. A rise in labor productivity raises
the surplus from hiring Ψ˜j ; as a result, firms post more job vacancies which increases the labor
market tightness θ˜j .
Second, setting ξ˙j = 0 into eq. (84) and using the fact that W˜ j − W˜ jR = αW Ψ˜j leads to
ξ˜j = αW Ψ˜
j
sj+r? . Rewriting the latter equation by inserting the vacancy creation equation (214) for
sector j to eliminate Ψ˜j gives the expected value of finding a job, i.e., m˜j ξ˜j = αW1−αW κ
j θ˜j . Plugging
this equation into (14b) leads to the equality between the utility loss from participating the labor






j θ˜j + Rj . Setting





L˜j , the decision of search equation reads



















corresponds to the reservation wage, W˜ jR, reflecting the marginal benefit
from search. According to (215), higher labor market tightness increases labor L˜j by raising the
job-finding rate for the worker and thus the employment rate m˜
j
m˜j+sj . Moreover, for given λ¯, the rise




κj θ˜j +Rj induces agents to supply more labor.
Third, setting B˙ = 0 into eq. (25), we obtain the market clearing condition for the traded good:
r?B˜ +AT L˜T − C˜T − κT U˜T θ˜T − κN U˜N θ˜N = 0, (216)
60While we calibrate the model to data by considering government spending, we set Gj = 0 to derive
analytical results in order avoid unnecessary complications.
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where C˜T = CT
(
L˜N , λ¯, AN
)
.
The system comprising eqs. (214)-(216) can be solved for the steady-state sectoral labor market
tightness and employment, and traded bonds. All these variables can be expressed in terms of the

















, and B˜ = B
(
λ¯, AT , AN
)
. Inserting first B˜ = B
(
λ¯, AT , AN
)
,




, the intertemporal solvency condition (149) can be solved for the equilibrium










, one can solve for U j ; then the relationship
V j = θjU j can be solved for the steady-state job vacancy in sector j. Using the fact that C˜T =
CT
(




















where we have eliminated λ¯ by using (217).
H.2 Steady-State Effects of Productivity Shocks
Eliminating U˜T from eq. (167d) by using (167b), i.e., U˜T = s
T L˜T
m˜T
, eliminating U˜N from eq. (167e)
by using (167c), i.e., U˜N = s
N L˜N
m˜N
, and inserting the short-run static solution for the relative price
of non tradables given by (108), inserting the short-run static solution for consumption in tradables
given by (110) into the market clearing condition for traded goods (167i), the steady-state can be


























































r?B˜ +AT L˜T − CT
(









and the intertemporal solvency condition













0 and ΦN ≡ ΛN
νN1 −r?
< 0 (see (150)); to get (219e), we use the fact that U˜ j = s
jL˜j
m˜j and f
j = mj/θj .
Note that the market clearing condition for non tradables (167h) can be solved for the relative price
of non tradables. To avoid unnecessary complications, we set GN = 0 so that eq. (167h) reduces
to Y N = CN . The solution for the relative price of non tradables is P = P
(
LN , λ¯, AN
)
. Totally
differentiating the market clearing condition for non tradables, we get:
pˆ =
−aˆN − lˆN − σC ˆ¯λ
[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] (220)








[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] . (221)
As will become clear later, it is convenient to first solve the steady-state without the intertempo-
ral solvency condition (219f), i.e., to solve the system comprising (219a)-(219e), which allows us to
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express the steady-state values in terms of the stock of traded bonds, the marginal utility of wealth
and labor productivity indices Aj (with j = T,N). Totally differentiating the system of equations
(219a)-(219e), using both (220) and (221), yields in matrix form:








0 0 1 − [αNV u˜N + σNL χ˜N ] 0


























−P˜ANσC ˆ¯λ+ P˜AN {[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ]− 1} aˆN











Y = (1− αC)ωC , and Y
T
Y = (1− ωN ), we set ωjV = κVY ;







[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] , (223a)
a51 =
[





(1− αC)ωCαC (φ− σC)





System (219a)-(219e) can be solved for steady-state employment and labor market tightness in




































] > 0, (225a)
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[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] + P˜AN
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αNV u˜











[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] + P˜AN
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αNV u˜
N + σNL χ˜N










[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ]− σC P˜AN
[
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[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] + P˜AN
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P˜AN {[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ]− 1}
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[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] + P˜AN
[
αNV u˜
N + σNL χ˜N




(1− ωN ) +
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(1− ωN )− ωTV
] [
αTV u˜
T + σTL χ˜
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[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] + P˜AN
[
αNV u˜
N + σNL χ˜N
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+
(1− αC)ωCαC (φ− σC)



























[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] + P˜AN
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[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] + P˜AN
[
αNV u˜
N + σNL χ˜N
]} ≶ 0.(225j)
H.3 The Dynamic Adjustment
The tilde is suppressed below for the purposes of clarity. We now explore effects of higher produc-
tivity in tradables relative to non tradables by focusing on the labor market. Figure 8(a) depicts























is the reservation wage in the traded sector. The first equation
(226a) represents the decision of search schedule in the traded sector (henceforth DST ) which








θˆT , θˆT =
AT[
(1− αTV ) Ψ˜T + χ˜TWTR
] aˆT .








is upward-sloping in the (θT , LT )-space. The reason is that a rise in the labor market tightness
raises the probability of finding a job and thus increases employment LT by reducing the number
of job seekers. Moreover, because we consider an endogenous labor force participation decision,
the consecutive increase in the reservation wage induces agents to supply more labor. The second
equation (226b) represents the vacancy creation schedule (henceforth V CT ) which is a vertical line
in the (θT , L)-space. Note that Figure 8(a) depicts the logarithm form of the system (226).
By raising the surplus from hiring, a rise in labor productivity in the traded sector AT shifts to
the right the V CT -schedule from V CT0 to V CT1. Because traded firms post more job vacancies,
the labor market tightness θT1 exceeds its initial level θ
T
0 . Note that θ
T jumps immediately to its new
higher steady-state level while traded employment builds up over time along the isocline θ˙T = 0 until
the economy reaches the new steady-state. While increased labor market tightness raises traded
employment by pushing up the reservation wage and reducing unemployment, the positive wealth
effect moderates the expansionary effect on labor supply. Graphically, the fall in λ¯ shifts to the
right the DST -schedule. The new steady state is ET1 .
Since we are interested in the movement of sectoral wages, it is useful to explore the long-run
adjustment in the traded wage following a rise in labor productivity AT . The labor market in the
traded sector can alternatively be summarized graphically in the (θT ,WT )-space as shown in Figure




ΨT = AT −WT , the V CT -schedule is downward sloping and convex
toward the origin, reflecting diminishing returns in vacancy creation. The slope of the V CT -schedule
in the (θT ,WT )-space is:
dWT
dθT



















The wage setting-schedule (WST henceforth) is upward sloping (see eq. (22)). Using the fact that(
FT
)1/σTL /λ¯ = WTR , the WST -schedule is WT = αTW (AT + r?xT )+ (1− αTW )WTR with a slope in










T > 0. (228)
A rise in AT shifts to the right the V CT -schedule by stimulating labor demand which exerts an
upward pressure on the the traded wage. Because workers get a fraction αTW of the increased surplus,
the productivity shock shifts to the left the WST -schedule.62 Hence, the new steady-state at FT1 is
associated with a higher traded wage. The higher the worker bargaining power, the larger the shift
of the WST curve and thereby the more WT increases. To see it formally, totally differentiating
the Nash bargaining traded wage and eliminating θT by using the vacancy creation schedule (i.e.,
eq. (226b)) yields the deviation in percentage of the traded wage from its initial steady state:63















where ΩT > 0 represents the sensitivity of the traded wage to a change in the labor productivity
index AT .
We now turn to the non traded labor market equilibrium depicted in Figure 8(b) which is




























is the reservation wage in the non traded sector. While eq. (230a) rep-
resents the decision of search schedule (henceforth DSN) which is upward-sloping in the (θN , LN )-
space, eq. (230b) corresponds to the vacancy creation schedule in the non traded sector (henceforth
V CN). Note that whether we consider the traded or the non traded sector, the same logic applies
to explain the positive relationship between the employment and the labor market tightness along
the DSj-schedule (with j = T,N).
62Note that the shift in the V CT -schedule dominates the shift in the WST -schedule because workers and
firms have to share the surplus, i.e., 0 < αTW < 1.
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(b) (θN , LN )-space





























































(b) (θN ,WN )-space
Figure 9: Long-Run Sectoral Wage Effects of a Productivity Differential
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The slope of the DSN -schedule in the (θN , LN )-space is given by
[
αNV u











[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ]
= −PAN
{
lˆN + σC ˆ¯λ+ {1− [(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ]} aˆN
}
.
The slope of the V CN -schedule is negative and given by:
LˆN
θˆN





[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ]
< 0.
As depicted in Figure 8(b), the V CN -schedule is downward-sloping in the (θN , LN )-space. The
reason is as follows. Because an increase in non traded labor raises output of this sector, the relative
price of non tradables must depreciate for the market clearing condition (24) to hold. The fall in P
drives down the surplus from hiring an additional worker in the non traded sector which results in
a decline in labor market tightness θN as firms post less job vacancies.
Imposing σC = 1, a rise in AN raises the surplus from hiring if and only if the elasticity of
substitution φ between traded and non traded goods is larger than one. The reason is that only
in this case, the share of non tradables in total expenditure rises which results in an expansionary
effect on labor demand in the non traded sector. In Figure 8(b), we assume that σC = φ = 1, so that
the productivity shock does not impinge on the vacancy creation decision because the share of non
tradables remains unchanged. Yet, by producing a positive wealth effect, higher labor productivity
of non tradables shifts the V CN -schedule to the right by inducing agents to consume more which
in turn raises P and thereby the surplus from hiring. The fall of the shadow value of wealth also
shifts the DSN -schedule to the right as agents are induced to supply less labor. While θN is
unambiguously higher at the new steady-state EN1 , the positive wealth effect exerts two conflicting
effects on LN . In Figure 8(b), non traded employment falls in line with our numerical results.64
We now explore the long-run adjustment in the non traded wage which is depicted in Figure
9(b). As for the traded sector, the WSN -schedule is upward sloping while the V CN -schedule is




ΨN = PAN + r?xN −WN , the wage setting













)− κN (sN + r?)
fN
. (231b)
Before analyzing in more details the effects of a productivity shock on the non traded wage,
it is convenient to determine analytically the long-run response of WN . Totally differentiating the




. Totally differentiating the Nash bargaining non traded wage





















According to (232), the combined effects of higher labor productivity AN and the appreciation of the
relative price of non tradables pushes up the non traded wage in the long-run. Inserting the long-run
change in the equilibrium value of the relative price of non tradables, i.e., pˆ =
(1+Θ)(aˆT−aˆN)
(φ+Θ) − dυNX(φ+Θ)















+ aˆN (φ− 1)− dυNX
]
. (233)
Imposing the elasticity of substitution φ to be equal to one, labor productivity in the non traded
sector does no longer impinge on WN . In this case, the change in the non traded wage is only
driven by aˆT > 0 which appreciates the relative price of non traded goods and thereby stimulates
64In all scenarios, we numerically find that LN declines.
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labor demand in that sector. Further assuming that labor market parameters are similar across





. By producing a long-run improvement in the trade balance NX and thereby
stimulating the demand for tradables, a productivity shock exerts a negative impact on the relative
wage WN/WT . As depicted in Figure 9(b), due to the labor accumulation effect, a productivity
shock biased toward the traded sector induces smaller shifts in the V CN - and the WSN -schedule.
Note that, as for the traded labor market, the shift in the V CN -schedule dominates the shift in the
WSN -schedule because the worker bargaining power αNW is smaller than one.
I Solving Graphically for the Steady-State: Graphical Ap-
paratus
The steady-state can be described by considering alternatively the goods market or the labor market.
Due to the lack of empirical estimates at a sectoral level, and to avoid unnecessary complications,
we impose αjV = αV , α
j
W = αW from now on.
I.1 The Goods Market: Graphical Apparatus
To build intuition about steady-state changes, we investigate graphically the long-run effects of a
















































share of hiring cost in sector j = T,N in traded output. Remembering that Y T = ATLT and
Y N = ANLN , the system (234) can be solved for CT /CN , LT /LN , θT , θN , and P , as functions
of AT , AN ,
(
1 + υB − υTV − υNV
)









(see eq. (167j)), the system can be solved for B and λ¯ as
functions of AT and AN . Hence, when solving the system (234), we assume that the stock of foreign
bonds and the marginal utility of wealth are exogenous which allows us to separate intratemporal
reallocation effects triggered by the change in the share of tradables from the dynamic (or intertem-
poral) effects stemming from the accelerated hiring process that increases the demand for tradables
in the long-run.
When focusing on the goods market, the equilibrium can be characterized by two schedules in
the (yT −yN , p)-space where we denote the logarithm in lower case. The steady state is summarized
graphically in Figure 10(b).
Denoting by υNX ≡ NX/Y T the ratio of net exports to traded output, with υNX ≡ −
(
υB − υTV − υNV
)
,









Eq. (235) corresponds to eq. (26) in the text. Totally differentiating (235) and denoting
the percentage deviation from its initial steady-state by a hat yields the goods market equilibrium-
schedule (GME henceforth):
(
yˆT − yˆN) ∣∣∣GME = φpˆ− d ln (1− υNX) . (236)
According to (236), the GME-schedule is upward-sloping in the (yT − yN , p)-space with a slope
equal to 1/φ. Following a rise in traded output relative to non traded output, the relative price of






























































































GME0 (φ > 1)
(b) (yT − yN , p)-space
Figure 10: Steady-State
substitution φ is smaller. The 45◦ dotted line allows us to consider two cases. When φ > 1 (φ < 1),
the GME-schedule is flatter (steeper) than the 45◦ dotted line.
We now characterize the labor market equilibrium. Totally differentiating (214) gives the




Ξˆj . Totally differentiating (215) gives the deviation in percentage of sectoral





θˆj . Substituting the former into the




sj+r? at the steady-state, one obtains the labor market equilibrium (LME henceforth)
schedule: (












(1− αV ) (sj + r?) + αjWmj
] , (238)
in order to write formal solutions in a compact form. As depicted in Figure 10(b), the LME-schedule
is downward-sloping in the (yT − yN , p)-space with a slope equal to −1/ΘN (see eq. (237)). An
appreciation in the relative price of non tradables raises the surplus from hiring which induces non
traded firms to post more job vacancies. By raising the expected value of a job, the consecutive rise
in the labor market tightness induces agents to increase the search intensity for a job in the non
traded sector but less so as the elasticity of labor supply σL is lower. More precisely, lower values
of σL indicate that workers experience a larger switching cost from one sector to another; in this
configuration, the term Θj is smaller so that the LME-schedule is steeper. Conversely, when we
let σL tend toward infinity, the case of perfect mobility of labor across sectors is obtained; in this
configuration, the LME-schedule becomes a horizontal line.
I.2 The Labor Market: Graphical Apparatus
When focusing on the labor market, the model can be summarized graphically by two schedules in





)-space, as shown in Figure 10(a).
As will be useful later, we first solve for the relative price of non tradables by using the goods






















































Imposing σjL = σL into (234b), which implies that the marginal utility of wealth does not impinge



















κj θ˜j + Rj is the reservation wage. Eq. (242) corresponds to eq. (28) in
the text. Taking logarithm and differentiating eq. (239) yields:
lˆT − lˆN = [αV uT + σLχT ] θˆT − [αV uN + σLχN] θˆN , (243)





= αV uj θˆj and wˆ
j
R = χ






that the labor markets display initially similar features across sectors, i.e., uj ' u, χj ' χ, eq. (243)
reduces to: (
θˆT − θˆN






Inspection of (244) reveals that the DS-schedule:






• is steeper as the workers are more reluctant to shift hours worked across sectors (i.e., the
elasticity of labor supply σL is smaller), the unemployment benefit scheme is more generous
or the worker bargaining power αW is lower (because higher unemployment benefits R or a
lower worker bargaining power both reduce the share of the surplus associated with a labor
contract in the marginal benefit of search χ).




















ΞT + r?xT −WTR








. Eq. (245) corresponds to eq. (27) in the text. Totally dif-
ferentiating (245) by sing the fact that the change in overall surplus Ψj in percentage is given
by
Ψˆj =





) ∣∣∣V C = ΞT aˆT[
(1− αV ) Ψ˜T + χTWTR
] − ΞN (pˆ+ aˆN)[
(1− αV ) Ψ˜N + χNWNR
] . (247)
Eliminating the relative price by using (241), collecting terms, assuming that initially Ξj ' Ξ,
Ψj ' Ψ, W jR 'WR, χj ' χ, eq. (247) can be rewritten as follows:(
θˆT − θˆN
) ∣∣∣V C = − Ξ







(φ− 1) (aˆT − aˆN)− d ln (1− υNX)]
φ [(1− αV )Ψ + χWR] . (248)
Inspection of (248) reveals that the V C-schedule:





)-space with a slope equal to − Ξφ[(1−αV )Ψ+χWR] ;
• is steeper as the elasticity of substitution between traded and non traded goods φ is smaller
or the worker bargaining power is lower (because it reduces χWR);
• shifts to the right following higher productivity of tradables relative to non tradables (i.e.,(
aˆT − aˆN) > 0) as long as φ > 1 or when the country experiences a higher steady-state trade
balance surplus, i.e., if −d ln (1− υNX) ' dυNX > 0;
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J Long-Run Relative Price and Relative Wage Effects of
Higher Relative Productivity of Tradables
This section analyzes analytically the consequences on the relative wage and the relative price of
an increase in relative sectoral productivity AT /AN . It compares the steady-state of the model
before and after the productivity shock biased towards the traded sector. To shed some light on the
transmission mechanism, we analytically break down the relative wage and relative price effects in
two components: a labor market frictions effect and a labor accumulation effect.
Equating demand for tradables in terms of non tradables given by eq. (236) and supply (237)
yields (
yˆT − yˆN) = φpˆ− d ln (1− υNX) ,
= −ΘN pˆ+ (1 + ΘT ) aˆT − (1 + ΘN) aˆN .





aˆT − (1 + ΘN) aˆN
(φ+ΘN )
+
d ln (1− υNX)
(φ+ΘN )
. (249)
Eq. (249) corresponds to eq. (29) in the text. It is worthwhile noticing that pˆ given
by eq. (249) is determined by the system which comprises the goods market equilibrium (235),
the decision of search equation (242), and the vacancy creation equation (245). This implies that
P = P
(
AT , AN , υNX
)






To determine the long-run adjustment in the relative wage, Ω ≡ WN/WT , we first derive the
deviation in percentage of the sectoral wage. To do so, we totally differentiate the vacancy creation
equation for sector j given by eq. (214):
θˆj =
Ξj[
(1− αV )Ψj + χjW jR
] Ξˆj . (250)
We repeat the Nash bargaining wage given by eq. (22) for convenience by imposing αjW = αW :




+ (1− αW )W jR. (251)












αW (1− αV )Ψj + χjW jR
]
[
(1− αV )Ψj + χjW jR
] . (252)










αW (1− αV )Ψj + mjαWΨjsj+r?
]
[













[(1− αV ) (sj + r?) + αWmj ] Ξˆ
j . (253)













[(1− αV ) (sj + r?) + αWmj ] . (254)
Using the fact that ΞˆN = pˆ + aˆN and ΞˆT = aˆT , subtracting wˆT from wˆN by combining (253)
and (254) and inserting (249) leads to the deviation in percentage of the relative wage:



















Eq. (255) corresponds to eq. (33) in the text.
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K Analyzing Graphically the Long-Run Effects of Techno-
logical Change Biased toward the Traded Sector
This section analyzes graphically the consequences on the relative wage and the relative price of an
increase in relative sectoral productivity AT /AN , by breaking down the relative wage and relative
price effects in a labor market frictions effect and a labor accumulation effect.
K.1 Effects of Higher Productivity in Tradables Relative to Non Trad-
ables








d ln (1− υNX)
(φ+Θ)
, (256)
where d ln (1− υNX) ' −dυNX by using a first-order Taylor approximation.
Eq. (256) breaks down the relative price response into two components: a labor market frictions
effect and a labor accumulation effect. The first term on the RHS of eq. (256) corresponds to the
labor market frictions effect. When we let σL tend toward infinity, we have limσL→∞
(1+Θ)
(φ+Θ) = 1; in
this configuration, a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables by 1% appreciates
the relative price by 1% as well, in line with the prediction of the standard BS model. Graphically,
as shown in Figure 11(a), the LME-schedule is a horizontal line because the allocation of the labor
force across sectors is perfectly elastic to the ratio of sectoral reservation wages. A productivity
shock biased toward the traded sector shifts higher the LME-schedule which results in a relative
price appreciation, from p0 to pBS , i.e., by the same amount as the productivity differential. The
LME-schedule intercepts the 45◦ line at point BS′.
As long as σL <∞, workers experience a mobility cost when moving from one sector to another;
hence, the term Θ takes finite values while graphically, the LME-schedule is downward sloping in
the (yT −yN , p)-space. Graphically, higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables shifts
to the right the LME-schedule from LME0 to LME1: this shift corresponds to the labor market
frictions effect. If φ > 1, the GME-schedule is flatter than the 45◦ line so that the intersection
is at G′; since p′ < pBS , the relative price appreciates by less than the productivity differential
between tradables and non tradables, in line with our empirical findings. Conversely, if φ < 1, the
relative price must appreciate more than proportionately (i.e., by more than 1%) following higher
productivity of tradables relative to non tradables (by 1 percentage point). In this configuration, the
GME-schedule is steeper that the 45◦ line so that the LME1-schedule intercepts the GME-schedule
at a point which lies to the north west of BS′. Hence, through the labor market frictions channel, a
productivity differential between tradables and non tradables by 1% appreciates the relative price of
non tradables by less (more) than 1% if traded and non traded goods are substitutes (complements).
The second term on the RHS of eq. (256) reveals that a productivity differential between
tradables and non tradables also impinges on the relative price of non tradables by affecting net
exports and hiring expenditure expressed as a share of traded output, as summarized by dυNX .
The combined effect of the improvement in the trade balance and permanently increased hiring
expenditure has an expansionary effect on the demand for tradables which drives down the relative
price of non tradables, as captured by dυNX > 0. In terms of Figure 11(a), the labor accumulation
channel shifts the GME-schedule to the right, regardless of the value of the elasticity of substitution
between traded and non traded goods. It is worthwhile noticing that a change in υNX no longer
impinges on the relative price p and thus the labor accumulation channel vanishes when we let σL
tend toward infinity, i.e., if agents are not subject to switching costs from one sector to another.
Formally, we have limσL→∞
1
φ+Θ = 0. In this case, the GME1-schedule intercepts the LME1-
schedule at BS1. Unlike, when σL <∞, the intercept is at G1 if φ > 1.
We turn to the relative response. To facilitate the discussion, we assume that Θj ' Θ and










Through the labor market frictions channel, captured by the first term in brackets in the RHS of
eq. (257), higher productivity growth in tradables relative to non tradables lowers the relative wage
ω only if φ > 1. In terms of Figure 11(b), technological change biased toward the traded sector
shifts to the right the V C-schedule from V C0 to V C ′. Unlike, with an elasticity φ smaller than
one, the V C-schedule would shift to the left because the share of non tradables rises which has an
expansionary effect on recruitment in the non traded sector.
As captured by the second term on the RHS of eq. (257), a productivity differential between
































































































































(b) (lT − lN , ln (θT /θN))-space
Figure 11: Long-Run Relative Price and Relative Wage Effects of Technological Change
Biased toward the Traded Sector
nel. Graphically, as depicted in Figure 11(b), higher productivity in tradables relative to non
tradables shifts further to the right the V C-schedule from V C ′ to V C1. Hence, while ω unam-
biguously declines if the elasticity of substitution is larger than one, when φ < 1, the relative wage
response to a productivity differential is ambiguous. In the latter case, a productivity differential
between tradables and non tradables drives down ω through the labor accumulation channel while
it increases the relative wage through the labor market frictions channel.
K.2 Implications of Labor Market Institutions
In this subsection, we analyze graphically the implications of labor markets institutions for the
relative wage response to technological change biased toward the traded sector. In our framework,
the strictness of legal protection against dismissals is captured by a firing tax denoted by xj paid to
the State by the representative firm in the sector which reduces employment. The generosity of the
unemployment benefit scheme is captured by the level of Rj ; unemployment benefits are assumed
to be a fixed proportion % of the wage rate W j , i.e., Rj = %W j . Additionally, a higher worker
bargaining power measured empirically by the bargaining coverage is captured by the parameter
αW . Because the transmission mechanism varies according the type of labor market institution, we
differentiate between the firing cost on the one hand, the generosity of the unemployment benefit
scheme and the worker bargaining power on the other.
The implications of a higher firing tax is depicted in Figure 12(a) where we assume an elasticity
between traded and non traded goods in consumption φ larger than one. In this configuration,
as mentioned previously, technological change biased toward the traded sector shifts to the right
the V C-schedule. As highlighted in Figure 12(a), higher productivity in tradables relative to non
tradables shifts further to the right the V C-schedule from V C ′ to V C ′′, thus resulting in a larger
increase in θT /θN because hiring in the non traded sector which decumulates employment is limited
by the firing tax. Consequently, the relative wage ω declines more, in line with our empirical findings,
through a stronger labor market frictions effect. However, a higher firing tax also moderates the
decline in the relative wage since net exports increase less. Intuitively, as recruiting expenditure are
curbed by the firing tax, the productivity differential leads to a smaller current account deficit, thus
moderating the necessary trade balance improvement.
In contrast to a firing tax, raising the unemployment benefit replacement rate or the worker
bargaining power leads to a larger long-run rise in net exports and thus amplifies the decline in
the relative wage through the labor accumulation channel. The implication of a higher replacement
rate % or a larger worker bargaining power αW is depicted in Figure 12(b) where we consider an
elasticity of substitution φ larger than one. Figure 12(b) shows that technological change biased
toward the traded sector shifts further to the right the V C-schedule from V C1 to V C2 in countries
where the replacement rate % is higher or the worker bargaining power αW larger. As mentioned
above, the larger increase in net exports amplifies the expansionary effect on hiring in the traded
sector which pushes up further the ratio of labor market tightness θT /θN . Hence, the relative wage
of non tradables falls more through a stronger labor accumulation effect. Raising % or αW also
modifies the labor market frictions channel by increasing the mobility of labor across sectors.65













































































































































(b) Consequences of a higher replacement rate or
worker bargaining power
Figure 12: Implications for the Relative Wage Response of Labor Market Regulation in the
(lT − lN , ln (θT /θN))-space
Because we find numerically that raising % or αW merely modifies the relative wage response to
a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables through the labor market frictions
channel, we restrict our attention to the labor accumulation channel in Figure 11(b).
L Effects of Higher Relative Productivity of Tradables on
Unemployment Rate Differential
In this section, we investigate the effects of higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables
on the unemployment rate of tradables relative to non tradables. To alleviate the notation, we drop
the superscript x˜ to denote steady-state values since we focus on steady-state changes.
To write analytical expression in a compact form, it is useful to set:
Σj =
Ξj
(1− αV )Ψj + χjW jR
. (258)
which implies (see eq (172) for the traded sector and eq. (180) for the non traded sector):
θˆj = ΣjΞˆj . (259)






one obtains the standard negative relationship between uj and the labor market tightness in sector
j:




Using the fact that ΞˆT = aˆT and ΞˆN = pˆ+ aˆN , subtracting uˆN from uˆT by using (259) and (261),
one obtains:






































d ln (1− υNX)
(φ+ΘN )
, (262)
is relatively less costly due to a higher probability to fill a job vacancy) while workers are less reluctant
to move from one sector to another (since they receive a larger share χ of the surplus associated with a
labor contract in the marginal benefit of search). In economies with a more generous unemployment benefit
scheme, while workers are more reluctant to move from one sector to another (because χ falls), the vacancy
creation is more elastic to technological change. Since the latter effect predominates, the labor mobility
rises.
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where we have inserted the decomposition of the steady-state change of the relative price of non
tradables given by eq. (249) to determine the percentage change in the labor market tightness in
































d ln (1− υNX)
(φ+ΘN )
. (263)




1− uj), eq. (262) can be rewritten as follows:
uˆT − uˆN = −αV
{[(
1− uT )ΣT − (1− uN)ΣN ( 1 + ΘT
φ+ΘN
)]







1− uN)ΣN d ln (1− υNX)
(φ+ΘN )
. (264)
To facilitate the discussion of the effect of a productivity differential on the unemployment rate in
the traded relative to the non traded sector, we assume that at the initial steady-state, we have
Θj ' Θ, uj ' u, Σj ' Σ, and we multiply both sides of eq. (264) by u in order to express the
unemployment differential in percentage point so that eq. (264) reduces to:









Eq. (265) corresponds to equation (37) in the main text. Eq. (265) breaks down the
response of the unemployment differential to a productivity differential into two components: a
labor market frictions effect and a labor accumulation effect. The first term on the RHS of (265)
corresponds to the labor market frictions effect. Through this channel, higher productivity gains
in tradables relative to non tradables lower or increase the unemployment rate in the traded sec-
tor relative to the non traded sector depending on whether the elasticity of substitution between
tradables and non tradables φ is smaller or higher than one. If φ < 1, as our evidence suggest, a
productivity differential between tradables and non tradables appreciates the relative price of non
tradables more than proportionately. Because the share of non tradables increases, non traded firms
recruit more which result in a larger decline in uN relative to uT . The second term on the RHS
corresponds to the labor accumulation effect. Through this channel, the long-run increase in net
exports raises the demand for tradables and thus encourages firms to recruit more. When φ < 1,
the labor market frictions effect and the labor accumulation effect have conflicting effects on the
unemployment differential between tradables and non tradables. If the labor accumulation effect
predominates, a productivity differential lowers the unemployment rate in the traded sector by a
larger amount than that in the non traded sector. When φ > 1, higher productivity in tradables rel-
ative to non tradables unambiguously drives down the unemployment differential between tradables
and non tradables.
M The Role of Endogenous Sectoral Labor Force Participa-
tion Decision
In this section, we look at a special case of the model for which the sectoral labor force is inelastic,
i.e., σL = 0 (reflecting the situation of labor immobility across sectors), in order to highlight the
role of an endogenous sectoral labor force participation decision in driving the long-run effects of a
productivity differential between tradables and non tradables. Then, we analyze the implications of
σL →∞ (reflecting the situation of perfect mobility of labor across sectors).
M.1 Equilibrium Dynamics when σL = 0
To begin with, we determine the dynamic system. Denoting by W jR the reservation wage in sector
j, the first-order conditions for the traded and the non traded sector described by eqs. (83b)-(83c)









ξj . Using the












)σL − [sj +mj (θj)]Lj .
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)− [sj +mj (θj)]Lj . (266)





ξj = αW1−αW κ









ξj , the Nash bargaining wage can be rewritten as follows:
W j = αW
(
Ξj + r?xj





Ξj + r?xj + κjθj
)
+ (1− αW )Rj . (267)


















where the overall surplus from an additional job Ψj is:
Ψj ≡ Ξj + r?xj − αW
1− αW κ
jθj −Rj , (269)
with ΞT = AT and ΞN = PAN .
Traded Sector
Linearizing the accumulation equation for labor (266) and the dynamic equation for labor market





LT (t)− L˜T , θT (t)− θ˜T
)T
(270)
where JT is given by
JT ≡






]  , (271)





The trace denoted by Tr of the linearized 2× 2 matrix (270) is given by:
TrJT = r? +
m˜T
1− αV [αW − (1− αV )] . (272)
The determinant denoted by Det of the linearized 2×2 matrix (118) is unambiguously negative:





From now on, for clarity purpose, we impose the Hosios condition in order to avoid unnecessary
complications:
αW = (1− αV ) . (274)
Denoting by νT the eigenvalue, the characteristic equation for the matrix J (271) of the linearized
system writes as follows: (
νTi
)2 − r?νTi +DetJT = 0. (275)






















r? ± [r? + 2 (sT + m˜T )]} , (276)
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where we used the fact that DetJT = − (sT + m˜T ) (sT + r? + m˜T ).
We denote by νT1 < 0 and ν
T





< 0 < r? < νT2 =
(




Linearizing the accumulation equation for non traded labor (266) by setting j = N and the
dynamic equation for labor market tightness (268) in the non traded sector by inserting first the
solution for the relative price of non tradables (108), i.e., P = P
(
LN , λ¯, AN
)





LN (t)− L˜N , θN (t)− θ˜N
)T
(278)
where JN is given by
JN ≡










]  , (279)





TrJN = r? +
m˜N
1− αV [αW − (1− αV )] . (280)
The determinant denoted by Det of the linearized 2× 2 matrix (279) is unambiguously negative:


















Assuming that the Hosios condition (274) holds, the determinant (281) can be rewritten as follows:














(sN + m˜N )
 ,








(1− αV ) Ψ˜N
]
< 0, (282)























































We denote by νN1 < 0 and ν
N
2 > 0 the stable and unstable eigenvalues respectively which satisfy:
νN1 < 0 < r
? < νN2 . (284)
M.2 Formal Solutions for LT (t) and θT (t)
The stable paths for the labor market in the traded sector are given by :
LT (t)− L˜T = DT1 eν
T
1 t, (285a)
θT (t)− θ˜T = ωT21DT1 eν
T
1 t, (285b)
where DT1 = L
T
0 − L˜T , and element ωT21 of the eigenvector (associated with the stable eigenvalue
νT1 ) is given by:
ωT21 =
(





) = 0. (286)




(see eq. (277)). From (285a), the dynamics for
labor market tightness θT degenerate.
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M.3 Formal Solutions for LN(t) and θN(t)
The stable paths for the labor market in the non traded sector are given by :
LN (t)− L˜N = DN1 eν
N
1 t, (287a)
θN (t)− θ˜N = ωN21DN1 eν
N
1 t, (287b)
where DN1 = L
N
0 − L˜N , and element ωN21 of the eigenvector (associated with the stable eigenvalue
νN1 ) is given by:
ωN21 =
(













sN + r? + m˜N − νN1
) < 0. (288)
M.4 Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Bonds B(t)
Substituting first the short-run static solutions for consumption in tradables given by (110), and
using the fact that V j = U jθj , the accumulation equation for traded bonds (112) can be written as
follows:
B˙(t) = r?B(t)+ATLT (t)−CT (LN (t), λ¯, AN)−κT θT (t) (1− LT (t))−κNθN (t) (1− LN (t)) , (289)
where we used the fact that U j = 1− Lj when σL = 0.
Linearizing (289) in the neighborhood of the steady-state and inserting stable solutions given















ΛT = AT + κT θ˜T > 0, (291a)
ΛN = −CTLN − κN U˜NωN21 − κN θ˜NωN31,













θN/mN = αV to get (291b); note that
CTLN ' 0 as long as φ ' σC in line with evidence for a typical OECD economy. The sign of (291b)
follows from the fact that ωN21 < 0 (see (288)).
Solving the differential equation (290) yields:























Invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency, and using the fact that DT1 =
LT0 − L˜T and DN1 = LN0 − L˜N , we obtain the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal budget
constraint:















AT + κT θ˜T
)
(sT + m˜T + r?)









, BLT = Φ
T < 0, BLN = Φ
N < 0. (295)
For the national intertemporal solvency to hold, the terms in brackets of equation (292) must be
zero so that the stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to:










M.5 Solving Graphically for the Steady-State
We investigate graphically the long-run effects of a rise in the the ratio of sectoral productivity.
Assuming αjW = αW and setting σL = 0, the steady-state (234) reduces to the following system






























) = (1− αNW ) Ψ˜N
(sN + r?)
, (297d)






where −υNX = υB − υTV − υNV .
Goods Market
Because we restrict ourselves to the analysis of the long-run effects, the tilde is suppressed for
the purposes of clarity. To characterize the steady-state, we focus on the goods market which can be
summarized graphically by two schedules in the (yT − yN , p)-space, where we denote the logarithm
of variables with lower-case letters.
The goods market equilibrium (GME)-schedule that we repeat for convenience is identical to
(236): (
yˆT − yˆN) ∣∣∣GME = φpˆ− d ln (1− υNX) . (298)
The GME-schedule is upward-sloping in the (yT −yN , p)-space and the slope of the GME-schedule
is equal to 1/φ.
The labor market equilibrium (LME)-schedule that we repeat for convenience is identical to
(244),
yˆT − yˆN
∣∣∣∣LME = −ΘN pˆ+ (1 + ΘT ) aˆT − (1 + ΘN) aˆN , (299)




(1− αV )ΨT + χ˜TWTR




(1− αV )ΨN + χNWNR
] > 0. (300b)
The LME-schedule is downward-sloping in the (yT−yN , p)-space and the slope of the LME-schedule
is equal to − 1
ΘN
. When σL = 0, Θj is smaller so that the LME-schedule is steeper.
Labor Market











Taking logarithm and differentiating eq. (301) yields:
lˆT − lˆN = αV uT θˆT − αV uN θˆN . (302)

















)-space. Comparing (303) with (244), it
is straightforward to show that the DS-schedule becomes steeper when σL = 0. The V C-schedule
is downward-sloping and identical to (248).
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M.6 Effects of Higher Relative Productivity of Tradables when σL = 0
Equating demand for tradables in terms of non tradables given by eq. (298) and supply (299) yields
the deviation in percentage of the relative price from its initial steady-state (249). When assuming











Θ′ ≡ ΞαV u
[(1− αV )Ψ + χ˜WR] < Θ ≡
Ξ [αV u+ σLχ]
[(1− αV )Ψ + χ˜WR] , (305)
with Θ given by (238). Assuming σL = 0 lowers the elasticity Θ of sectoral employment w.r.t.
marginal revenue of labor. Intuitively, increased productivity induce firms to post more job vacancies
which raises the labor market tightness and thus the probability of finding a job. When σL > 0,
higher θj increases Lj through two channels: i) by triggering an outflow from unemployment, and
ii) by inducing agents to increase the search intensity for a job. Because the latter effect vanishes if
σL = 0, employment becomes less responsive to productivity gains, as captured by a lower Θ, i.e.,
Θ′ < Θ (see inequality (305)). Since Θ′ < Θ, comparing eq. (304) with eq. (31) shows that when
setting σL = 0, the labor market frictions effect captured by the first term on the RHS of eq. (304)
is moderated or amplified depending on whether φ is larger or smaller than one. In the former case,
traded output increases less so that the relative price of non tradables must appreciate by a smaller
amount to clear the goods market. If φ < 1, a productivity differential between tradables and non
tradables raises the share of non tradables and thus has an expansionary effect on labor demand
in the non traded sector. When σL = 0, as detailed below, firms must increase wages by a larger
amount. To compensate for the higher unit labor cost, non traded firms set higher prices so that p
increases more. Irrespective of whether φ is larger or smaller than one, a productivity differential
between tradables and non tradables exerts a larger negative impact on p when σL = 0 through the
labor accumulation effect. The reason is that following higher net exports, because the reallocation
of labor across sectors is absent, traded output increases less which in turn triggers a greater excess
of demand for tradables, thus leading to a larger depreciation in the relative price of non tradables
(i.e., a larger decline in p).
Equating labor supply (303) with labor demand (248) while assuming Θj ' Θ and Ωj ' Ω leads
to the deviation in percentage of the relative wage from its initial steady-state:
ωˆ = − Ω
φ+Θ′
[
(φ− 1) (aˆT − aˆN)+ dυNX] . (306)
Eq. (306) shows that assuming a fixed labor force by setting σL = 0 amplifies both the labor
market frictions effect (captured by the first term on the RHS of eq. (306)) and the labor market
accumulation effect (captured by the second term on the RHS of eq. (306)). Intuitively, higher
productivity shifts the V C-schedule along a steeper DS-schedule, thus resulting in larger changes
in the ratio θT /θN and in the relative wage ω. As discussed in section 5.2, across all scenarios,
even if the labor market frictions effect raises the relative wage (when setting φ < 1), the labor
market accumulation effect predominates. Setting σL = 0 amplifies the negative impact of the
labor accumulation effect on the relative wage by such an amount that the model cannot account
quantitatively for the size of decline in the relative wage (i.e., tends to overstate the decline in ω)
found in the data.
M.7 Effects of Higher Relative Productivity of Tradables when σL →∞
In this subsection, we investigate the relative price and relative wage effects of higher productivity
of tradables relative to non tradables when we let σL tend toward infinity. In this configuration, the
case of perfect mobility of labor emerges.
As mentioned in section I, the steady-state can be characterized graphically by considering
alternatively the goods market or the labor market. When we let σL tend toward infinity, eq. (238)
implies that Θ, which captures the elasticity of sectoral employment w.r.t. the marginal revenue of
labor, tends toward infinity. Inspection of (236) and (237) indicates that when σL →∞, the slope
of the GME-schedule (equal to 1/φ) is unaffected while the LME-schedule (whose slope is equal



















] aˆT − aˆN . (307)
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According to our quantitative analysis, while labor market parameters are allowed to vary across
sectors, the term in front of aˆT is close to one for the baseline calibration . As a result, a 1 percentage
point increase in the productivity differential between tradables and non tradables appreciates the
relative price of non tradables by 1% approximately. Assuming that Θj ' Θ and applying l’Hoˆpital’s
rule, the rate of change of the relative price described by eq. (31) reduces to:
lim
σL→∞
pˆ = aˆT − aˆN . (308)
Consequently, a model with labor market frictions reaches the same conclusion as the standard
neoclassical model with a competitive labor market as long as the elasticity of labor supply at the
extensive margin tends toward infinity.
Inspection of (244) and (248) indicates that when σL → ∞, the DS-schedule (whose slope
is equal to 1[αV u+σLχ] ) becomes a horizontal line while the V C-schedule (whose slope is equal to

























] − ΩT} aˆT . (309)
Assuming that Θj ' Θ and applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule, the rate of change of the relative wage described





ΩN − ΩT ) aˆT , (310)
where Ωj captures the elasticity of the sectoral wage w.r.t the marginal revenue of labor; according
to (310), the effect of higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables on the relative wage
is proportional to ΩN − ΩT . More precisely, when we let σL →∞, while the ratio of labor market
tightness remains unaffected if Θj ' Θ, technological change biased toward the traded sector may
influence the relative wage as long as the elasticity of sectoral wage w.r.t. the marginal revenue of
labor Ωj varies across sectors. For our benchmark parametrization, we have Ωj ' Ω so that the
relative wage is (almost) unaffected by a productivity differential.










= ΣN aˆT , (311)




duT − duN) = −αV [uT (1− uT )ΣT − uN (1− uN)ΣN ] aˆT . (312)
In conclusion, a model with labor market frictions reaches the same conclusions as the standard
neoclassical model with a competitive labor market as long as the elasticity of labor supply at the
extensive margin tends toward infinity.
N Calibration Procedure
In this section, we provide more details about the calibration to a representative OECD economy and
to data from 18 OECD countries. Section A.2 and section A.3 present the source and construction
of data.
N.1 Initial Steady-State
Assuming that the elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin (σjL), the elasticity of vacancies
in job matches (αjV ), and the worker bargaining power (α
j
W ) are symmetric across sectors, i.e.,
σjL = σL, α
j
V = αV and α
j
W = αW , and normalizing to 1 the parameters ζ
T and AN that correspond
to the disutility from working and searching for a job in the traded sector and the productivity of
labor in the non traded sector, respectively, the calibration reduces to 20 parameters: r?, β, σC , σL,
φ, ϕ, ζN , ωG (= GY ) ωGN (=
PGN
G ), A
T , sT , sN , 1− αV , αW , κT , κN , XT , XN , xN , %, and initial




Since we focus on the long-run equilibrium, the tilde is suppressed for the purposes of clarity.



















































, ΨN ≡ PAN + r?xN −WNR , (313i)
V T = θTUT , (313j)
V N = θNUN , (313k)
ANLN = CN +GN , (313l)
r?B +ATLT = CT +GT + κT θTUT + κNθNUN , (313m)
and the intertemporal solvency condition









where the system jointly determines C, UT , UN , mT , mN , LT , LN , θT , θN , V T , V N , P , B, λ¯.
Some of the values of parameters can be taken directly from data, but others need to be endoge-
nously calibrated to fit a set of an average OECD economy features. Among the 20 parameters, 6
parameters, i.e., κT , κN , XT , XN , ζN , ϕ, together with initial conditions (B0, LT0 , L
N
0 ) must be
set in order to match key properties of a typical OECD economy. More precisely, the parameters
κT , κN , XT , XN , ζN , ϕ, together with the set of initial conditions are set to target θT , θN , mT ,
mN , LN/L, αC , υNX . Denoting by υGN the ratio of government spending in non tradables, GN , to




































































ϕ+ (1− ϕ)P 1−φ . (316)
The net foreign asset position B implicitly determines υNX = NXY T with NX = Y
T −CT −GT and
−υNX = υB − υV T − υV N with υB ≡ r
?B
Y T
, υV T = κ
TV T
Y T
and υV N = κ
NV N
Y T
. To see it, multiply both
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where we used the fact that V j = θjU j and U j = s
jLj
mj at the steady-state; according to (318) the
ratios υV T = κ
TV T
Y T
and υV N = κ
NV N
Y T
are pinned down by θT , θN , mT , mN , LN/LT which are
endogenously determined by system (314). Eqs (317) and (318) determine the ratio of net exports
to traded output (i.e., υNX):
υB − υV T − υV N ≡ −υNX . (319)
In order to finish the proof that system (314) can be solved for θT , θN , mT , mN , LT /LN , P , B,
we have to determine analytical expressions ofWTR , W
N
R , Ψ
T , ΨN . The reservation wage in sector j,
W jR, is defined as the sum of the expected value of a job m
jξj = αW1−αW κ
jθj and the unemployment
benefit Rj = %W j . The Nash bargaining wage in sector j, W j , can be rewritten as follows:














Ξj + r?xj + κjθj
)
1− (1− αW ) % . (320)











Ξj + r?xj + κjθj
)
1− (1− αW ) % . (321)
Since ΞT = AT and ΞN = PAN , the reservation wage in the traded sector, WTR , is a function of
θT , while the reservation wage in the non traded sector, WNR , is a function of θ
N and P . Since
Ψj = Ξj −W jR, the overall surplus from an additional job in the traded sector, ΨT , is a function of
θT , while the overall surplus from an additional job in the non traded sector, ΨN , is a function of
θN and P .
To begin with, labor market parameters of the traded sector, i.e., the matching efficiency XT
and the recruiting cost κT , can be set to target the monthly job finding rate mT and the labor
market tightness θT . To show it more formally, we first compute the share of the overall surplus
from an additional worker obtained by the firm, (1− αW )ΨT , which is equal to the excess of labor
productivity over the Nash bargaining wage, AT −WT ; inserting (320), one obtains:
(1− αW )ΨT = AT −
αW
(
AT + κT θT
)
1− (1− αW ) % ,
=
(1− αW ) (1− %)AT − αWκT θT
1− (1− αW ) % . (322)
Plugging (322) into (314a) and using the fact that fT = m
T
θT
allows us to rewrite the vacancy-creation







(1− αW ) (1− %)AT − αWκT θT
1− (1− αW ) % . (323)
Equations (314c) and (323) form a separate subsystem which jointly determine θT and mT ; parame-
ters κT and XT are set in order to target θT and mT shown in Table 6. It is worthwhile mentioning
that while theoretically κT and XT jointly determine θT and mT , we find numerically that θT is
mostly affected by κT while mT is mostly determined by XT .
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The remaining equations (314b), (314d)-(314g) form a separate subsystem which jointly deter-




































υNX = − (υB − υV T − υV N ) , (324e)
where υB , υV T , υV N are given by eqs. (317), (319), (320), respectively; to rewrite (314b) as (324a),
we used the fact that (1− αW )ΨN = (1−αW )(1−%)(PA
N+r?xN)−αWκNθN
1−(1−αW )% . Remembering that P
determines αC and LT/LN determines LN/L, parameters κN , XN , ϕ, ζN and initial conditions
(B0, LT0 , L
N
0 ) are set in order to target θ
N and mN (see columns 11 and 7 in Table 6), αC and LN/L
(see columns 2 and 1 in Table 5), υNX ' 0 as we assume that at the initial steady-state, the balance
of trade is nil. While theoretically the four parameters and initial conditions are endogenously
determined to target θN , mN , αC , LN/L and υX , we find numerically that θN is mostly affected
by κN , mT by XN , αC by ϕ, LN/L by ζN , and υNX by initial conditions.
N.2 Calibration to a Representative OECD Economy
In order to assess the ability of our model to account for the evidence, we proceed in two stages.
Since we find analytically that a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables exerts
two opposite effects on the relative wage if the elasticity of substitution in consumption between
tradables and non tradables is smaller than one, we have to investigate whether the model can
generate a decline in the relative wage that is similar to that in the data for the whole sample. To
do so, we first calibrate our model to a representative OECD economy. The quantitative exploration
of a productivity shock biased toward the traded sector allows us to investigate whether our model
can produce:
• a fall in the relative wage regardless of the value of the elasticity of substitution which displays
a large dispersion across countries;
• a larger decline in the relative wage in countries where labor markets are mode regulated.
This section provides more details about how we calibrate the model to match the key empirical
properties of a representative OECD economy. Our reference period for the calibration of the non
tradable share given in Table 5 is running from 1990 to 2007 while labor market parameters have
been computed over various periods. Due to the availability of data, we were able to estimate sectoral
unemployment rates for 10 European countries and 5 OECD economies as ILO does not provide
series for sectoral employment and unemployment for France, the Netherlands, and Norway at a
sectoral level. Regarding Korea, while ILO provides data necessary for the computation of sectoral
unemployment rates, the OECD does not provide unemployment by duration for this country which
prevents the computation of job finding and job destruction rates. Data for the labor markets are
described in Table 6.66
We first describe the parameters that are taken directly from the data; we start with the pref-
erence parameters shown in panel A of Table 23:
• One period in the model is a month.
• The world interest rate, r?, equal to the subjective time discount rate, β, is set to 0.4%.
• We assume that utility for consumption is logarithmic and thus set the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution for consumption, σC , to 1.
• We set the elasticity of substitution (in consumption) between traded and non traded goods
to 1 in the baseline calibration.67
66For sectoral unemployment rates, and monthly job finding and job destruction rates, we take the EU-10
unweighed average due to data availability.
67Excluding estimates of φ for Italy which are negative (see Table 9), column 1 of Table 8 reports con-
sistent estimates for the elasticity of substitution φ between traded and non traded goods which average
to 0.9. The advantage of setting φ to 1 in the baseline scenario is twofold. First, the share of non traded
goods in consumption expenditure αC coincides with the weight of the non traded good in the overall con-
sumption bundle 1− ϕ if φ = 1. Second, setting φ = 1 implies that only the labor accumulation channel is
(mostly) in effect as the labor market frictions channel almost totally vanish which allows us to highlight
the intertemporal effect trigged by the hiring boom.
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• Next, we turn to the elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin which is assumed to
be symmetric across sectors. We choose σL to be 0.6 in our baseline setting but conduct a
sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter.68
We pursue with the non-tradable content of consumption expenditure, employment, government
spending displayed in panel B:
• The weight of consumption in non tradables 1 − ϕ is set to 0.42 to target a non-tradable
content in total consumption expenditure (i.e. αC) of 42%, in line with the average of our
estimates shown in the last line of Table 5.
• In order to target a non tradable content of labor of 66% which corresponds to the 18 OECD
countries’ unweighted average shown in the last line of Table 5, we set ζN to 0.18 (see eq.
(11)) while ζT has been normalized to 1.
• Government spending as a percentage of GDP is set to 20% and we set the non tradable
content of government expenditure, i.e., ωGN = PG
N
G , to 90%.
69
• We assume that traded firms are 28 percent more productive than non traded firms in line
with our estimates; we thus normalize AN to 1 and set AT to 1.28;
We describe below the choice of parameters characterizing the labor markets of a typical OECD
economy in panel C:
• In line with our estimates shown in the last line of Table 6, we set the rates of separation in
the traded (i.e., sT ) and the non traded (i.e., sN ) sector to 1.48% and 1.54% respectively. To
capture the U.S. (EU-12) sectoral labor markets, we set sT and sN to 2.24% (sT = 1.18%)
and 2.46% (sN = 1.25%), respectively.
• We set 1−αV to 0.6 in line with the estimates documented by Barnichon [2012] who reports
an elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployed workers of about 0.6.
• As it is common in the literature, we impose the Hosios [1990] condition, and set the worker
bargaining power αW to 0.6 in the baseline scenario.
• To target the labor market tightness for a representative OECD economy in the traded sector,
θT = 0.24, and in the non traded sector, θN = 0.34, we set the recruiting cost to κT = 1.482
and κN = 0.575 in the traded and the non traded sector respectively. To target the sectoral
labor market tightness for the US (EU-12), i.e., θT = 0.43 (θT = 0.21) and θN = 0.65
(θN = 0.30), respectively, we choose κT = 1.333 (κT = 1.535) and κN = 0.476 (κN = 0.597).
• When calibrating to a representative OECD economy, we set the matching efficiency in the
traded (non traded) sector XT (XN ) to 0.307 (0.262) to target a monthly job finding rate
mT (mN ) of 17.4% (17.0%). A job destruction rate in the traded (non traded) sector sT
(sN ) of 1.48% (1.54%) together with a monthly job finding rate of 17.4% (17.0%) leads to an
unemployment rate uT (uN ) of 7.9% (8.3%) in the traded (non traded) sector. To target a
monthly job finding rate mT for the US (EU-12) in the traded sector and in the non traded
sector mN of 44.4% (12.4%) and 44.0% (12.2%), respectively, in line with the data shown in
Table 6, we set the matching efficiency parameters XT and XN to 0.620 (0.231) and 0.521
(0.197), respectively. The job destruction rates sT and sN are set to 2.2% (1.2%) and 2.4%
(1.2%) which leads to an unemployment rate in the traded sector uT and in the non traded
sector uN of 4.8% (8.7%) and 5.3% (9.3%), respectively.
Finally, we present the parameters that capture the labor market institutions shown in panel D:
• Since the advance notice and the severance payment are both expressed in monthly salary
equivalents, we have xj = τW j with τ ≥ 0. Values of τ are shown in the last column of Table
6. For the baseline calibration, we set the firing tax τ to 4.2. When calibrating to the US
(EU-12) economy, we set τ = 0 (τ = 4.3) in line with estimates shown in the last column of
Table 6. When conducting the sensitivity analysis, we set τ to 13 which corresponds to the
highest value for the firing cost.
68Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Fiorito and Zanella [2012] find that aggregate
time-series results deliver an extensive margin elasticity in the range 0.8-1.4, which is substantially larger
than the corresponding estimate (0.2-0.3) reported by Chetty, Friedman, Manoli, and Weber [2011]. Using
Japanese data, Kuroda and Yamamoto [2008] report a Frisch elasticity on the extensive margin which falls
in the range of 0.6 to 0.8 for both sexes. By calibrating a model with endogenous participation decision,
Haefke and Reiter [2011] find labor supply elasticities for the baseline case of 0.4 and 0.65 for men and
women, respectively.
69The market clearing condition for the traded good and the non traded good at the steady-state are
r?B + Y T = CT +GT + κTV T + κNV N and Y N = CN +GN , respectively.
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• Assuming that unemployment benefits are a fixed proportion of the wage rate, i.e., Rj = %W j ,
with % the replacement rate, we choose a value for % of 52.4%, in line with our estimates shown
in Table 6. When calibrating to the US (EU-12) economy, we set % = 26.1% (% = 55.9%) in
line with estimates shown in column 14 of Table 6. When conducting the sensitivity analysis,
we set % to 78.2% which corresponds to the highest value for the unemployment benefit
replacement rate.
Finally, we choose values for B0, LT0 , L
N
0 for the ratio of net exports to traded output to be nil at
the initial steady-state, i.e., υNX ' 0.
N.3 Calibration to Each OECD Economy
In a second stage, we move a step further and compare the predicted values with estimates for
each country and the whole sample as well. The initial steady-state of each OECD economy is
described by the system (314) that comprises seven equations. To calibrate our model to each
OECD economy in our sample, we use the same baseline calibration for each country, except for
the elasticity of substitution φ between traded and non-traded goods, and labor market parameters
which are allowed to vary across economies. More specifically, the elasticity of substitution φ between
traded and non traded goods is set in accordance with its estimates shown in the first column of
Table 8.70 The parameters which capture the degree of labor market regulation such as the firing
cost x, and the replacement rate % are set to their values shown in the last two columns of Table 6.
The matching efficiency Xj in sector j is set to target the job finding ratemj summarized in columns
5 and 7 of Table 6. The job destruction rate sj is set in accordance to its value reported in columns
6 and 8 of Table 6. Ideally, the recruiting cost κj would be set in order to target θj ; however, the
series for job vacancies by economic activity are available for a maximum of seven years and for a
limited number of countries. On the contrary, the OECD provides data for job openings (for the
whole economy) over the period 1980-2007 allowing us to calculate the labor market tightness, i.e.,
θ = V/U , for several countries that we target along with the ratio θT /θN by choosing κT and κN .
Thus, when calibrating the model to each OECD economy, the costs per job vacancy κT and κN
are chosen to target the aggregate labor market tightness θ shown in column 13 and the ratio of
sectoral labor market tightness θT /θN obtained by dividing column 10 by column 11.
When data for sectoral labor market tightness are not available, we target the average value
θT /θN for EU-12 if the country is a member of the European Union, the average value for the US
for English-speaking countries (excluding European economies), and average value for the OECD
otherwise. When data for job openings are not available at an aggregate level, we first calibrate the
model to EU-12 (US, OECD), in particular choosing κT and κN to target an aggregate labor market
tightness θ of 0.12 (0.59, 0.18) and a ratio θT /θN of 0.75 (0.66, 0.77); then, we set κT and κN chosen
for EU-12 if the country is a member of the European Union, chosen for the US for Canada, and
chosen for the OECD otherwise. Finally, because labor market parameters cannot be calculated
at a sectoral level for France, the Netherlands and Norway, we assume that the job destruction
rate s and the matching efficiency X are identical across sectors and are chosen in accordance with
estimates shown in column 6 (or alternatively in column 8) of Table 6 for the former and to target
mj shown in column 5 (or alternatively in column 7) of Table 6 for the latter.
N.4 Correction of the bias to map theoretical results into elasticities
estimated empirically
In this section, we compute the bias originating from search frictions varying across sectors which
must be accounted for in order to map theoretical results for relative price and relative responses
to a productivity differential into elasticities estimated empirically.





aˆT − (1 + ΘN) aˆN
(φ+ΘN )
+












d ln (1− υNX)
(φ+ΘN )
. (325)
Because empirically we consider a productivity differential aˆT − aˆN , to make our estimates compara-
ble with our numerical results, we have to adjust the long-run change in the relative price computed












70We also choose the weight of consumption in non tradables 1 − ϕ to target a non-tradable content in

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Subtracting (326) from (325) leads to:






aˆT − aˆN)+ d ln (1− υNX)
(φ+ΘN )
, (328)
where we denote by pˆ′ the value of pˆ which has been adjusted with the bias originating from the
presence of search frictions which vary across sectors and thus make the elasticity Θj of sectoral
employment Lj w.r.t. the marginal revenue of labor, Ξj , slightly different between sectors. Once
the value of pˆ has been adjusted with, we can map the deviation in percentage of the relative price
of non tradables from its initial steady-state derived analytically into the elasticity of the relative
price, γ, estimated empirically:
γ =
pˆ′









d ln (1− υNX)
aˆT − aˆN . (329)
Eq. (329) corresponds to eq. (38a) in the main text. The first term on the RHS of eq.
(329) corresponds to the effect of a productivity differential aˆT − aˆN of 1% on the relative price
keeping net exports fixed while the second term captures the impact of the long-run adjustment in
net exports caused by rise in productivity of tradables relative to non tradables of 1%.
The same logic applies to the relative wage. The long-run reaction of the relative wage described












































d ln (1− υNX)
φ+ΘN
. (330)
We have to adjust the long-run change in the relative wage computed numerically with the
following term:



















 aˆN . (331)
Subtracting (331) from (330) leads to:








aˆT − aˆN)+ΩN d ln (1− υNX)
φ+ΘN
, (333)
where we denote by ωˆ′ the value of ωˆ which has been adjusted with the bias originating from the
presence of search frictions which vary across sectors and thus make Θj along with Ωj slightly
different between sectors. Once the value of ωˆ has been adjusted with, we can map the deviation in
percentage of the relative wage from its initial steady-state derived analytically into the elasticity
of the relative wage, β, estimated empirically:
β =
ωˆ′











d ln (1− υNX)
aˆT − aˆN . (334)
Eq. (334) corresponds to eq. (38b) in the main text. The first term on the RHS of eq.
(334) corresponds to the effect of a productivity differential aˆT − aˆN of 1% on the relative wage
keeping net exports fixed while the second term captures the impact of the long-run adjustment
in net exports caused by rise in productivity of tradables relative to non tradables of 1%. It is
worthwhile mentioning that the rise in net exports exerts a negative impact on both pˆ′ and ωˆ′ and
thus the term d ln(1−υNX)
aˆT−aˆN which shows up in eqs. (329) and (334) is negative.
Table 24 gives a sense of the correction term in columns 3 and 6 and compares ωˆ with ωˆ′, and
pˆ with pˆ′.
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Table 24: Comparison of Computed Numerically Responses Before and After Bias Correc-
tion
Country Relative wage response Relative price response
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ωˆ ωˆ′ bias ωˆ pˆ pˆ′ bias pˆ
AUS 0.179 0.172 0.007 1.179 1.166 0.013
AUT -0.337 -0.318 -0.019 0.691 0.684 0.007
BEL -0.294 -0.281 -0.013 0.724 0.715 0.009
CAN 0.009 0.015 -0.006 1.017 1.011 0.006
DEU -0.423 -0.420 -0.003 0.572 0.562 0.010
DNK -0.527 -0.515 -0.012 0.473 0.468 0.005
ESP -0.286 -0.261 -0.025 0.760 0.750 0.010
FIN -0.384 -0.355 -0.029 0.628 0.638 -0.010
FRA -0.355 -0.346 -0.009 0.650 0.645 0.005
GBR -0.049 -0.050 0.001 0.956 0.944 0.012
IRL -0.171 -0.148 -0.023 0.831 0.844 -0.013
ITA -0.272 -0.266 -0.006 0.729 0.729 0.000
JPN -0.152 -0.145 -0.007 0.860 0.853 0.007
KOR -0.685 -0.640 -0.045 0.379 0.373 0.006
NLD -0.286 -0.280 -0.006 0.711 0.706 0.005
NOR -0.292 -0.286 -0.006 0.705 0.703 0.002
SWE 0.134 0.144 -0.010 1.161 1.152 0.009
USA -0.037 -0.035 -0.002 0.972 0.974 -0.002
EU-12 -0.160 -0.149 -0.011 0.855 0.849 0.006
Whole sample -0.229 -0.218 -0.011 0.783 0.778 0.005
Notes: pˆ and ωˆ correspond to deviations in percentage of the relative price and the relative
wage from their initial steady-state which are computed numerically following a productivity
differential of 1%; we denote by pˆ′ and ωˆ′ the steady-state changes in the relative price and
relative wage computed numerically once their values have been adjusted with the bias origi-
nating from the presence of search frictions which vary across sectors. Columns 3 and 6 show
that magnitude of bias for the relative wage and the relative price which must be subtracted
from pˆ and ωˆ in order to make elasticities computed numerically directly comparable with β
and γ which are estimated empirically.
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The numerical computation of the unemployment rate differential is subject to the same bias
the relative price and the relative wage. The long-run reaction of the unemployment differential
between tradables and non tradables described by (264) can be rewritten as follows:




1− uT )ΣT − uN (1− uN)ΣN ( 1 + ΘT
φ+ΘN
)]















































Subtracting (337) from (335) leads to:(
duT − duN)′ = (duT − duN)− bias (duT − duN), (338)
= −αV∆T
(
aˆT − aˆN)+ αV uN (1− uN)ΣN d ln (1− υNX)(φ+ΘN ) , (339)
where we denote by
(
duT − duN)′ the value of duT − duN which has been adjusted with the bias
originating from the presence of search frictions which vary across sectors and thus make Θj along
with Σj slightly different between sectors. Once the value of duT − duN has been adjusted with,





aˆT − aˆN ,




d ln (1− υNX)
aˆT − aˆN . (340)
Eq. (340) corresponds to eq. (39) in the main text. Eq. (340) is used to compute numerically
the response of the unemployment rate differential to higher relative productivity of tradables by
1%, as reported in column 8 of Table 8. Column 9 of Table 8 shows results when we let σL tend
toward infinity. When we abstract from labor mobility costs, the unemployment rate differential
reduces to eq. (312). In this case, changes in uT relative to uN are only driven by differences in
search frictions between sectors.
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